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ABSTRACT 
 
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC), is a planned park in Madhya 
Pradesh (central India) that is being designed as a compensatory conservation plan to 
overcome the loss of wildlife and forest by the construction and submergence from 
nearby Indira-Sagar and Omkareshwar dams, part of the infamous multi-purpose 
Narmada dam project. All the village communities in the ONPC largely depend on the 
forest resources for their daily sustenance, particularly fuel-wood and non-timber forest 
products such as tendupatta, mahua, kullu and dhavda gums. The local people typically 
engage as gatherers of non-timber forest resources, farmers or work as labors on other 
agricultural farms. Enclosing, this forest commons, threatens the livelihood opportunities 
of adivasis. Hence, this dissertation questions how compensatory conservation 
transforms the forest governance and the economic activities of the local communities. I 
examine how rules-in-use control spatial actions alter economic, political and social 
relationships within proposed ONPC in central India. I gathered the economic, social 
and political data through interviews, case-studies and surveys. Farmers benefit from the 
creation of the ONPC as a biodiversity offset, while other villagers engaged in off-farm 
and NTFP extraction labor, are more economically vulnerable. Adivasi depend mostly on 
the forest resource extraction for their income generation. Therefore, with increasing 
restrictions placed on the resource access and control, resource users are forced to travel 
outside their villages in search of wage labor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
CONTEXT AND STATEMENT OF PROBLEM  
Creation of the development projects and subsequent conservation enclosures is a 
customary practice around the world (Seagle 2009, Morris et al 2006, Robertson 2004). 
Such projects have costs and benefits attached to them. While they advance economic 
development in the region by providing various benefits including employment and 
infrastructure development, development projects are also responsible for displacing or 
restricting resource access to the local communities (Brockington and Igoe 2006, Mclean 
and Straede 2003). One example is the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh.  
The proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC) is a planned park in 
Madhya Pradesh, a region known for its notorious Narmada Dam development project 
which has displaced several millions of local inhabitants (Baviskar 1995, Chitale 1997).. 
The ONPC is being designed as a compensatory conservation project to overcome the 
loss of wildlife and forest by the construction and submergence from nearby Indira-
Sagar and Omkareshwar dams. This complex consists of the Omkareshwar National 
Park, the Singhaji Wildlife Sanctuary, the Mandhata Sanctuary and the Narmada 
Conservation Reserve Unit I and II. The ONPC region is largely populated by tribal 
‘adivasis’ people, a group  that constitutes approximately 22.3% of the total state 
population,  and depend on the forest resources for their subsistence livelihoods. The 
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adivasis literally means ‘original inhabitants’ but are more often called as indigenous 
groups or tribal people in India.  
Creation of this protected area will result in new rules-in-use that will restrict and control 
the forest access of the local inhabitants and therefore change their livelihoods and 
socio-cultural relationships. While no villages within five kilometers of the proposed 
park will be relocated, the effect of the ONPC on the local livelihoods will be 
significant. This study, therefore,  examines how new rules-in-use affect how the forest 
is governed in the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex and the expected 
changes in the livelihoods and economic activity of local people dependent on the forest 
resources (Figure 1.1).  
The main analytical framework addresses how the state-mandated changes in forest 
management alter myriad relationships local people have with the forest (Figure 1.1). 
These changes are captured by understanding different economic, social and political 
factors. Therefore, this dissertation examines changes in the local responses in context of 
income generation, labor dynamics and social relationships, all driven by the creation of 
a conservation enclosure. 
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Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework 
 
 
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
Biodiversity Offsets
1,2
 
The relationship between biological diversity conservation and human development has 
evolved over the decades. A sea-change has moved conservation policy from the classic 
“fortress” (Brockington 2002, Hulme and Murphree 1999, Igoe 2004) to the community 
based conservation focused on development (Hulme and Murphree 2001, Neumann 
1988, McNeely and Miller 1984, Miller 1984, Agrawal 2001, Agrawal and Chhatre 
2006, Agrawal and Gupta 2005). Such conservation interventions have also been 
                                                          
1
Unless specified, I have used the terms biodiversity offset and conservation trade-off interchangeably. 
2
 However, the form of compensatory conservation in India is not based on tradable credit type program 
such as in Australia and New Zealand. Still in infancy stage, it is based on the idea of trading off a 
developmental project with a conservation enclosure where community development is enforced 
through projects such as ecotourism. 
Access to 
Resources 
Rules-in-use 
STATE 
Landuse  
Income Generation 
Labor Dynamics 
Social Relationships 
Response 
Behavior 
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influenced by changing state-society relations, where previous state policies have taken a 
back-seat to the current forms of market-based incentives and valuation of ecosystem 
services (Igoe and Brockington 2007, Igoe et al 2010, Dressler and Roth 2011, 
Brockington and Igoe 2006, Büscher and Whande 2007). Amidst the conservation 
paradigm change, a distinct branch has led to the emergence of environmental 
compensatory mitigation, or “biodiversity offsets”. Biodiversity offsets can be defined as 
“conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity” 
(ten Kate et al 2004:13).  
Biodiversity offsets are considered an important tool for addressing environmental 
impacts of development, thus maintaining and equilibrium between the environment and 
development (McKenney and Kiesecker 2010). The biodiversity offset program is 
proving to be beneficial to businesses, governments, conservation groups and 
communities as evident by the wetland and conservation banking program in USA and 
habitat conservation in Australia and Canada (ten Kate et al 2004). Some positive 
aspects of biodiversity offsets include – (1) it permits individuals and institutions to 
reinforce economic prospects through market based incentives to improve biodiversity 
conservation outcomes; (2) forest regeneration improves carbon sequestration; (3) by 
participating, companies’ licenses and their agendas are strengthened, thus empowering 
them to gain communities’ trust; (4) provides an opportunity for conservationists to 
secure funding for their  conservation goals, (5) without creating new legislative policies 
for conservation through the mechanism of biodiversity offsets, governments can boost 
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private participation, (6) by assimilating conservation and development goals, 
communities will be benefited through livelihood programs  (Norton 2007, ten Kate et al 
2004, Burgin 2008, Bayon 2008). 
However, the social dimensions of these interventions are mixed. For some, such 
programs have included local communities in resource governance while fostering an 
interaction between sustainable resource management and economic development 
(Burgin 2008, Burgin 2011, Norton 2007). But others are not so positive. These offset 
program have led to the displacement and relocation of local communities from the 
conservation enclosures (Brockington and Igoe 2006, Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 
2006, Adams and Hutton 2007). These negative processes may or may not result in 
further economic marginalization of the local communities, however (Brockington and 
Igoe 2006). In addition, biodiversity offsets have been criticized for several reasons. 
First, different private and public stakeholders lack shared visions for the biodiversity 
offset programs thus often creating conflicting situations (ten Kate et al 2004). Secondly, 
by creating strong policy frameworks for the offset programs to encourage private 
interests, it becomes essential to secure and build trust relationships among the different 
stakeholders (ten Kate et al 2004).  Yet the specific processes are still understudied. 
Therefore, this dissertation will investigate economic, social and political nuances of the 
biodiversity offsets type of intervention and how such trade-offs operate in local 
communities.   
  
6 
 
While different names for biodiversity offsets exist, including mitigation banking, 
conservation banking, compensatory mitigation, BioBanking, they all share similar 
objective: to reduce biodiversity loss through market-based incentives and payments 
(Madsen et al 2010, ten Kate et al 2004, Morris et al 2006). According to State 
Biodiversity Markets report, at present 39 compensatory mitigation programs exist 
across the world, with several individual offset sites, in addition to 25 more programs in 
different stages of development (Madsen et al 2010). Such offset programs can be 
particularly found in New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, China, South 
Africa, Madagascar, Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom, Brazil, Colombia, United 
States, and Canada (McKenney and Kiesecker 2009, Madsen et al 2010, Gordon et al 
2011).  
Different realities of biodiversity offset programs exist globally (Table 1.1). In North 
America, the biodiversity offsets programs are well-developed and focus on the wetlands 
and species mitigation in US (Robertson 2004, Bayon 2008) and fish habitats and 
wetland compensation in Canada (Madsen et al 2010).  In collaboration with the public-
private sectors, commercial wetland mitigation banking, an environmental management 
policy, was introduced in United States in 1991. Under this program, the agencies 
developed a market in privately owned ‘wetland ecosystem services where the 
ecosystem services are produced and sold through site-restoration (Robertson 2004).  
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Table 1.1 Examples of Biodiversity Offsets 
 
Country/Region Program Legislation Policy goal 
United States Species Mitigation 
(of which  
conservation 
banking is one tool) 
 
 
Wetland Mitigation 
Endangered Species Act 
1973 as amended and the 
Guidance on Establishment, 
Use and Operations of 
Conservation Banks 
 
Clean Water Act 1972 
Chapter 404(b)(1) and the 
US Army Corps of 
Engineers regulation (33 
CFR 320.4(r)) 
To offset adverse 
impacts to  
threatened and  
endangered species 
 
 
“No overall loss of 
values and 
functions” (1990); 
“net gain” (2004) 
Australia, 
New South Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia, Victoria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Western Australia 
 
 Green Offsets for 
Sustainable Development: 
Concept Paper (2002); 
Native Vegetation Act 
(2003) and subsequent 
regulations (2005); the 
Threatened Species 
Conservation Amendment 
(Biodiversity Banking) Bill 
2006 
 
Native Vegetation 
Management Framework 
(2002) and subsequent 
amendments to related Acts; 
BushBroker– native 
vegetation credit registration 
and trading: Information 
Paper (2006) 
 
Native Vegetation Act 
(2003); Environmental 
Offsets: Position Statement 
No. 9 (2006) 
Net environmental 
gain” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A reversal, across 
the entire 
landscape, of the 
long-term decline in 
extent and quality 
of native 
vegetation, leading 
to a Net Gain” 
 
“Net environmental 
Benefit” 
European Union Habitats and Birds 
Directive 
Council Directive 
92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 
on the conservation of 
natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora and Council 
Directive 79/409/EEC 
 
Maintain overall 
(ecological) 
coherence 
of the sites 
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Table 1.1 (continued) 
 
Country/Region Program Legislation Policy goal 
Canada Fisheries Act R.S. 1985, c. F-14, 
Policy for the 
Management 
of Fish Habitat 
(1986), and the 
Habitat Conservation 
and Protection 
Guidelines, Second 
Edition (1998); 
see especially 
Subchapter 35(l) and 
Subchapter 35(2) of 
the Fisheries Act 
No net loss in 
capacity of habitat to 
produce fish 
Brazil Forest Regulation 
and National System 
of Conservation 
Units 
Lei No. 4771 of 1965; 
Lei No. 14.247 of 
22/7/2002, Lei No 
9.985 of 18/7/2000, 
Decreto No. 4.340 of 
22/8/2002 
No net loss of habitat 
under a defined 
minimum 
forest cover for 
private landholdings 
Source: Bayon 2008 
 
 
More noticeable offset programs can be found elsewhere in Australia and New Zealand. 
Twelve biodiversity offset programs currently exist with five more in developmental 
stages (Madsen et al 2010). The offsets are largely acquired by the urban property 
developers, infrastructure (road, pipelines) agencies, extractive industries, energy 
companies and agricultural landowners (Madsen et al 2010). In Australia, there is a 
sharp rise in the loss of threatened species that primarily exist in the urban areas due to 
urban expansion (Burgin 2008). In New South Wales, to address this issue, “Threatened 
Species Conservation Amendment (Biodiversity Banking) Bill” was passed in 2006 
  
9 
 
(Burgin 2008). Similar to carbon credit program, according to BioBanking, Burgin 
(2008) explains biodiversity credits may be produced by the land owners based on their 
commitment to reinforce and protect biodiversity on their land.  These credits act as 
‘additional actions’ and can be traded off to compensate for the biodiversity impacts due 
to land development (Bayon 2008, McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Burgin 2008). The 
land development may progress, only if the traded credits implement a “net maintain or 
improve outcome” for biodiversity (Burgin 2008). Main drawback of the program 
includes lack of government enforcement to base decisions on scientific reasoning 
(Burgin 2008). According to the State of Biodiversity Market report (Madsen et al 
2010), till end of 2009, about 8,865 hectares of land has been cleared and 25,564 
hectares of offset has been created under BioBanking program in New South Wales. In 
New Zealand, the biodiversity offset program is authorized under the Resource 
Management Act of 1991 and the Conservation Act of 1987 (Madsen et al 2010). 
Waikatea Station (in New Zealand), is a classic sheep and cattle farm surround by 
indigenous forest and shrubland, threatened by lack of forest regeneration due to heavy 
undergrazing by cattle, sheep and feral goats (Norton 2009). The offset areas have been 
created adjacent to the cleared undergrazed areas within same ecosystem types. In 
Waikatea station, about 799 hectares of offset area has been created with larger (79 
percent) proportion of indigenous forest and shrubland and smaller (21 percent) for 
pasture (Norton 2009). 
Different studies on biodiversity offset program largely explore definition and global 
status (Madsen et al 2010, ten Kate et al 2004), framework assessment (Norton 2009, 
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McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Kiesecker et al 2009, Burgin 2008, Burgin 2011, Tew 
2011) and mechanisms and impacts (Bayon 2008, Gordon et al 2011). However, there is 
inadequate literature linking biodiversity offsets with development parameters of 
livelihoods, resource sustainability, institutions, and social relationships.  
 
Conservation-Development Nexus in Geography 
Conservation paradigm in 1980s and 1990s embraced sustainable use that supports the 
need to manage the conservation efforts along with the local communities in globalized 
era (Zimmerer 2006). This third wave is characterized by conservation territories, 
defined as “designated spaces of nature protection and resource management” 
(Zimmerer 2006a:8, Zimmerer 2006b). The spatial settings within conservation 
territories are marked with the environmental management goals and definite set of 
activities that range from the rigid nature conservation (“fortress conservation”) to 
sustainable utilization (Zimmerer 2006a, Zimmerer 2006b).  These spatial settings are 
also defined by the changing technological tools that advance such projects. Zimmerer 
notes, for example, the creation of innovative management spaces including community 
conservation units, environmental networks, and interconnected spatial units as a result 
of the participatory planning (Zimmerer 2006a). Emergence of biodiversity offsets can 
be considered an example of such conservation territories. Biodiversity offsets are trade-
offs that set aside land for conservation from within development schemes. Such trade-
offs are accompanied by different processes to control and command the project 
  
11 
 
regulations. They also transform practices and processes at micro-scale, thus forever 
changing the social, political and economic dimensions of the local communities. Such 
trade-offs might affect the complex workings of conservative initiatives in either 
negative or positive ways.  
Conservation-development studies have deeply engaged questions about the human-
nature dichotomy, thus deepening the age-old park versus people debate, through studies 
related to the conflict over resources (Jarosz 1996, Peluso 1992, Carney 2004, Schroeder 
1993, Rocheleau and Ross 1995, Sundberg 2003), colonial power struggles (Peluso 
1993, Robbins et al 2006, Robbins 1998, Neumann 1998) and resource institutions 
(Robbins 2000, Agrawal and Gibson 1999). These studies explore the different ways 
through which the human practices and processes shape and are shaped by their 
environment. However, such studies are absent within biodiversity offset literature. 
Therefore, this study will employ the following frameworks to examine and further the 
biodiversity offset literature in India. 
 
Forest Institutions 
Institutions have played a central role in mediating how societies use, conserve, and 
preserve natural resources. Ostrom describes conservation institutions as sets of working 
rules that determine who is eligible to make decisions for management of natural 
resources, what actions are allowed, and what procedures are followed to manage the 
resource (Ostrom 1992: 19). Institutions include a range of social, economic and 
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political relationships that include markets (Lambin et al. 2003), cooperation (Jiang 
2004), authority (Robbins 1998), and contracts (Jepson et al 2008; Jepson et al 2010). 
Emphasizing on the close direct association between the local institutions (authority) and 
its impact on the human-environment relationship, Robbins (1998) argues that 
institutions play a significant role in making decisions related to resource extraction and 
thus executing them. Consequently, the varied responses to such rules-in-use change 
according to the social parameters of caste, class and gender. In their study, Jepson et al 
(2010) redefined institutional interactions that contribute to land-use change by 
proposing an ‘access regime framework” which examines how land change is created by 
the institutions by reshaping their access to natural and productive resources.   
Different institutional relationships are shaped by different forms of social capital, that 
include shared knowledge, trust, social networks, norms and understandings that 
influence the nature of these relationships. Co-ordination and trust between the state and 
the resource-users are essential to create rules of use that exclude and enforce rules in the 
best interest of all the actors involved. Lack of such social capital generally results in 
power conflicts of varying degrees either between or within different layers of 
institutions (Ostrom 1992, Robbins 1998). Depending on the degree to which the 
institutions regulate the power and authority, rules are either resisted, enforced, 
respected or subverted (Robbins 1998). However, through his case study of Rajasthan, 
he argued that different producers respond differently to authority as a result of being 
influenced by social factors such as gender, caste, class. Political ecology of institutions 
suggests that micro-politics of access and control of forest resources at different scales, 
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including households, communities and state, may force the marginalized actors to 
redefine, negotiate and contest the resources (Peet and Watts 1996, Robbins 1998). 
Hence, this framework will help in understanding how change in rules-in-use control 
spatial actions that alter social and economic relationships between the resource 
controllers and the resource-users by restricting their access/control of resources which 
compel the resource users to often negotiate or contest resources.  
 
Indian Initiatives  
Indian forest conservation studies have extensively focused on deforestation (Robbins 
1998, Sinha and Swaminathan 1991, Jha et al 2000), resource management institutions 
(Agrawal 1996, Kumar 2002, Agrawal 2000, Lise 2000), and power dynamics (Robbins 
2000, Robbins 1998, Sivaramakrishnan 1995 and Guha and Gadgil 1988). Studies and 
reports indicate that the boundaries of the conservation enclosures are transformed for 
various reasons, thus altering how various communities use forests (IANS 2009, Press 
Trust of India 2010, Agrawal 2005). IANS (2009) report that the boundaries of the 
wildlife sanctuaries in the state of Himachal Pradesh would be  redrawn, for the 
development activities, such that the number of national parks in the state would 
increase to a total of four. As a result, 767 villages and about 100,564 people will be 
moved out of the protected areas. According to another report (Press Trust of India 
2010), due to decline in migration of Great Indian Bustard, Karera wildlife sanctuary in 
Madhya Pradesh will be denotified. Following this, the local communities will be 
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allowed to carry out commercial activities in the area. In another study, Agrawal (2005) 
discussed that the changes in the boundaries of the forest reserves in Kumaon, in pre-
independence period, resulted in restricted forest rights of the villagers. This led to mass 
protests in the region by the villagers. As a result, approximately 5000 sq. kilometer of 
forest reserves was diverted and later came to be known as the community forests 
(Agrawal 2005). Agrawal (2005) argues that decentralization of authority to the local 
village councils is significant for the forest conservation. From these reports, it is evident 
that the boundaries of the protected areas have been expanded as well as downsized. But 
the effect of these boundary changes on the local communities is still overlooked, 
particularly in context of their resource use and access. 
Scholars study boundaries as something that separates people from parks (Nagendra et al 
2010, Persha et al 2011). Nagendra et al (2010) examine particular paths of forest 
change in different areas of the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve by evaluating land cover 
change, floral diversity, and people’s attitudes towards conservation inside and 
peripheral areas of the park. In another study, Persha et al (2011) suggest that to improve 
conservation effects within existing truths of people versus park conflicts in South Asia, 
management of forest commons through community forestry, instead of strict ‘fortress’ 
protected areas, should be implemented. There is a clear lack of studies in Indian forest 
conservation discourse that highlight the change in access regime due to creation of 
biodiversity offsets. Therefore, this study focuses on how creation of biodiversity offsets 
affects political-economic processes through new rules-in-use in the proposed 
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Omkareshwar National Park Complex. To further our understanding, a background 
history of Indian Forest Conservation is summarized next. 
 
Indian Forest Conservation: A Review 
Forests are considered valuable for its economic, social and cultural services since 
earliest times. Forests have provided timber for construction purpose, fuelwood, fodder, 
fruits and roof, medicinal plants, to the local communities for economic and self-
sustenance and hunting grounds for the ancient rulers. Customs and traditions of several 
forest dwelling communities in India or particular trees scared and worship them as 
abode of Hindu gods or local deities (Robbins 1998).  
The absolute role of state has been prominent since the beginnings of the forest 
management in India. India’s critical tryst with the forest management began during the 
Mauryan dynasty particularly in 325 B.C. It was during this time that Chanakya, the then 
prime minister and a learned scholar, created a set of guidelines for the advancement of 
forestry in his book “Arthashastra’ (Jha 1994, Lal 1989, Jain 1989). He emphasized on 
the significance of the forest management by the king to preserve and maintain the 
forests. He highlighted the need for an appropriate way to exploit forests, setting up of 
processing units for the forest produce, protection of fauna for greater genetic diversity, 
prescribed specific fines for various offences including destruction of trees (Jha 1994). 
More importantly, he stressed on the importance of honest government employees for 
effective policy implementation.  
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History of Indian Forest Policies and Acts 
During the colonial rule, the British remained unsympathetic to the state of India’s 
forests in the first half of the eighteenth century. The ‘forest conscience’ that developed, 
during the latter part of British rule in India, originated from safeguarding against 
climate issues. They extensively exploited Indian forests by exerting pressure through 
expansion of railways, agricultural production and urban areas (Jha 1994, Lal 1989, 
Barton 2002, Birla Institute of Scientific Research 1986). However, this perception was 
changed when the British ‘empire forestry’ was threatened by the dwindling supplies of 
timber after the loss of its other colonies (Barton 2002) Subsequently, in 1865 the first 
Indian Forest Act (also known as Act 7) was passed by the British government which 
gave powers to the forest officers to issue local rules for conserving the forests in India. 
The main emphasis of this forest act was “preventing injuries to forests” by exerting 
force of law (Lal 1989). This act was amended later in 1878 which advanced on its 
predecessor’s shortfalls particularly the conservation and preservation of reserved and 
protected forests. Based on revised Act 7 of 1878, all the rights and claims to land, in 
reserved forests, were dissolved and were passed on to the state. But in the case of 
protected forests, land rights were permitted to continue. It also created a category that 
later came to be known as ‘Panchayat or community forests’ for the local communities 
to indulge in their daily forest resources needed for sustenance. However this community 
approach failed as it stressed on the extensive use of the community forests for daily 
forest functions instead of its preservation and hence this caused severe forest 
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degradation. By 1889-90, approximately 50,000 square miles of reserved forest and 
20,000 square miles of protected forests existed in India (Barton 2002).  
Colonial forestry ideology was passed down to the modern-day Indian forest department 
that stressed on the forest preservation and the increasing role of state in its management 
(Sivaramakrishnan 1995). A series of legislation acts followed the Act 7 of 1878 and 
provided further protection to the Indian wildlife through Forest Act of 1927. This was 
later amended several times in 1930, 1933 and 1948 which permitted the state and 
central government to announce the wastelands and remaining ‘not-privately owned’ 
forest areas as ‘reserved forests’ (Barton 2002).  
After gaining independence in 1947, India passed its first independent National Forest 
Policy in 1952. This policy offered a functional classification that classified forests 
owned by state and private sectors into protective forests, national forests, and village 
forests and tree lands to enhance appropriate forest management to each type created. 
The 1952 policy granted the state the power to assign reserved forests to village forests 
where the local villagers can enjoy the extraction and use of minor forest resources in a 
restricted manner which was later amended in the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 to 
include the ‘dereservation’ power to reside only with the central government due to 
heavy forest degradation (Jha 1994, Barton 2002). Furthermore this policy focused on 
the long-term scientific management of the forests, preservation of the village forests for 
the future rural generations and the importance of forest education for its officers 
including the rangers. A significant characteristic of this policy was its acknowledgment 
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to allocate one-third of the total geographical area of India to maintain forest cover 
which has been periodically recorded by the Forest Survey of India since 1989 through 
remote sensing.  
National Forest Policy of 1988 addressed the growing need of afforestation created due 
to the over-exploitation of forest resources particularly timber. It was at this time that 
definition of forest preservation was expanded to include conservation of Indian forests. 
Hence, 1988 policy is well-known for introducing various forestry programs in India and 
the subsequent increasing demand of power vested in the local institutions. It established 
Joint Forest Management, social forestry, farm forestry to relieve pressures of the 
growing commercial needs from the forests in India through plantation management 
(Poffenberger and McGean 1996, Jha 1994). Changing the economic outlook towards 
forest to include further conservation of all biological diversity dominated the ideology 
of this policy. Consequently, massive scale afforestation was promoted including strip 
plantation alongside the railway lines, streams, canals and roads, establishing nistaar 
depots (where minor forest resources meant for direct consumption including fuelwood 
are available) replace and supplement the daily needs (particularly fuelwood) of tribals 
and non-tribals in the forested area with modern sustainable techniques such as bio-gas, 
solar gas stove and LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) and last but not the least, create 
environmental consciousness among the Indian masses (Jha 1994). Protected areas 
including national parks and wildlife sanctuaries were created through this policy all 
across India. Based on IUCN’s categories of protected areas, several national parks and 
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wildlife sanctuaries among other protected area categories were formed in India (Table 
1.2) with specific guidelines to protect and conserve diverse species.  
The importance of the role of state was stressed throughout its implementation including 
the necessity of state approval for various processes in forest management. It recognized 
the necessity of the legitimate grassroot forest organizations including the Forest 
Protection Committees or van suraksha samitis across the rural settings and brought in 
the decentralization era in India. State forest departments were pressured to delegate 
some forest management responsibilities to the local communities and include them in 
decision-making process thus empowering them (Poffenberger and McGean 1996).  
 
 
Table 1.2 Different categories of India’s Protected Areas under 
Indian forest Act 1988 
 
Classification of India’s 
Protected Areas 
 
IUCN’s categories of 
Protected Areas 
Details 
National Parks Category II To safeguard conservation 
species 
Wildlife Sanctuaries (Animal 
Sanctuaries) 
Category IV Conservation of flagship faunal 
species; step before attainment 
of National park status 
Reserved Forests Category IV or VI Explicit permission required for 
sustainable activities 
Conservation and Community 
Forests 
Category V and VI 
respectively 
Areas around parks, act as 
buffer zone – has ecological 
value 
Village and Panchayat Forests Category VI Administered by village or 
panchayat for sustenance 
Source: Ghimire and Pimbert 1997 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overall goal of this research is to examine how new rules-in-use to affect the 
political economic processes within the proposed ONPC in central India. To investigate 
this goal, primarily there are three objectives – 
Objective 1: To examine how economic processes and practices are affected by the 
changes in rules-in-use that results. The following aims will fulfill the mentioned 
objective- 
1. Estimate the contribution of different economic activities, in particular Non 
Timber Forest Products (NTFPs hereafter) to household income. 
2. Analyze how income varies across different socio-cultural groups and villages in 
the proposed ONPC.  
3. Examine how formalization of the park complex will change the economic 
practices and how local communities use forest products in the proposed ONPC. 
Objective 2: To investigate how new rules-in-use as a result of compensatory 
conservation affect the labor dynamics. The following aims are formed to answer the 
above-mentioned objective.  
1. Examine labor dynamics within the proposed ONPC. 
2. Investigate the different territorial strategies of compensatory conservation and 
how they influence the labor regimes of forest use.  
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Objective 3: To study the changes within the social practices underlined through 
tendupatta filières in the proposed ONPC. Specific aims answered for this objective 
include – 
1. Investigate the tendupatta filières.  
2. Examine social and political institutions within the filière.  
3. Identify and analyze politics of the tendupatta production and distribution 
process.  
 
RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE AND INTELLECTUAL MERIT 
This research is significant because it studies a forthcoming national park in a volatile 
region that has been marked with decades of struggles for rehabilitation and human 
rights. Several similar biodiversity offsets have been created in India but little research 
has been conducted. This research’s attention to immediate social, political and 
economic implications advances the study of biodiversity offsets, particularly in a 
developing country with a colonial history. This study conceptualizes immediate 
implications of biodiversity offsets in political and economic context while examining 
resource use and access.  
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BROADER IMPACTS OF RESEARCH 
This doctoral dissertation will produce three peer-reviewed journal articles in addition to 
the dissemination of the information through different academic conferences. This 
research will also provide scientifically informed policy recommendations to improve 
the participation of the stakeholders and assessment of conservation projects in India. In 
particular, a summary from the results of the sections 3, 4 and 5 will be made available 
in English to the Chief Conservator of Forest, Omkareshwar National Park Complex in 
India. By focusing on a project that includes different socio-cultural groups, this project 
will identify the possible openings and opportunities for increasing local participation 
and decision-making opportunities in such trade-off schemes.  
 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
Different sections within this dissertation are written in a journal article format. 
Therefore, subsections on the study area and methodology are overlapped in sections 3, 
4 and 5. Besides introduction, study area and conclusion sections, there are three 
additional empirical sections. Each of the three sections caters to the above-mentioned 
objectives and their specific questions.  
Section 2 situates the creation of the new conservation enclosure within the broader 
Narmada dam development project. Then, it describes the proposed Omkareshwar 
National Park Complex and its background through its forest resources, villages and 
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park management plan. The section on the study area is followed by detailed 
methodology which included a description of qualitative and quantitative data collection 
and data analysis.  
Section 3 addresses the economic effects from the new rules-in-use, thus identifying who 
benefits from the creation of the proposed ONPC. Three main economic activities 
include extraction of forest resources, agriculture and labor jobs. It was found that the 
income varies along with different socio-cultural groups and different economic 
activities. 
Section 4 focuses on how new rules-in-use affect the labor dynamics by altering access 
to, control and mobilization of forest resources. It shows that with increasing limitations 
on the extraction of forest resources, commodification of labor is occurring. 
Section 5 employs filière approach to highlight the social practices in proposed ONPC to 
explore interlinkages between economic, political and social aspects.  
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the research findings and provides 
recommendations for further research and policy-making.  
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This section is divided into a background of study area and methodology. The first 
section reviews background information on the study site by presenting a brief history of 
Narmada Dam Project conflict followed by a description of the proposed Omkareshwar 
National Park Complex. Subsequent sections describe the qualitative and quantitative 
data collected through various techniques and analysis. I conclude with the limitations of 
the research design with a discussion of bias and possible data related problems.  
 
STUDY AREA: A BACKGROUND 
Various scholars have written widely on the Narmada Dam Project including the   
development and nation-building (Nilsen 2008, Dharmadhikary 2001, Mukta 1995), 
marginalization and mobilization of local masses (Aravinda 2000, Bose 2004, Ram 
1993, Gandhi 2003, Sangvai 2002) and environmental costs (Bhattarcharya 1989, Sabnis 
2001). To understand the creation and possible problems of the proposed ONPC, it is 
essential to situate it within the background of Narmada Dam Project. Proposed ONPC 
is being created as a conservation trade-off. Other similar cases in India like that of 
ONPC park and Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams, as examples of conservation trade 
off include Chandoli dam constructed in 1976 (in Maharashtra) (Whitaker 2007) and the 
resultant Chandoli National Park formed in 2004. It was previously a Wildlife Sanctuary 
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which was declared in 1985 (Trepp 2010). Such trade-offs have occurred regularly in 
India but less is known about them. 
This section provides an overall knowledge about the proposed Omkareshwar National 
Park Complex (ONPC henceforth). First, it begins with the backdrop of Narmada dam 
project controversy. It briefly describes the pro and anti- development coalitions 
specifying the different events situated within a timeline. It is followed by an overall 
summary detailing the costs and benefits of the project. Next, this section examines the 
proposed ONPC with regards to its creation, logistics including park area, local 
communities and the different rules-in-use with particular emphasis on tendupatta, 
mahua, kullu gum and dhavda gum.   
 
Narmada Dam Project  
The Narmada River originates from Amarkantak plateau in Shahdol district, Madhya 
Pradesh. It flows through the three Indian states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. Its total length is 1,312 kilometers, of which around 90 percent (1,112 
kilometers) flows through the state of Madhya Pradesh (Cullet 2007, Bhattacharya and 
Loganathan 1989, Kothari and Bhartari 1984). Narmada River has a potential of 
irrigating over 6 million hectares of land in addition to its capacity to generate 3,000 
megawatts of hydroelectric power (Sangvai 2002, Rajagopal 2005). To harness its 
benefits, a plan to develop a multi-purpose Narmada Dam Project was introduced after 
India’s independence in 1947. Based on this plan, a series of multi-purpose dams were 
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planned to be constructed across India to bring prosperity in drought and 
underdeveloped regions in western India (Kothari and Bhartari 1984).  
Dams (like Koyna in Maharashtra and Bhakra Nangal in Punjab) were considered the 
‘Modern temples of India’ (Sangvai 2002: 11). As part of nation-building, Central, 
Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission (CWINC) suggested Bargi, Tawa, 
Punasa and Bharuch sites in Narmada valley for large-scale dam projects. By 1955, 
Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC) identified 16 projects sites (Wood 1993, 
Rajagopal 2005, Dharmadhikary 2001). 
Overall, the multi-purpose dam project included construction of a series of 30 major 
dams and 135 medium and over 3000 small scale dams in the Narmada valley (Baviskar 
1995, Cullet 2007, Bhattacharya and Loganathan 1989, Kothari and Bhartari 1984, 
Sabnis 2001). It comprised of an irrigation project designed to channel water through 
66,000km (40,920 miles) of canals, distributaries and water channels to farmers in the 
drought-prone areas of central and northern Gujarat and even neighboring Rajasthan in 
addition to two major hydro-electric power generating units, one in the riverbed dam and 
other at the head of the canal system (Wood 2007). As part of this project, Indira Sagar 
and Omkareshwar dams were constructed in the Khandwa and Dewas districts of 
Madhya Pradesh. In 1956, CWINC proposed a 160 feet high dam in Gujarat which, 
later, came to be known as ‘Sardar Sarovar’ (Sangvai 2002, Cullet 2007). A brief 
timeline of the development of the Narmada dam project is presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Timeline of Narmada Dam Project 
 
Year Details 
1947 India got independence 
1949 Preliminary investigation of Narmada valley for development of Narmada basin 
1955 Studies conducted to assess hydro-electric potential of Narmada basin 
1957 Sardar Sarovar Project (terminal dam) at Navagam proposed 
1959-65 Several major projects (including Indira Sagar dam) were prepared 
1960 Sardar Sarovar project (cleared by planning commission 
1961 Onset of disputes between Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra over height of 
Sardar Sarovar dam 
1964 Khosla Committee appointed by Government of India to investigate the project with 
particular focus on the height of the Sardar Sarovar dam. 
1964 Khosla committee recommendations are released 
1969 Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal was set-up to settle inter-state disputes 
1978 World Bank becomes interested in Narmada Dam Project 
1979 Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal’s verdict released 
1980 Creation of central Ministry of Environment and Forest 
1980 Forest Conservation Act is passed 
Early 
1980s 
Construction at Sardar Sarovar Dam begins 
1985 World Bank gave start up loan for Sardar Sarovar Project 
1990-94 Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) protests the dam construction by mobilizing 
people 
1991 World Bank conducts independent review for environment and resettlement plans 
1993 World Bank withdraws financial support upon Government of India’s request 
1995 Narmada Bachao Andolan spreads from Gujarat to other parts of the Narmada valley  
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Two major coalitions developed to promote or challenge the construction of the 
Narmada Dam Project. Federal and state governments, interested corporations, and 
development agencies, including the Narmada Valley Development Authority (NVDA), 
supported the pro-development agenda, including advocating for the Sardar Sarovar 
dam.  Conversely, the anti- development coalition was led by the mass social movement 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and international allies (including Friends of River 
Narmada, International River Network). 
 
Pro- Dam Development Coalitions 
The Indian government justified the massive dam project by arguing that it will alleviate 
drought-like conditions from arid Kutch region in western Gujarat. The pro-dam 
development party argued that primarily the Sardar Sarovar dam and network of other 
large and small dams will irrigate more than 18,000 sq. kilometers of drought prone 
areas like Saurashtra and Kutch in western Gujarat and provide employment 
opportunities through development of fisheries (Opie 1990). They further argued that the 
dams will protect against advancement of desert from Rajasthan and mitigate damaging 
floods. Fundamental objective of advocating dam-building was the development of canal 
irrigation to foster food security and economic development in post-Independence era 
(Cullet 2007). 
Over the years, disputes arose between the three main states over the height of dams and 
unequal distribution of costs and benefits (Wood 1993). Different planning bodies such 
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as Narmada Control Authority, Narmada Planning Group existed in different stakeholder 
states which executed the central government’s policies. In absence of a comprehensive 
planning body, the disputes between the states increased.  
The state governments of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra disagreed on 
numerous issues pertaining to water sharing between the states, extent of the areas to be 
irrigated in each state, and the height of the major dams including Sardar Sarovar dam in 
Gujarat (Kothari and Bhartari 1984). Initially under the project, project planners decided 
to construct the Sardar Sarovar dam, a terminal dam, at a height of 160 feel full reservoir 
level (FRL) which was later raised to 300 feet and then another 320 feet in 1959 (Wood 
1993). The idea was that the higher the dam would enable water to flow longer distances 
through the canals. After the inauguration of the project in 1961, chief ministers of 
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh agreed once more to increase the dam height to 425 feet 
(Cullet 2007). The Gujarat government ratified this agreement unlike Madhya Pradesh. 
As a result, the Indian government formed Khosla committee in 1964 to investigate the 
project with particular focus on the height of the dam. The committee recommended in 
1964 to raise the height 500 feet (Cullet 2007). This decision annoyed the governments 
of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra because they had signed an agreement to build a 
dam at Jalsindhi (Madhya Pradesh) which would benefit both states. Implementation of 
the newer recommendation would mean that the dam at Jalsindhi would be submerged 
by the reservoir of the Sardar Sarovar dam. The then chief minister of Madhya Pradesh 
objected to this project, arguing that “the river primarily belongs to Madhya Pradesh and 
  
30 
 
that Gujarat had been claiming more than its due share in the allocation of the Narmada 
waters” (Sangvai 2002:13). 
To settle the disputes between the different states, Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal 
was established in 1969 (Wood 1993, Sangvai 2002). Some of the important decisions 
taken by the tribunal included: a) Rajasthan should also be included among the disputed 
parties, who/which allied itself with Gujarat based on its invested interests; b) height of 
Sardar Sarovar dam which Gujarat and Rajasthan wanted to increase to maximize water 
delivery to these states whereas the Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra wanted to curtail 
the dam height to limit the submergence area; and finally c) allocation of the cost of dam 
construction and resettlement among the four states (Wood 1993, D’Souza 2002). The 
tribunal determined that the height of the terminal dam would be set at 455 feet, much 
less than what Gujarat wanted. By its reservoir, it was estimated that 34,996 hectares in 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat including 248 villages and a population of 
66,593 will be submerged. Out of the four states, Madhya Pradesh was set to bear the 
maximum brunt of the project as 193 villages and 45,000 people were affected. In the 
case of rehabilitation and resettlement, the tribunal decided to grant “land for land” 
under which displaced families would receive land of their choice, equivalent to their 
loss or minimum of 2 hectares in the irrigable command of the project in addition to 
every male, 18 years or older, would be considered a separate family. Approximately 
two thirds displaced in the Sardar Sarovar project are/were adivasis.  
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Originally estimated at US$1.673 billion, it was believed by engineers that the project 
cost would increase to US$4.649 billion by the time it is completed (Kothari and 
Bhartari 1984, Wood 1993).  This project received World Bank’s attention in 1978 when 
the central government of India concluded that it cannot incur such high investment 
(Cullet 2007, Opie 1990).  Subsequently, the World Bank gave a ‘start-up’ loan of 450 
million in 1985 to the Sardar Sarovar Project. This included $350 million for canal-
construction and $90 million for environmental protection.  
Influenced by the global environmental events (including Stockholm Conference in 
1978), a new Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests was created who passed their 
first Forest Conservation Act (1980) stating that before any central clearance is provided 
to any developmental project, the condition of conducting environmental assessment of 
developmental projects will have to be satisfied (Wood 1993). Subsequently, it was 
mandatory for the governments of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat to a) provide an 
alternative site for afforestation activities to compensate for the submerged forest lands; 
b) amend rehabilitation package for the displaced masses; c) establish wildlife 
sanctuaries; d) to adapt the command and catchment areas for dam’s environmental 
consequences (Wood 1993). Shoolpaneshwar Wildlife Sanctuary, in Gujarat, was 
developed as part of conservation effort extension of Sardar Sarovar dam. It was 
extended from original Dumkhel Slothbear Sanctuary from 5,300 to 68,000 sq. hectares 
(Whitehead 2007). By 1983, the central clearance to the projects was denied as the 
mandatory guidelines were not met.  
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Due to the pressure applied by various member countries, the World Bank, conducted an 
independent review of environmental and resettlement aspects within the Narmada 
project in 1991. The findings included a) people affected by the project were not 
consulted neither by the Indian government nor by the World Bank and no human 
impact assessment were conducted; b) special needs of the adivasis were not 
acknowledged; and c) the ‘oustees’ compensation packages offered by the Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat were not accepted by the World Bank (Cullet 2007, 
Morse and Berger 1992). In addition, the review supported that the downstream 
population whose livelihoods would be affected and those displaced by the canal 
construction should be provided compensation packages. Concerning the environmental 
impacts, the review concluded that besides insufficient studies, plans to mitigate 
environmental damage had not been prepared. Moreover, current schemes on 
compensatory afforestation, prevention of waterlogging and salinization within the 
command area were also criticized. Consequently, the review suggested that the World 
Bank should withdraw from the Narmada dam project until all the expected standards 
are met (Morse and Berger 1992). As a result, all the European member countries 
encouraged the withdrawal of The World Bank from the Narmada dam project (Wood 
1993). As a result, The World Bank withdrew its financial support from the Narmada 
Dam Project in 1993 (Morse and Berger 1992).  
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Anti-Dam Coalitions 
Communities and individuals affected by the dam projects formed various anti-dam 
coalitions with grassroots organizations (Narmada Bachao Andolan/Save Narmada 
Movement, NBA) and international allies (including Friends of River Narmada, 
International River Network) that focused on the social and environmental costs of 
Narmada development (Sangvai 2002). These organizations struggled for the people’s 
right to know and participate in the decision-making process while analyzing their 
resource base and livelihoods, compensation, submergence of fertile land and loss of 
cultural heritage (Sangvai 2002, Cullet 2007, Bose 2004).  
 The issues were wide-ranging, but they were always grounded in the local and 
community outcomes of development. Over the years, the NBA raised several critical 
questions - Whose development? At what cost? What kind of development? How do 
they outweigh benefits? Is such a development essential for a developing country like 
India? Are the rights of those affected by it recognized? Are the resources being 
distribution in democratic and egalitarian manner? Who participates in the decision-
making process? 
The most internationally recognized anti-dam organization is the coalition Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (NBA hereafter) or Save Narmada Movement.  In 1986, Medha Patkar, 
an activist with Setu (an NGO) organized a seminar to train and coordinate the adivasis 
for the struggle (Wood 1993). When she learned about lack of participation of adivasis 
in their own future decision-making, she mobilized all small grassroots organizations 
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that existed in different parts of the valley to form the NBA at the village level.  NBA 
was inspired by first dam movement in India during the independence struggle in 1921 
in Maharashtra when Tata company wanted to build a hydro-electric dam there (Sangvai 
2002). NBA provided an umbrella for many groups challenging the Narmada projects, 
including environmentalists, neo-Gandhians, socialists, and neo-Marxists.  Moreover, 
NBA built a middle-class coalition with economists, journalists, advocates, doctors and 
engineers from all over India to advance their cause. NBA, drawing upon Gandhian 
philosophy of non-violence, organized and engaged in direct action (Bose 2004). Some 
of the protest tactics involved by them include jalsamadhi (protest by standing in the 
water), rallies, hunger-strikes, marches, blocking highways, dharnas (camping on the 
banks of river Narmada) and singing songs about the movement (Baviskar 1995, Sims 
2001, Aravinda 2000). NBA interacted and engaged masses for mobilization at different 
levels- village, tehsil (block), district, state, and national levels as well as the 
international level.  
In the Narmada valley, different struggles arose and people were mobilized to fight in 
different ways. In 1989, the NBA along with communities, including adivasis and other 
local farmers, crystallized opposition (towards dam-building) in two-point programs: (1) 
non-cooperation with all dam related work in the villages and (2) refusal to leave their 
lands and villages.  This plan is embodied by the slogan ‘we will drown but won’t move 
out’ (Baviskar 1995). Moreover, in the same year a nationwide action plan was formed. 
From 1990-1994, NBA and its allies carried out some major protests in form of dharna 
and marches (Baviskar 2001, Bose 2004, Gandhi 2003). The state repressed them by 
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arresting people, beating them, stealing their grains/ ruining their lands and destroying 
their homes. Thereafter, NBA launched satyagraha (fight for truth), following a similar 
non-violent tactic to stop the submergence of Manibeli village in Maharashtra. 
Satyagraha sent a strong message to the nation about their struggle. NBA continued to 
employ non-violent tactics like jalsamadhi (protesting by standing in water). While the 
non-violent approach to social action did not stop immediate submergence of homes, 
temples, land and villages, NBA action led to the withdrawal of financial support by 
international aid agencies and the international civil society (Wood 1993, Sangvai 2002, 
Gandhi 2003, Rajagopal 2005, Dharmadhikary 2001).  
In cases of specific schemes, NBA employed focused strategies for mobilizing people 
and protesting against dams. The NBA organized boat rallies as another tactic to protest 
Narmada development. In Tawa dam case, since 1980s the aggrieved population 
demanded fishing rights similar to that by the people in Bargi dam area (Sims 2001). In 
1996 the government finally granted them the rights. In another instance of the struggle, 
in 1991, in the case of Bargi dam, among various tactics adopted- boat rally by 
fishermen demanding their fishing rights over the reservoir and finally in 1996 
government was compelled to recognize their demands (Baviskar 1995). Following this, 
the people organized themselves into cooperative societies and now they handle the 
production and marketing of the fisheries. This has emerged as a model for participatory 
and sustainable fisheries (Sims 2001).  
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In the instance of Maheshwar dam, the struggle against submergence by increasing the 
height of the dam started in 1997. This was the first hydro-electric project whose 
construction was given to a private company S.Kumars. The struggle continued for a 
long time through dharnas and marches. In 2000, various NGOs and people’s 
organizations appealed to the German government to withdraw their loan from the 
project. In 2001 January, a loan of US$ 130 million was cancelled and hence the 
construction was halted (Sangvai 2002). Until the summer of 2007, it was noted that no 
construction activity has been going on there.  
Man dam, another example, which was predominantly tribal and constituted mainly of 
Bhils and Bhilalas, over 1000 families submerged (Sangvai 2002). According to the 
rehabilitation policy of the government, land would be given for land but instead the 
people were given paltry amounts and their struggles were crushed. The people were 
provided a temporary camp with food and water and half the minimum wages for 
unskilled labors for two months only (Sangvai 2002).  
The Narmada Dam Project has displaced more than quarter million people directly and 
indirectly and had four times more effect on the livelihoods especially on people living 
downstream (Chitale 1997). The following table provides an idea by elaborating the 
percentage of adivasis that were affected due to construction of various dams under 
Narmada dam project (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Percentage of adivasis affected due to Narmada project 
 
Project Total number displaced Tribal persons displaced 
(in percent) 
Bansagar 142,000 75 
Bargi 35,000 43 
Narmada Sagar 170,000 20 
Sardar Sarovar 200,000 56 
Source: Sangvai, 2002 
 
 
Overall, the Narmada dam project came to world’s attention due to its considerable size 
succeeded by various controversies. While the project had some positive implications in 
terms of nation-building and development, it also created severe consequences for the 
masses. Its proponents argued that the dam-building is beneficial, particularly in terms of 
drinking water, irrigation and hydroelectric power (Bose 2004). Consequently, the 
opponents opposed the project due to massive social and environmental costs that 
included flooding of 245 villages, conversion of farm lands of 140,000 farmers for 
constructing canals, disruption in livelihoods (fisheries), loss of dense forests and 
endangered wildlife, probable seismicity risks, soil degradation due to water logging 
(Bose 2004, Bhattacharya and Loganathan 1989, Sabnis 2001). They further debated the 
inadequate resettlement and rehabilitation plans for the displaced people due to the land 
submergence from the Narmada dam project till 1988. From the Sardar Sarovar Project 
in Gujarat alone, it was estimated that 4,000,000 people and livelihoods of another 
6,000,000 people will be affected (McCully 1996, Ram 1993, Sangvai 2000). After 
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1988, they demanded completely suspension of the project (Gandhi 2003). However, 
one of the positive effects of the project remained the Indian Forest Act (1980) which 
resulted in compensatory afforestation. This led to the establishment to the proposed 
Omkareshwar National Park Complex.  
 
The Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
The Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex is a planned protected area in 
Madhya Pradesh (Figure 2.1).  It is being designed as a compensatory conservation 
project which will overcome the loss of wildlife and forest resulting from the 
construction of and submergence from the nearby Indira-Sagar and Omkareshwar dams. 
The creation of the ONPC broadly results from one of the mandatory guidelines from the 
independent review conducted in 1991. 
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Figure 2.1 (a) and (b) Location of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in 
India and within the state of Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
The ONPC region, situated in the south-west part within the state of Madhya Pradesh, 
makes an ideal site location for the study of people-park relationships as a consequence 
of conservation trade-off for multiple reasons. First, while two major dams from the 
Narmada project – Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams are situated here, it has resulted 
in mass displacement of local population particularly from their submergence areas. 
Moreover, the office of the mass social movement Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) is 
also located in the Khandwa district of this region. Based on the history of the region in 
context to the social movement, in addition to the social along with environmental 
Figure 1a. India 
Figure 1b. Madhya Pradesh and Study Site Location 
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inadequacies which resulted from the massive dam project, make the ONPC region 
sensitive for policy implementation.  
Second, the state of Madhya Pradesh has 30.72 percent of India’s total forests cover, the 
largest forested area within a state in India (Forest Survey of India 2005). Furthermore, 
the state boasts nine national parks and 25 wildlife sanctuaries (highest in India) that 
cover 3.36 percent of the state’s geographical area (Forest Survey of India 2011). In 
addition to supplying fuelwood for domestic use, the forests are rich in non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs). In a constant effort to maintain the state’s forest cover, the state 
government has stricter forest rules implemented for resource use. 
Third, since the idea to establish ONPC park project is quite recent, I can study the 
formation of the park from its inception focusing on reasons for its creation, its current 
impacts on the local communities and their resource use. Where less has been written on 
the conservation trade-offs such as ONPC in India, this site provides an excellent chance 
to further explore it. Future opportunities could include more in-depth studies on the 
park-people relationship for instance the different forest management programs in the 
park and their status. 
In 1987, the Government of India approved the redirection of 41,111.97 hectares of 
forest lands in the districts of Dewas, Khanwa and Hoshangabad (in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh) towards the construction of the Indira Sagar dam project (Personal 
Communication. Government Official 2012). However, at the same time, the 
government also made it mandatory that representatives from different stakeholder 
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agencies should form a committee for wildlife management and conservation, which 
would be displaced during the dam construction. These stakeholder agencies were the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), the Narmada Valley Development 
Authority (NVDA hereafter), the state government of Madhya Pradesh and the state 
forest department. This committee selected the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of 
Nature Society to prepare impact assessment reports, which were released in 1994 and 
1996. As a result, in 1993, NVDA declared its intentions to create a national park and 
sanctuaries.  
The idea to create the ONPC was marked by disagreement based on the total extent of 
the protected area. Dominated by the controversies of the Narmada dam project, impact 
assessment studies conducted by the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature 
Society recommended that a protected area be established as a combination of national 
park and wildlife sanctuary (total area 758.88 sq. km.). Such an area would help 
minimize the consequences of direct and indirect losses resulting from the development 
of Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams. They suggested that the selected forest area 
should share similar conservation characteristics with those that were lost due to 
submergence, so that the wildlife displaced by submergence could take refuge in the 
protected areas built around the reservoirs. However, the NVDA solicited another 
agency, the Indian Institute of Forest Management, to conduct an independent study to 
review the recommendations of Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature Society. 
They suggested reducing the total extent of the proposed protected area (658.35 sq.km) 
by 100 sq.km. This decision was opposed by Wildlife Institute of India, who argued that 
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the reduced area is not sufficient to restore the affected biodiversity (Personal 
Communication. Government Official 2012).  
The Supreme Court ruled that the stakeholders should compensate submergence area 
with increased forested area. This increase in forested area was implemented through the 
Compensatory Afforestation program. Under this program, compensation for any change 
in forest land use to a definite non-forest land use achieved ‘on-site’ (for deforestation, 
de-reservation or diversion for any development project) was implemented, carried out 
and monitored through set of established guidelines (Kohli et al 2011). Based on the 
management plan of the proposed ONPC, the compensation should be carried out on 
forest area equivalent to the change into a non-forest land use. Ultimately, in 2007, it 
was considered pragmatic to announce the total extent of the protected area to 
651.31sq.km. 
The proposed conservation complex consists of Omkareshwar National Park, Singhaji 
Wildlife Sanctuary, Mandhata Sanctuary and Narmada Conservation Reserve Unit I and 
II (Figure 2.2). It is situated at the junction of three districts, namely, Dewas, Khandwa 
and Khargone. Created under the Indian Forest Act of 1980, different zones within the 
ONPC are based on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) 
categories of Protected Areas for specific objectives (Table 2.3).  
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Figure 2.2 Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
 
 
Table 2.3 Details of different categories of India’s Protected Areas 
 
Classification of India’s 
Protected Areas 
 
IUCN’s categories of 
Protected Areas 
Details 
National Parks Category II To safeguard conservation 
species 
Wildlife Sanctuaries (Animal 
Sanctuaries) 
Category IV Conservation of flagship faunal 
species; step before attainment 
of National park status 
Reserved Forests Category IV or VI Explicit permission required for 
sustainable activities 
Conservation and Community 
Forests 
Category V and VI resp. Areas around parks, act as 
buffer zone – has ecological 
value 
Village and Panchayat Forests Category VI Administered by village or 
panchayat for sustenance 
Source: Ghimire and Pimbert 1997 
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In terms of use, I identified the different demarcated zones based on the zones suggested 
by the ONPC management report (Table 2.4). I classified the wilderness areas as the 
core National Park with strict restrictions on use. The wildlife management zone would 
include Mandhata and Singhaji wildlife sanctuaries with limited ecotourism use in form 
of safaris and wildlife sightings. Finally, the utility zone will be comprised of the buffer 
zone around the entire complex with settlements and the community dependency on the 
forest use, including the Narmada Conservation Reserve Units I and II. These zones are 
largely based on defined limits of the forest specified by formal notifications.  
The proposed ONPC is yet to be notified. By notification, it means that the state 
government declares its intention to constitute a protected area specifying its territorial 
limits and declare that the said area shall be a protected area in and from such date as 
specified in the notification (Ministry of Environment and Forest 2013).  It is important 
to mention here since this is quite a recent development, there are hardly any conflicts 
created by the ONPC. As the fencing of the park began in 2010, definite struggles to 
access forest resources are yet to be seen.  
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Table 2.4 Zones based on management objectives 
 
Zones within 
ONPC 
Suggested Zones Details 
Omkareshwar 
National Park 
Wilderness zone Shall include all parts of area, except for 
wildlife management zone and management 
facility development zone, for the 
preservation, protection and maintenance of 
the natural state of the natural ecosystems. 
No human activity including tourism should 
be allowed, except for most essential 
research and training.  
Singhaji and 
Mandhata 
Wildlife 
Sanctuaries 
Wildlife Management Zone Shall include the areas of the reserve where 
research and management actions related 
with maintenance and enhancement of 
wildlife and their habitats is permitted. 
Compatible tourism is encouraged.  
Narmada 
Conservation 
Reserve Units I 
and II; Other 
Forest Area 
Utility Zone 
 
 
 
1. Administrative 
facility zone 
 
2. Tourism use zone 
 
 
 
3. Eco zones 
 
 
 
a. Resource 
Management zone 
 
 
b. Infrastructure 
Development zone 
c. Settlement zone  
 
 
Shall include the areas where high human 
pressure is expected due to location of 
administrative, tourism and other public 
work installations. Further divided into – 
Shall include areas like reserve and 
protection unit headquarters and post areas, 
fire lines and communication towers.  
Shall include areas, designated hotels and 
campsite areas, religious sites, jungle drives, 
nature walk routes, and public work 
installation areas. 
Should include areas delineated to villagers 
for meeting need of their forest products and 
cattle as well as for eco-development. 
Further divided into- 
Forest area managed for sustainable 
utilization of natural resources including 
agriculture and institutional and community 
waste land.  
Areas for development of roads, schools, 
industries and markets. 
Areas with settlements and villages, 
cultivated lands and tourism facilities like 
hotels, lodges, resorts, restaurants and 
recreational services 
Source: ONPC management plan, N.D. 
 
  
46 
 
The main objectives of the proposed ONPC focus on developing programs related to 
eco-restoration and sustainable livelihoods. They include identifying problems related to 
wildlife, ecology, people’s livelihoods and eco-tourism; determining management 
priorities for development within the region; and developing detailed project reports for 
the development of the protected areas as part of the Indira Sagar project (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
Social Justice         Empowerment 
 
 
 
 
Participation            Sustainability 
Source: ONPC N.D. 
Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework of the proposed ONPC 
 
 
 
Eco-Restoration 
Conservation 
 
Eco-tourism 
 
Eco-development 
Livelihood 
Diversification 
Developing PAs 
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According to the plan, the conservational dimension of the project emphasizes on the 
habitat and species conservation and restoration whereas the livelihoods aspect will 
focus on the local capacities related to the local cultures and skills (ONPC N.D.). To 
implement these, different zones will be created to facilitate effective and efficient 
management of the planned ONPC (Table 2.5).  Once these zones are identified, they 
will be demarcated by erecting “boundary pillars, integrated trench-mound wire- 
biological fence and propagate social fencing (awareness and motivation) to discourage 
boundary encroachment” (ONPC N.D.:27). During the fieldwork in 2009-2010, I 
observed that the park officials had started putting wired fences around the communities 
selected for this study. According to the management plan (ONPC N.D.), the objective 
of eco-development policy is to lessen the reliance of local resource-users on the forest 
resources and to get their extensive support in implementing the conservation-
development policies in the region in addition to the goal of boosting household 
incomes. This objective will be fulfilled by the development of agroforestry, village 
resources, alternative energy and participatory forest management (ONPC N.D.). 
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Table 2.5 ONPC Project Objectives and Strategies 
 
Objective Strategy 
Manage and restore critical 
ecosystem important for 
the sustenance of wildlife 
Establish corridors or passages for wildlife species 
Reintroduce both floral and faunal endangered species  
Relocate species in the submergence area 
Restoration of threatened sub-ecosystems due to submergence 
Conserve, enhance and 
maintain biodiversity of the 
region 
Notify protected areas 
Identify and protect biological hotspots 
Conduct species monitoring and research 
Develop species conservation action plan 
Control of illegal hunting and poaching activities 
Reduce human dependency on protected areas’ resources 
Strengthen conservation education and awareness programs 
Establish land use based 
management system 
Classify area into different management zones 
Demarcate boundaries and develop detailed plan 
Strengthen management of 
protected areas  
Prepare comprehensive management plan 
Develop organizational capacity 
Develop human resources 
Establish biodiversity conservation trust fund 
Enhance the knowledge 
and skill on biodiversity 
conservation and wise use 
of bio-resources 
Promote multi-disciplinary management 
Strengthen research and documentation 
Develop effective management informative system 
Carry out monitoring and evaluation 
Maintain and improve the 
conservation, utilization 
and ownership of 
biophysical resources 
Constitute/strengthen community-based institutions 
Delineate eco-zones for providing souvenir rights to local communities 
Minimize conflicts between protected areas and people 
Document indigenous and ethno-biological knowledge  
Diversify livelihood 
opportunities of the local 
communities 
Improve Agriculture and livestock farming 
Develop alternative means of livelihood 
Develop alternative forest resources outside protected areas 
Implement eco-development for the protected area periphery villages 
Relocate villages of sub-submergence area 
Promote community based 
eco-tourism 
Identify areas of tourism importance and develop  tourism 
infrastructure 
Develop models of physical facilities for rural tourism 
Promote cultural heritage for conservation 
Develop a strategy for private sector investment for tourism 
development in the area 
Develop ecotourism management plan for the area 
Build and strengthen the 
capacity of local people 
and community institutions 
Form federate units of community based institutions 
Establish linkages and coordination with stakeholders 
Strengthen capacity of the local institutions 
Gender empowerment and mainstreaming in resource conservation 
Community capital generation and mobilization 
Source: ONPC report (N.D.) 
  
49 
 
The ONPC region is rich in both floral and faunal species. According to the ONPC 
report, Friends and Nature Society (1996) stated that a total of 311 floral species were 
found in the submergence area of the Indira Sagar dam (Table 2.6). Of these, 36 percent 
belong to the different tree species, followed by herbs and shrubs (34 percent), and 
climber species (21 percent). About 69 plant species, reported in this area, were 
significantly categorized into medicinal and food groups. In addition, there are about 206 
faunal species in the submergence area of the Indira Sagar dam (Table 2.7). More 
specific distribution of the faunal species which is spread over the ranges of Kantaphod, 
Satwas, Punjapura and Udaynagar is presented in Table 2.8.  Important wildlife in the 
region includes lion, panthers, nilgai, deers, jackals and other smaller animals.  
 
 
Table 2.6 Floral diversity of the submergence area 
 
Number Type Number of species 
reported 
Proportion 
1 Tree 112 36.0 
2 Herbs and Shrub 106 34.1 
3 Grasses 29 9.3 
4 Climbers 64 20.6 
 Total 311 100.0 
Source: FONS (1996) in ONPC report (N.D.)  
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Table 2.7 Faunal diversity within the submergence area 
 
Type Species reported 
Number Percent 
Mammals 33 16.0 
Birds 126 61.2 
Reptiles 15 7.3 
Amphibians 8 3.9 
Fishes 24 11.7 
Total 206 100.0 
Source: FONS (1996) in ONPC report (N.D.) 
 
 
STUDY SITE COMMUNITIES 
Approximately 84 villages are situated around the proposed ONPC - 55 villages in the 
Dewas district; 28 in Khandwa and 1 village in Khargone. Largely, this region 
incorporates the tribal ‘adivasis’ population, constituting approximately 22.3% of the 
total population. All the villages in the ONPC largely depend on the forest resources for 
their daily sustenance, particularly fuel-wood and non-timber forest products. Since the 
decision to create the park has been recent, presently there is no direct or indirect 
conflict between the park officials and the local communities regarding the changes in 
rules-in-use.  
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Table 2.8 Specific faunal distribution within the ONPC region 
 
Wildlife Species Kantaphod range Punjapura 
range 
Udaynagar 
range 
Satwas range 
Panther (male) 1 4 4 - 
Panther (female) 1 3 4 - 
Panther (unknown 
gender) 
1 - 4 - 
Nilgai (boselaphus 
tragocamelus) 
10 95 47 337 
Deer 26 - 288 50 
Monkey 649 2177 212 410 
Rabbit 26 568 965 305 
Jungle Cat(Felis 
Chaus) 
9 94 116 - 
Dhole/ Asiatic 
wild dog(Cuon 
Alpinus) 
8 - 113 3 
Jackal 103 248 428 159 
Wild boar(Sus 
scrofa) 
11 391 532 297 
Fox - 26 101 36 
Indian black buck 
(Antelope 
cervicapra L.) 
- 4 - - 
Peacock - 155 144 100 
Lion - - 1 - 
Bear - - 3 8 
Hyena - - 26 14 
Porcupine - - 34 19 
Wild Buffalo - - 8 - 
Indian Gazelle - - 26 - 
Grey Junglefowl - - 73 - 
Indian Bison 
(Gaur) 
- - 55 - 
Crocodile - - 5 - 
Fishes - - Enough Plentiful 
Cheetal/ Spotted 
deer (Axis Axis) 
- - - 30 
Source: ONPC official (Personal communication 2009) 
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Within the proposed ONPC, six sample villages were selected for this study. Of these six 
villages, villages A, B, C and D are located within the Khandwa district. The remaining 
villages E and F are situated in the Dewas district. Of these six villages, two villages, 
namely Village E and Village F, are situated in the Dewas district while, the other four 
villages – Village C, Village B, Village D and Village A are located in the Khandwa 
district of Madhya Pradesh. These villages were selected on the criteria based on the 
proximity to the base station (Narmadanagar), safety and accessibility especially during 
the severe monsoon season in July-August. In addition, these villages were especially 
selected under the guidance of the advisor, the Chief Conservator of Forests (of 
proposed ONPC) and the proposed national park’s office. The guiding factor in this 
study was the proximity to the proposed national park.  As a result, the villages selected 
for the study were situated within two kilometer of the park boundary and had alternate 
selective criteria such as safety and daily commute especially during the monsoons. In 
such cases, the weekly market or haat are one of the adopted trading places where the 
resources extracted are sold locally except in the case of tendupatta which is sold on 
contractual basis. 
Villages E and F are located in Dewas district. From the base-station in Khandwa 
district, the base station of Dewas was about 140 kilometers away. The second base-
station Pipri was located right on the main road. The forest office complex had three 
separate one-room buildings. There was no electricity in the vicinity. For water, the 
forest staff has installed water tanks on top of every building to conserve water and for 
24 hours use. One of the most interesting things was that the forest staff has installed 
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three solar lamps in the compound for lightning purposes in the evening. They are 
automatic so when it starts getting dark, they automatically are switched on and as dawn 
arrives, they are automatically turned off. They are six watts each and can conserve up to 
100 watts battery. So even if the sun does not come out for few days, they can still use 
the conserved solar energy. They even use solar portable lamps and torches which they 
charge everyday using the solar energy and use it during the night. Next, I present a 
description of the selected communities from the proposed ONPC.  
 
Village A 
Village A is located about 25 kilometers away from the base station. It is situated close 
to the submergence area of the Indira-Sagar dam. It is accessible through public 
transport buses. The village is situated on one side of the main state highway. On one 
side of the paved road, there was forest and the other side was the entry to the village. A 
forest post guards the entry to the village, adjacent to which there was a 4 room house 
has been built for the forest guards and the other visiting forest officials. In front of the 
forest-house and forest post, there was a unpaved mud road that extended into the 
village. After almost 0.5 kilometers, the road was lined with mud houses on both the 
sides. Beyond the houses, extensive agriculture fields could be seen. I noted that many 
houses in the village are made of mud walls and locally made country tiles called kavelu. 
The built material make-up of the houses looked same but they differed in sizes. Every 
house had a mixture of mud and cow-dung coated on the walls and the floor. A common 
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picture of clean mud yard, with a tree or two and a woven cot called charpai greeted the 
eyes.  
There are twenty five households in this village.  Some were located right next to each 
other while some were placed a bit farther from the unpaved road. A couple of the 
affluent households were noted as they were constructed of bricks with kavelu on the 
roof. There were less trees and shrubs along the roadside. However, at the other end of 
the village, the 2.5 km unpaved road leads up into another village. Fields separate the 
villages. Towards the end of the village, there was a large ground which had a couple of 
scattered trees. The Village A tendupatta cooperative society was located there with a 
giant storage unit, locally called godaan. During the tendupatta season, the bundles of 
leaves are collected there and then placed into numerous sacks. There was only one 
small general shop in the village which sold confectionaries, dry snacks like biscuits and 
bidis.  
 
Village B 
 Village B is situated deep inside the forest (Figure 2.4). It is accessible through private 
vehicles including bullock-carts, cycles or by foot. From village A, continuing further on 
the state highway away from the base-station, the road bifurcates. One road goes further 
up to Satwas and other leads into the forest. The unpaved forest road extends up to about 
nine kilometers before connecting to the Village B. The forest extends to about eight 
kilometers before opening into agricultural fields and mud and bamboo houses. It was 
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observed that the households within this village used bamboo for roofs instead of kavelu. 
To go to Village B, another village must be passed through first. Village B is shaped like 
a circle. Beyond the village lies the forest and in front of the households, the agricultural 
fields are situated.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Village B bordering the ONPC forest 
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Village C 
Village C is located approximately 5 kilometers away from the base station. It is 
accessible through public transport buses which connects Khandwa (town) on one side 
to Satwas (town) on another. After getting down from the bus on a paved road, a small 
unpaved muddy road, locally called pagdandi led into the village. Numerous tire marks 
were found on the pagdandi which led to the conclusion that either many households 
have a two wheeler in the village or this is an important forest post. Both options were 
found to be true. This pagdandi extended for two and a half kilometer before entering 
the village. On both sides of the pagdandi, agricultural fields were found, some of which 
had growing crops and hence were green. In the agricultural fields, towards the front of 
the village, some machaans (raised temporary hay shelter) were noted which are 
constructed by the farmers on their lands, generally as a resting place while taking care 
of their fields. In addition, three to four fields had built animal shelters. Small dead 
shrubs marked the edges of the pagdandi. A huge garbage dump lies, where the entire 
village throws their garbage, immediately before the entry of the village. This made the 
village look very dirty. Unlike village A where the houses were only lined next to the 
main unpaved road in the village, Village C had numerous multiple houses, one behind 
another. These houses were made of mud with mud floors and had front fences 
constructed out of bamboos. Outside some of the houses, bathroom/toilets were 
constructed with bricks and covered by a cloth curtain at its entry door. The pagdandi 
ended in the village center (square) where a temple (Hanuman) was located. On one side 
of the village square, there was a handpump where small girls were filling water into 
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their earthen pots and on another corner there were two general shops. One of the 
general store had an extended shop that repaired two-wheelers including tires. From this 
village center, the houses extended in an asymmetrical fashion in every direction. It was 
noted that different social tribes live in separate neighborhoods within the village. For 
instance, all bhilalas and barelas lived towards the right side and bhanjaras towards the 
back end of the village. It was observed that the banjara neighborhood was the worst in 
terms of cleanliness and hygiene. It really looked dirty with human (or animal) feces 
lying and people’s spits on the almost every path around the village. There were lots of 
dirty water puddles as a result of which there were lots of flies around. 
From the village square towards the right, after almost half a kilometer, there are two 
schools – one primary and one secondary (till 8th class). These schools are located 
almost towards the right periphery of the village surrounded by the forests. In the school, 
it was observed that the teachers verbally scolded small children. Some of the reasons 
included not attending school daily, not wearing school dress, or not bringing school 
copy/slate. One of the school teacher informed that the main problem teaching in such a 
school is that when parents are not interested in their children studying then they do not 
care. They often do not send their children to school daily. Just because children get food 
at school every day under government’s mid-day lunch scheme hence they come daily. 
Often children do not come because they have to help their parents in the agricultural 
fields/ grazing the cattle or goats/ go to jungle with them for bringing wood. Their 
society and culture is such that they don’t think it necessary for their kids to learn how to 
read and write. Ultimately the kids have to help the parents with different chores and get 
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married later. As a result, the pass percentage of the children in the school from this 
village is really low (as told by the school teacher).  
 At the back side of the village, there was a large dirty pond, surrounded by the forests, 
where cattle take bath and village women wash their clothes. Village C is a bigger 
village in land size and population. Of all the sampled villages, it was closest to the 
forest, only next to village C. 
 
Village D 
Village D is located further down the road from the base station. From the main road, the 
village is situated further approximately 10 kilometers on a dusty unpaved road. The 
village has water shortage and hence has less greenery. The forests surround the village 
from left to right in a semi-circular pattern. As seen in the other villages, the houses are 
made of bamboo and are mud coated. The houses are lined on either side of the unpaved 
road that follows into the village from the main road. While entering the village, more 
houses are clustered together and as one moves farther away, the houses become 
scattered. The main agricultural fields are located just outside the village along the 
unpaved road (Figure 2.5). A shared godaan for tendupatta can also be seen about a 
kilometer before entering the village. There is no school in the immediate village and 
hence the children have to travel to another nearby village. Because of the distance 
between the nearby village and Village D and the fact that there is no secondary school 
nearby, some families do not send their children to school. Therefore, many children 
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from different age groups are seen loitering away on the streets. There is only one 
weekly public bus that connects the Village D to larger villages.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Village D farm lands with scattered huts and forests in the background 
 
 
Village E 
Village E is situated towards eastern direction, at least 4 kilometers away, on the hill 
slope on the Dewas side of Narmada river. From the second base station, Village E is 
about 25 kilometers away. Two villages are located between the base station and the 
Village E. Just outside the village, the forests include anjan (Hardwickia binata Roxb.) 
  
60 
 
trees, which are often lopped by the villagers for cattle food. Some of the trees have been 
lopped so badly that the park officials had to advise and educate them about lopping 
branches.  
This is a relatively small and scattered village. There are about 48 households within the 
village. Adivasis from Maan Thakur tribe live here. It was found that in 1910 only 12 
families or 12 households lived in the village. By 2009, the total number of households 
has increased to 48. Due to constant electricity and water problem, Village E looked the 
poorest (Figure 2.6). While the other villages looked green with the mud houses, Village 
E had bamboo houses. Only houses were coated with mud and rest were not. Two hand 
pumps were installed by the park officials for the villagers, but the ground water level is 
so low that the water cannot be pumped with installing an electric pumping machine. To 
operate this machine, electricity is required. Hence, there is an acute shortage of water 
and electricity in the village. The only source of water is the Narmada river. To fetch 
water for household purposes, a trip of 4 kilometers downhill and then another 4 
kilometers uphill has to be made.  
From the months of March till June, the local inhabitants of Village E get enough work 
from the forest by extracting tendupatta, mahua, and gums. During the monsoon, only 
jowar (Sorghum), maize, tuar (Gram), soybean and cotton are grown in the village E. 
Out of these, soybean and cotton are sold and rest all are used for subsistence purposes. 
Animals like wild pigs and monkeys often cause problems during the growing crop 
season. Hence, the villagers have to stay all night at the fields to take care of the crops.  
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Figure 2.6 Unpaved roads in Village E 
 
 
Village F 
Village F is located about 4 kilometers inside the forest from the second base-station.  
The houses were made of bamboos which are tied in a crisscross pattern and are filled by 
cow-dung and mud. Every four months, the owner has to apply more cow-dung paste on 
the walls to beautify the walls and make it stronger. The courtyards were also coated 
with the mud and cow-dung paste. This is a large village with scattered agricultural 
fields around the periphery of the village. The forests are located beyond the fields 
(Figure 2.7). The village is not shaped in a symmetrical manner. Some houses are close 
to each other and some are far away. There is a community center in the village which is 
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well-constructed by the bricks. Of all the sampled villages except for Village C, Village 
F has the most livestock mainly cows and buffaloes. This means that the Village F is 
more agricultural and depends relatively less on forest resources.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Village F with unpaved roads and mud houses 
 
 
Different selected communities engage in different productive economic activities. Since 
the state of Madhya Pradesh is predominantly an agricultural economy, the inhabitants 
of proposed ONPC mainly engage as gatherers of non-timber forest resources (NTFPs), 
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farmers or work as laborers on other agricultural farms (Table 2.9). While waiting for 
the designation of the ONPC as protected area, the villages situated within the area have 
been declared forest villages. Forest protection committees have been formed there by 
the ONPC management as the micro-forest governance structures.  
 
 
Table 2.9 Occupation details within the study area 
Types of 
occupation 
Number of households within villages 
A B C D E F 
Total Farm 
Own 
Labor  
-  
140 
4 
 
175 
150 
-  
25 
 
70 
6 
Total Labor 
Farm 
Development  
-  
146 
3 
 
150 
300 
-  
25 
 
6 
Forest 
extraction 
- 146 450 - 83 76 
Temporary 
migration 
- 14 40 - 10 6 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010.   
Note- some categories overlap 
 
 
Regional differences also result in infrastructure disparities across the six selected 
villages (Table 2.10). The data for the infrastructural facilities was generated through the 
village forms. These forms were filled by the local school teachers, as they are the ones 
who are engaged in the census data collection. There is no NGO, regional or 
international, that operates within this region. However, every village has an anganwadi 
  
64 
 
for the basic healthcare as a part of the public healthcare system. In addition, asha 
karyakarta, or the women healthcare workers for particularly poor women and children, 
can also be found in these villages. Every selected village has a primary school, while 
insufficient middle and senior schools.  
 
 
Table 2.10 Details of infrastructures within selected villages 
 
Parameters Details of infrastructure within villages 
A B C D E F 
Total Population - 715 2139 748 500 700 
Total Households - 146 478 155 83 78 
Literacy rate  
- 
51% 37% 
 
25% 25% 60% 
Total livestock - - 1945 - 700 360 
Water sources 
Hand pumps 
Well 
Tube well 
Pond 
Others 
-  
4 
0 
20 
1 
0 
 
12 
2 
0 
1 
0 
 
4 
1 
2 
0 
0 
 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
5 
2 
0 
0 
0 
Sanitation facility in 
households 
Incomplete 1 433 0 0 0 
Electricity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School 
Primary 
Middle 
Senior 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 
0* 
0 
 
1 
1 
0 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 
0 
0 
Anganwadi 1 1 2 1 1 1 
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Table 2.10 (continued) 
 
Parameters Details of infrastructure within villages 
A B C D E F 
       
       
Number of 
families 
below 
poverty line 
- 33 128 84 40 76 
Number of 
families 
above 
poverty line 
- 113 350 127 43 2 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010.  *Proposal sanctioned. Construction will begin within one or two years 
 
 
FOREST RULES: BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED ONPC 
Different rules-in-use exist for different forest resources such as tendupatta (leaves of 
Diospyros melanoxylon), flowers of mahua (Madhuka indica), Kullu gum (Sterculia 
urerns), and Dhavda gum (Anogeissus latofoia) (Table 2.11). These rules-in-use varied 
during pre-ONPC and during ONPC implementation. The extractions of all these forest 
resources are restricted to the ‘Other Forest Area’ within the ONPC. At this point, it is 
unknown whether ‘Other Forest Area’ has been declared as the village forests within the 
ONPC.  
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Table 2.11 Summary of Forest Rules-in-Use before and after the ONPC implementation  
 
 
 
These rules-in-use will be described as follows- 
1. Nistaar Rights 
2. Fuelwood 
3. Cattle grazing 
4. NTFPs 
a. Tendupatta 
Forest extraction 
activities 
Rules before 
implementation 
Rules during/after 
implementation 
Location within 
ONPC where 
allowed 
 
Fuelwood  Extracted from 
village forest; extract 
as per need; 
Nationalized in 1974 
One headload per 
person allowed 
during one/multiple 
visits 
Other Forest Area 
Cattle Grazing Cattle can graze  
anywhere 
No cattle grazing 
allowed except on 
reserved forest land 
Other Forest Area 
NTFPs: 
1. Tendupatta 
Private extraction; 
Nationalized in 1964 
Extracted under Park 
officials’  
supervision; sold to 
cooperatives only 
Other Forest Area 
2. Mahua Extracted from   
private trees; 
sold to village  
merchants 
Private extraction; 
sold to village 
merchants 
Other Forest Area 
3. Kullu gum Nationalized in 1995; 
free extraction 
Extracted from 
reserved forests; sold 
to cooperatives. 
Other Forest Area 
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b. Mahua 
c. Kullu and Dhavda gums 
 
Nistaar Rights 
Under the Indian Forest Act 1878, all unreserved forests were notified as reserved. This 
restricted the local forest dwellers to unreserved forests for their daily needs. To help 
them fulfill their needs, the state introduced ‘nistaar’ rights. Nistaar rights are the rights 
that relate to villagers’ necessities of forest produce made available to all agriculturalists, 
village artisans and agricultural laborers (Buch 1991). Before India’s independence in 
1947, to exercise their nistaar rights, villagers were issued licenses in rotation for 
extracting forest materials for their needs such as bamboo for constructing house. In 
post-independence period, Forest Nistaar policy of Madhya Pradesh was introduced in 
1958 under which nistaar depots were started, specifically for those villagers who did 
not live near the forests. The state government stated that “all nistaar requirements of the 
cultivators be fulfilled, as far as possible from those forests which are most conveniently 
located. There should be no distinction between any class of cultivators, including on 
account of the nearness or distance of residence from the forest” (Buch 1991:68). 
Currently in the proposed ONPC, no household depends on the nistaar depots as they 
exercise their nistaar rights to extract from the nearby forests. While planning the 
creation of the proposed ONPC, the ONPC authorities have decided to grant enough area 
in the nearby reserved forests to the local communities so that they do not depend on the 
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proposed ONPC for their daily sustenance. In addition, the local people will be 
encouraged to use nistaar depots.  
 
Fuelwood 
 Before the proposed ONPC came into existence, the designated park area was managed 
by the state territorial forest department as village forest. There, local inhabitants were 
allowed to use resources for different sustenance needs. The timber was nationalized in 
1974. As a result, to control illegal tree felling, the forests of Khandwa division were 
classified as protection forests, production forests and social forests (Lal 1987). 
Protection forests were the forests which were found on steep and precipitous slopes (25 
degrees Celsius and above) along the river banks. To control rapid soil erosion, 
conservation of such forests was determined by banning logging within 2 kilometers 
along Narmada River. Production forests included that belt of forests which was 
managed for timber production for commercial and industrial purposes. Lastly, local 
communities were allowed to fulfill their daily needs through social forests. However, 
according to one of the working plans of the then territorial forest department in 1987, it 
was noted that the village forests were gradually being destroyed by the local inhabitants 
for agricultural, settlements and other purposes (Lal 1987). Hence, to control the rapid 
exploitation of tree felling, measures were taken to spread awareness and educate the 
local communities through meetings.  
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Once ONPC was proposed as a protected area, its broader management and policy 
planning related to wildlife conservation was guided by the Central Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry. For the day to day tasks, a self-regulating department under 
the state forest department was created with vested responsibility of implementation of 
the national policies and plans, administered by centrally appointed forest officer called 
Chief Conservator of Forest (Ministry of Environment and Forest 2012).  
All the previous rules and regulations that were applied to the space, now defined as 
ONPC, were terminated. New rules (based on combination of the Wildlife Protection 
Act 1972, Indian Forest Act of 1927, Forest Conservation Act 1980, Environment 
Protection Act 1986 and Biological Diversity Act 2002), under which different 
categories of protected areas were created, came into being (Ministry of Environment 
and Forest 2012). According to these new rules-in-use, no commercial or subsistence 
activity will be allowed inside the core area that included the national park and wildlife 
sanctuaries. Furthermore, to use the conservation reserves, the local inhabitants were 
expected to acquire permission from the forest guards. Based on the newer rules-in-use, 
women are allowed to bring fuelwood, but only as much as they can carry in a single 
headload. Local people are not allowed to take vehicles like tractors or bullock carts 
inside the forest. This inhibits their ability to cut down large trees for constructing their 
small huts. 
 
 
  
70 
 
Cattle-Grazing 
It is believed that before the ONPC was created, the peripheral communities grazed their 
cattle in the forests. Due to stricter rules-in-use, the cattle grazing will be limited to the 
‘Other Forest Area’.  
 
Tendupatta (Leaves of Diospyros Melanoxylon) 
 In the pre-ONPC period, before 1964, tendupatta extraction was done privately by 
landowners and sold it to bidi-making (local cigarettes) businesses independently. To 
stop illegal extraction of tendupatta from government and forest lands, safeguard 
extractors’ interests against exploitation and to increase the state revenue, in 1964 
tendupatta extraction was nationalized, which means that it cannot be traded freely 
(Madhya Pradesh State Minor Produce 2010). Under this policy, the tendupatta 
producing forest areas were divided into forest compartments, in such a way that from 
each compartment, the maximum extraction can be 2500-3000 manak boras (1 manak 
boras = 50,000 leaves or 1000 bundles). This measure is still followed currently in the 
ONPC. Different processes including pruning of the tendu shrubs and the extraction of 
leaves are now supervised by the forest department officials (previously) and park 
officials (currently). Since the nationalization of tendupatta, all the villages within the 
region were divided into clusters and cooperative societies were formed. As a result, the 
bundled tendupatta are now sold to the respective cooperative societies which are 
supervised by the bidi contractor and the park officials. 
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Flowers of Mahua (Madhuka Indica) 
Flowers of mahua are extracted in this region for subsistence purposes including its use 
as a raw material for cooking. It is mainly employed to prepare local alcoholic drinks. 
These trees can be found in and around the villages in addition to the forests. Local 
households generally own the trees scattered around the villages. Hence, during the pre-
ONPC days, local inhabitants could freely extract flowers of mahua from the forests and 
around their villages. However, when the park gets officially notified, the local 
inhabitants would still be able to extract flowers from their private trees but not from the 
forests, unless it lies within ‘other forests’ created for the local village use.  
 
Kullu Gum (Sterculia Urerns) and Dhavda Gum (Anogeissus Latofoia) 
Extraction of kullu gum is done during the summers particularly, while the extraction of 
dhavda gum is done throughout the year. The extract of kullu gum has high medicinal 
value and hence is bought by the pharmaceutical companies. In addition, it is also used 
for making confectionaries. In local practice, extracted kullu gum is often given to 
pregnant ladies for strength. Before the creation of ONPC, due to rapid exploitation of 
these trees in Madhya Pradesh, the state government banned its extraction by the late 
1980s. However, this ban was uplifted by 1995 when the extraction of kullu gum was 
nationalized. Currently, in the ONPC, it is extracted particularly through Minor Produce 
Cooperative Societies and district unions. It was observed that the ONPC management 
holds meetings about one a year to educate the locals about the right procedure to extract 
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gum. In addition, they are also given necessary equipment including a sickle and plastic 
sheets. 
The ONPC officials regulate the collection and sale of some NTFPs. For example, the 
forest department gives contracts to the ONPC inhabitants to collect tendupatta, and 
once collected, the local communities make bundles and deliver it to the forest 
department who then exports it out of the region based on national or international 
demands.  At the same time, current conservation reflects some aspects of “fortress 
conservation,” such as guards (nakedaar) empowered by the proposed ONPC principles 
to enforce and regulate forest access, particularly for local people living in the nearby 
forest villages.  
The changes in rules-in-use have implemented a ban or restrictions on the daily 
extraction of forest resources for livelihood activities. Forest cover density is measured 
on the basis of density of the tree canopies. Canopy density is defined as “the relative 
completeness of canopy usually expressed as a decimal coefficient, taking closed canopy 
as a unit” (Forest Survey of India 2009). Forest covers with 0.4 densities or more will 
have a van suraksha samiti (Forest Protection Committee). On the other hand, in areas 
with less than 0.4 forest cover densities, gram van samiti (village forest committees) are 
found. The villages with van suraksha samitis are characterized as forest villages, while 
the villages with gram van samitis are categorized as revenue villages (Personal 
Communication. Government Official 2010).  
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METHODOLOGY 
I collected the data and information for the different research objectives from a 
qualitative semi-structured interviews, case studies, and household surveys.  
 
Data Collection 
 I conducted intensive household surveys and participant observation, in the selected six 
villages, which attempted to extensively collect resource use and household economic 
related data from different socio-cultural groups inhabiting the region. I designed the 
household survey to generate quantitative data.  
I collected data and information for this study from six villages situated within five 
kilometer radius of the proposed ONPC boundary in the central Indian state of Madhya 
Pradesh. Of these six villages, two villages, namely Village E and Village F, are in the 
Dewas district while, the other four villages – Village C, Village B, Village D and 
Village A are in the Khandwa district of Madhya Pradesh. I also obtained a map of 
proposed ONPC from the park officials during the preliminary fieldwork in the summer 
of 2008. Based on the map, I then identified villages lying within 2 kilometers radius. 
During the pre-fieldwork in 2008, few random villages were selected for a visit on the 
basis of accessibility and contacts for the purpose of getting acquainted with the region. 
Preliminary data was collected from these selected villages. Ultimately, a final selection 
of the villages were based on the criteria including proximity to the base station 
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(Narmadanagar), safety and accessibility especially during the severe monsoon season in 
the months of July August. Except for Village D and Village F, rest of the selected 
villages had been visited during preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 2008 and 
contacts were established there. In addition, these villages were especially selected under 
the guidance of the advisor, the Chief Conservator of Forests (of proposed ONPC) and 
the proposed national park’s office.   
Focusing on the household economics, in contrast to selecting villages situated within 5 
kilometer of a market town (Mahapatra and Albers 2005), the guiding factor in this study 
was the proximity to the proposed national park.  As a result, the villages selected for the 
study were situated within 2 kilometer of the park boundary and had alternate selective 
criteria such as safety and daily commute especially during the monsoons. In such cases, 
the weekly market or haat are one of the adopted trading places where the resources 
extracted are sold locally except in the case of tendupatta which is sold on contractual 
basis. 
I collected the data from November 2009 to August 2010 and December 2010-January 
2011 involving a random chain sample of 204 panel households in the six villages. The 
target population was 18 years and older. As a different dialect of Hindi language is 
spoken in the region (Nimari), I hired field assistants. Education, social networking, 
availability and family permission were the main criteria I used to select the assistant. 
Three different field assistants were hired at different phases of the fieldwork. One field 
assistant helped with the data collection in the Village A, Village B, Village C and 
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Village D in the Khandwa region. On the other hand, two assistants provided help in the 
Village E and Village F of the Dewas region. These assistants helped in translating the 
interviews and filling out of the survey forms. They were trained for two days that 
included their orientation with the study objectives and IRB protocol. I discussed 
interview and survey questions with them to help them understand how to explain the 
question, if required, and what kind of answer to expect. Interviewer training consisted 
of role playing which was followed by practice interviews. I decided to spend one and 
half months in each village to collect data. I began the process by visiting each village 
for first three days, either early morning or late evenings (for the convenience of the 
villagers) and socialized with the villagers by introducing ourselves and the study 
objectives. Along with my field assistant, I spent time at the local schools interacting 
with the school teachers, chatting with the bais (village women) about their daily 
activities and discussing local health issues at the local anganwadi (basic healthcare 
provider in the village). At the end of the three-day period, I broadly understood the 
daily routines of the villagers and their activities and situated my plan for data collection 
around it. I visited villages early in the morning to talk to men and late mornings to talk 
to bais within each household. Visits to the villages were canceled during cultural 
events. Often, I accompanied the bais to the forest for collecting fuelwood or tendupatta 
while interviewing them at the same time. A voice recorder was used to record the 
interviews once interviewee gave his/her permission. At the end of the day, observations 
were noted in the field diary.  
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Surveys 
 I conducted a total of 204 household surveys. In order to provide detailed information, 
the household survey was designed in six elaborative sections. Out of these six sections, 
two sections contributed to the data on household economics. Of these, the first section 
‘general economics’ focused on the data from individual households and was divided 
into three categories based on the income generation activities – forest products, farm 
and non-farm. The first category compiled detailed data such as which resources they 
collected each year, month-wise resource extraction, units collected and its sale. The 
second category on ‘income generated due to farm activities’ included questions related 
to the agricultural activities such as how much land do the people own, how much do 
they produce, what do they grow, if they need to work on other’s land or if they hire 
labors for their own land. Questions related to, travel in particular labor tasks outside the 
village and how much do they get paid, formed part of the third category.   
Other section aimed at calculating (closest approximate) individual household incomes, 
utilizing forest resources for cultural events, forest management institutions and 
consumption of fuelwood for different purposes based on the information provided by 
each household. Numerous questions on forest management institutions were 
incorporated in the household surveys to acquire perception of the resource-users to 
understand the dynamics of forest institutions. 
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Case-Studies 
I developed household case-studies to describe detailed household resource use and 
mobilization of tendupatta, mahua, kullu and dhavda gums particularly. Altogether I 
conducted 18 case studies, three from each of the sample villages. Before I began my 
fieldwork, I prepared a set of detailed prompts for each of the resource. Then I tested 
these prompts randomly on the local villagers from the six sampled villages to 
experiment the type of responses. Once I was satisfied, I conducted the micro case-
studies in the selected villages. Each interview ranged from 3 to 5 hours depending on 
the respondent’s work schedule. I selected three households from each village based on 
random chain sample. I ensured that the respondents selected for the micro case-studies 
were not engaged in the household surveys. I, along with my field assistant, visited the 
three selected households in each village and interviewed them based on the final 
prompts. Once I gained the respondent’s permission, these interviews were recorded on 
my voice recorder. At times, the entire family gathered while these interviews took place 
and the responses of the family members were also recorded. The names of the 
respondents were not recorded to maintain confidentiality so that their identities cannot 
be linked with the information they provided. As I had spent weeks visiting each of the 
villages and forming relationship with the village bais, I gained their trust which helped 
me particularly during the interviews.  
The prompts focused on the household resource use and mobilization of the selected 
resources particularly on how they mobilized and accessed resources, how often, for 
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what purposes, their perceptions of the recent changes on their access to resources and 
its regular mobilization and how it affect the social relationships within the household 
due to lack or excess of resources. The prompts also explored how they use the forest 
resources for cultural events, which resources and how it affects them and their social 
relationships when such resources are inaccessible due to restrictive access to forest or 
its unavailability. Some interviewees offered elaborative responses while others 
answered in few sentences.  
 
Interviews 
 I conducted ten interviews with the park officials randomly varying from the rangers to 
the forest guards. These interviews were designed to elicit responses based on the 
relationship between villages committees and park officials, history of the regional forest 
conservation practices and the recent changes. I asked questions involving changes in the 
condition of the local forests, role of local communities in safeguarding forest, their 
access to forest resources is beneficial or destruction to foundational forest conservation 
goals, van suraksha samiti and its role, whether they are successful or disaster and if 
decentralizing has been a good idea. These prompts were designed to examine whether 
any conflicts exist between the park officials and the local communities and in what role 
do the park officials situate the local communities – as benefactors or destroyers? 
In addition, I also developed some prompts to interview the head of the van suraksha 
samiti (Forest Protection Committee) from each selected villages. Out of six villages, I 
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was able to interview only four heads, while other two were unavailable for interviews. 
These prompts were helpful in obtaining specific information about each van suraksha 
samiti including when they were established, their goals and members, how are they 
elected or selected, powers that reside with the head and the members, their duties and 
responsibilities as per the committee rules towards forest conservation, involvement of 
women within the committee, meetings held, how often, any conflicts among the 
villagers or between the villagers and the park officials and its benefits to the village. 
These interviews revealed the role of van suraksha samiti in village development and 
forest conservation.  
 
Data Analysis 
 The data collected from the surveys was designed into excel spreadsheets, with each 
village maintaining a separate spreadsheet. Once these spreadsheets were complete with 
the raw survey data, I created descriptive statistics highlighting the participant 
households engaged in different income generation activities and related labor dynamics 
along with the actual income generated from these economic activities. Descriptive 
statistics included mean, median, standard deviation and variance which were all 
calculated through IBM SPSS version 20 software.  
Three categories were created that included farm activities, off-farm activities and non-
timber forest resources for 204 households. For the farm activities, all the income 
generated from the crop production in summer, monsoon and winter seasons was 
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registered separately along with the livestock sale. The income from the off-farm 
activities was divided into the work on another’s farm, work under forest department, 
work under the village panchayats, and temporary remittances. Subsequently, incomes 
from the non-timber forest products were noted separately from the sale of tendupatta, 
mahua, kullu gum, dhavda gum and fuelwood.   
For the qualitative data, the first step for analysis involved transcribing all the interviews 
from Hindi/Nimari to English through Express Scribe software. Next step entailed 
developing a theory through focused coding – categorizing and organizing codes into 
key themes, which was done by employing Atlas.ti software. Following codes, memos 
were prepared for transparent analysis. Subsequently, these memos were linked together 
to form a grounded theory (Charmaz 2006, Corbin and Strauss 1994).   
 
Data Problems 
When I initiated investigating the creation of the ONPC in summer 2007, I encountered 
resistance from the State Ministry of Environment and Forest, Madhya Pradesh. 
Repeatedly, I was told that there is no such plan and that I should end this project and 
select another area for my doctoral research. Over the years, I made a breakthrough by 
establishing contacts and gained entry into the ONPC. This resistance decreased over the 
years but did not completely disappear. While gathering data from the villages has not 
been a problem, but securing government plans and documents about the park has been 
difficult as they were not ready to share them. This greatly affected the data analysis.  
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One of the other main problems that I encountered was that there was no way to 
corroborate the household income data which was collected through the surveys. It is 
possible that household heads or members, when surveyed, exaggerated their household 
income data, which might have caused anomalies in the data. However, I tried to 
ascertain the income told by the household head/member by observing the number of 
consumer items such as a television, a radio, a motor vehicle, a refrigerator in the house 
and type and built of the house. In addition, there were few cases in which the field 
assistants forgot to ask for the detailed household income data. Such cases have been 
included in the data analysis. These factors can again cause abnormality in the data.  
 
 
 
Table 2.12 Socio-cultural make-up of the six sampled villages 
 
Socio-cultural 
groups 
Village A Village B Village C Village D Village E Village F 
Total sample 19 36 34 40 36 39 
Adivasi 12 29 30 33 33 37 
Non-Adivasi 7 7 4 7 3 2 
Total 
percentage of 
Adivasi (%) 
63 81 88 83 92 95 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: Percentage has been rounded off  
 
 
It should be noted here the complex social heterogeneity of the rural Indian society is 
such that it cannot be ensured during sampling that similar socio-cultural groups are 
evenly distributed in each sample villages (Table 2.12). The total percentage of adivasi 
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reflects that the study area is predominantly tribal in social nature and non-adivasi are 
relatively smaller in number. Hence this affected the data analysis as the sample is not 
normally distributed.  
 
Field Biases 
 It is important to recognize the biases that existed during the fieldwork, thus playing an 
important role in the research results. Spending almost one year at the field site, I was 
conscious about minimizing these biases. Being an Indian and ability to speak Hindi was 
beneficial as it was relatively easy to gain trusts of the villagers. Despite the cultural 
advantages, the villagers were sensitively aware about me and my presence around their 
villages every day. Visiting villagers or the park officials, I took precautions to dress 
properly in Indian everyday clothes. I spent hours interacting with the villagers, ate food 
with them and walked several kilometers into the forest with the bais to collect fuelwood 
or tendupatta. I became accustomed to their lifestyle in order to minimize the biasness. 
However, at the same time, I was wary of the hygienic conditions in the villages, for 
instance, often covering my nose with a long scarf or carrying my own water bottle. 
During the fieldwork, I was thrice confronted by local events where in all circumstances, 
a small child had died and a feast was organized in the village. As a local school teacher 
told me it included drinking alcohol and eating meat. It was during these events that I 
stayed away from the villages. Throughout the mahua collection in February when the 
inhabitants begin preparing and consuming local alcohol, I spend minimal time in the 
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villages. I noticed particularly during February, either men would not go for work or 
return home from their jobs early in the afternoon. Both men and women would, then, 
spend the rest of the day drinking alcohol. Moreover, I was attentive to the rigid 
patriarchal village society structure. Before beginning the village surveys or interviews, 
it was important to first meet village headman and introduce the research. Several times 
during the fieldwork, my field assistant in Khandwa district compelled me to hire 
another field assistant for her position. I increased her salary to make her stay because of 
her social contacts in the selected villages. A local school teacher was astonished when 
she heard what I was paying my field assistant. She, then, told me that I am paying 
exorbitant salary to my field assistant in relation to the regional salaries. Hence, there 
was economic biasness that I could not overcome. These biases exerted unequal relations 
to some extent.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of the ONPC is a result of conservation trade-off compensating the loss of 
biodiversity from the submergence of forests from the nearby Indira Sagar and 
Omkareshwar dams. Developed under the compensatory afforestation program, ONPC is 
a result of the guidelines as per the independent review conducted by the World Bank in 
1993. Various zones have been created within the ONPC based on the IUCN’s 
categories namely, Omkareshwar National Park, Singhaji Wildlife Sanctuary, Mandhata 
Sanctuary and Narmada Conservation Reserve Unit I and II. Important wildlife in the 
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region includes lion, panthers, Nilgai, deers, jackals and other smaller animals. The 
ONPC focuses on the development of the programs related to eco-restoration and 
sustainable livelihoods within the forest communities. Six villages have been selected 
from the ONPC to conduct this study. These villages are dependent on the nearby forests 
for fuelwood consumption in addition to the income generating extraction of tendupatta, 
mahua, kullu and dhavda gums. Each of these resources has a distinct set of rules. 
Combinations of techniques were employed to gather qualitative and quantitative data 
including household surveys, interviews and micro case studies.  
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3. A TRADE-OFF FOR WHOM? CONSERVATION TRADE-OFFS AND 
INCOME DYNAMICS IN INDIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Biodiversity offsets emerged as a response to increasing number of development projects 
(Seagle 2009, Burgin 2008). It is important to study characteristics and shifts within 
biodiversity offsets because they can be thought of as double-edged sword – 
implications for the local communities from both conservation and development aspects. 
Creation of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in Madhya Pradesh is an 
example of one such conservation trade-off. Construction of the Indira Sagar and the 
Omkareshawar dams, part of the Narmada dam project in central India, marked severe 
deforestation and submergence of healthy forested areas. This threatened large areas of 
forest cover in the region. The Indian Forest Conservation Act of 1980 (1988 re-
amended) has implemented compensation for any change in forest land use to a definite 
non-forest land use, accomplished ‘on-site’ through deforestation, de-reservation or 
diversion for any development project, carried out and monitored through set of 
established guidelines (Kohli et al 2011). Establishing such areas necessitated 
reorganization of the rules-in-use, thus affecting the local communities. While the 
creation of the conservation trade-off addressed concerns of global environmental 
change, it consequently enhanced command and control policies at the local level. Yet, 
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we know little about the economic costs and benefits of changes in forest-resource use 
policies on the local people (Hirsch et al 2011, Igoe and Brockington 2007).   
To fill this knowledge gap, this section examines income dynamics across different 
socio-cultural groups within the proposed ONPC. Restructuring of the forest 
management institutions may alter access, control and mobilization of forest resources 
by all stakeholders. Change in access to forest resources implies a shift in local 
household economic practices. Hence, this study will investigate household economies 
to study the trends of income generation. Using data gathered from the six sample 
villages in the ONPC, this section will describe different economically productive 
activities and outline the shift in the household economic participation.  
I begin this section with a review of the relevant literature on biodiversity offsets and 
non-timber forest products in global and Indian context. The second sub-section 
describes the research design reviewing the case study site and data collection 
(household surveys) and analysis methods. I present results of two quantitative analyses 
of the data. First, I employ descriptive statistics to estimate the contribution of different 
economic activities to the household income. This analysis reveals income variance and 
discrepancies within the data. Second, I use non-parametric independent t-test to 
document how income varies across different socio-cultural groups and villages in the 
proposed ONPC.  This test provides a better understanding of the micro-realities of the 
economic relationships by indicating income variations. I use these data to analyze how 
formalization of the ONPC will change the local communities’ use 
  
87 
 
and household economies.  My analysis indicates that three main income production 
activities exist in the ONPC region that includes farm, off-farm and extraction of NTFPs. 
Different people engage in different economic activities in varying degrees. For all of 
the sampled villages, monsoon farming is most profitable. An inverse relationship exists 
between incomes derived from farm and NTFP extraction based on different farm sizes. 
Based on ethnicity, adivasi engage in more NTFP extraction, while non-adivasi prefer 
farm income, thus making the adivasi’s more economically vulnerable to changes in 
forest governance.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Biodiversity Offsets  
The relationship between biological diversity conservation and human development has 
evolved over the decades. A sea-change has moved conservation policy from the classic 
“fortress” (Brockington 2002, Hulme and Murphree 1999, Igoe 2004) to the community 
based conservation focused on development (Hulme and Murphree 2001, Neumann 
1998, McNeely and Miller 1984, Miller 1984, Agrawal 2001, Agrawal and Chhatre 
2006, Agrawal and Gupta 2005). Such conservation interventions have also been 
influenced by changing state-society relations, where previous state policies have taken a 
back-seat to the current forms of market-based incentives and valuation of ecosystem 
services (Igoe and Brockington 2007, Igoe et al 2010, Dressler and Roth 2011, 
Brockington and Igoe 2006, Büscher and Whande 2007). Amidst the conservation 
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paradigm change, a distinct branch has led to emergence of environmental compensatory 
mitigation or specifically called biodiversity offsets. Biodiversity offsets can be defined 
as “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity” 
(ten Kate et al 2004:13).  
Biodiversity offsets are considered an important tool for addressing environmental 
impacts of development, thus maintaining and equilibrium between the environment and 
development (McKenney and Kiesecker 2010). The biodiversity offset program is 
proving to be beneficial to businesses, governments, conservation groups and 
communities as evident by the wetland and conservation banking program in USA and 
habitat conservation in Australia and Canada (ten Kate et al 2004).  
However, the social dimensions of these interventions are mixed. On one hand, such 
programs have included local communities in resource governance while fostering an 
interaction between sustainable resource management and economic development 
(Burgin 2008, Norton 2007). But on the other hand, negative outcomes, including 
displacement and relocation of local communities from the conservation enclosures, still 
occur (Brockington and Igoe 2006, Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 2006, Adams and 
Hutton 2007). These adverse processes may or may not result in further economic 
marginalization of the local communities (Brockington and Igoe 2006). While different 
names for biodiversity offsets exist, including mitigation banking, conservation banking, 
compensatory mitigation, BioBanking, they all share similar objective – to reduce 
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biodiversity loss through market-based incentives and payments (Madsen et al 2010, ten 
Kate et al 2004, Morris et al 2006). According to State Biodiversity Markets report, at 
present 39 compensatory mitigation programs exist across the world, with several 
individual offset sites, in addition to 25 more programs in different stages of 
development (Madsen et al 2010). Such offset programs can be particularly found in 
New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, China, South Africa, Madagascar, 
Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom, Brazil, Colombia, United States, and Canada 
(McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Madsen et al 2010, Gordon et al 2011).  
Different realities of biodiversity offset programs exist globally. In North America, the 
biodiversity offsets programs are well-developed and focus on the wetlands and species 
mitigation in US (Robertson 2004, Bayon 2008) and fish habitats and wetland 
compensation in Canada (Madsen et al 2010).  In collaboration with the public-private 
sectors, commercial wetland mitigation banking, an environmental management policy, 
was introduced in United States in 1991. Under this program, the agencies developed a 
market in privately owned ‘wetland ecosystem services where the ecosystem services are 
produced and sold through site-restoration (Robertson 2004). More noticeable offset 
programs can be found elsewhere in Australia and New Zealand. Twelve biodiversity 
offset programs currently exist with five more in developmental stages (Madsen et al 
2010). The offsets are largely acquired by the urban property developers, infrastructure 
(road, pipelines) agencies, extractive industries, energy companies and agricultural 
landowners (Madsen et al 2010). In Australia, there is a sharp rise in the loss of 
threatened species that primarily exist in the urban areas due to urban expansion (Burgin 
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2008). In New South Wales, to address this issue, “Threatened Species Conservation 
Amendment (Biodiversity Banking) Bill” was passed in 2006 (Burgin 2008). Similar to 
carbon credit program, according to BioBanking, Burgin (2008) explains biodiversity 
credits may be produced by the land owners based on their commitment to reinforce and 
protect biodiversity on their land.  These credits act as ‘additional actions’ and can be 
traded off to compensate for the biodiversity impacts due to land development (Bayon 
2008, McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Burgin 2008). The land development may 
progress, only if the traded credits implement a “net maintain or improve outcome” for 
biodiversity (Burgin 2008). Main drawback of the program includes lack of government 
enforcement to base decisions on scientific reasoning (Burgin 2008). According to the 
State of Biodiversity Market report (Madsen et al 2010), till end of 2009, about 8,865 
hectares of land has been cleared and 25,564 hectares of offset has been created under 
BioBanking program in New South Wales.  
Studies on biodiversity offset program largely explore definition and global status 
(Madsen et al 2010, ten Kate et al 2004), framework assessment (Norton 2009, 
McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Kiesecker et al 2009, Burgin 2008, Tew 2011), 
mechanisms and impacts (Bayon 2008, Gordon et al 2011). However, there is inadequate 
literature linking biodiversity offsets with development parameters of livelihoods, 
resource sustainability, institutions, and social relationships.  
Conservation paradigm in 1980s and 1990s highlighted its interface with particularly, 
resource use and agriculture livelihoods, thus emphasizing its sustainable use that 
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supports the need to manage the conservation efforts along with the local communities in 
globalized era (Zimmerer 2006a). This third wave is characterized by conservation 
territories – “designated spaces of nature protection and resource management” 
(Zimmerer 2006a: 8, Zimmerer 2006b, Zimmerer 2000). The spatial settings within 
conservation territories are marked with the environmental management goals and 
definite set of activities that range from the rigid nature conservation to sustainable 
utilization (Zimmerer 2006a, Zimmerer 2006b).  These spatial settings are also defined 
by the changing technological tools that advance such conservation territories; creation 
of innovative management spaces including community conservation units; and 
environmental networks as well as interconnected spatial units, as a result of the 
participatory planning (Zimmerer 2006a). Emergence of biodiversity offsets can be 
considered an example of such conservation territories within spatial settings. 
Biodiversity offsets are trade-offs that set aside land for conservation from within 
development schemes. Such trade-offs are accompanied by different processes to control 
and command the project regulations. They also transform practices and processes at 
micro-scale, thus forever changing the social, political and economic dimensions of the 
local communities. Such trade-offs might affect the complex workings of conservative 
initiatives in either negative or positive ways. Hirsch et al (2011), expressing their 
concern, argue that the different distributional costs and benefits related to conservation 
enclosures including who pays, who loses and who benefits have been ignored and this 
interruption could result in conflicting struggles between different actors within the 
conservation initiative. In their study, the authors also claim that different methodology 
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should be employed that supports different complexities of conservation initiative in 
social and political context (Hirsch et al 2011). Karanth and Nepal (2012) examine local 
resident’s perception of losses and benefits from living in and around the protected areas 
in India and Nepal. The authors suggest that based on local resident’s perceptions, living 
in and around the conservation enclosures implies incurring losses such as crop, property 
and livestock  damages while receiving benefits at the same time including access to fuel 
and fodder and tourism (Karanth and Nepal 2012). However, their focus on losses and 
benefits from living in or around protected areas fail to engage the importance of 
persistent access to resource use and mobilization, particularly in India where millions of 
people still depend on daily forest resources like fuelwood.  Hence, this study will fill 
the gap in the literature by addressing the economic benefits and loses within the local 
households in the upcoming biodiversity offset in the ONPC and how it might influence 
the regulation of access to forest resources.  
Conservation-development studies has well-established the human-nature 
dichotomy/relationship through studies related to the conflict over resources (Jarosz 
1996, Peluso 1992, Carney 2004, Schroeder 1993, Rocheleau and Ross 1995, Sundberg 
2003), colonial power struggles (Peluso 1993, Robbins et al 2006, Robbins 1998, 
Neumann 1998), resource institutions (Robbins 2000, Agrawal and Gibson 1999). These 
studies explore the different ways through which the human practices and processes 
shape and are shaped by their environment. However, such studies are absent within 
biodiversity offset literature. 
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Studies have overlooked how the changes in the rules-in-use transform the livelihoods, 
thus impacting the income dynamics (Southworth et al 2006, Hirsch et al 2011, Igoe and 
Brockington 2007), within the context of conservation trade-offs.  According to Igoe and 
Brockington (2007), emerging concerns from creating exclusive conservation enclosures 
not only include, further inequalities among the various actors, but it also challenges the 
local traditional environmental knowledge and local initiatives. They further highlight 
the gap within the literature by suggesting that consequences of such processes on local 
communities are poorly addressed (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Southworth et al (2006) 
argue that in trade-offs resulting in conflicts between the people and parks, studies 
should examine and record the livelihoods of people around park peripheral areas and 
assess how their livelihoods and activities are in turn transformed by the effects of the 
protected areas. 
 
Non-Timber Forest Products and Conservation 
Rural forest dwellers across the world are known to extract and use extensively timber 
and non-timber forest products (NTFPs hereafter) to sustain their livelihoods (Love and 
Jones 2001, de Beers and McDermott 1989, Saxena 2003, Hembram 2007, Sunderland, 
Harrison and Ndoye 2004). The proximity of these dwellings to the forested areas exert 
pressure to the forest in forms of increasing human and livestock population along with 
growing poverty resulting in increasing loss of biodiversity (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau 
2003, Colchester 1994). Under such circumstances, the state either relocates the entire 
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forest dwelling, situated close to a protected area, away from the buffer zone or else 
amalgamates these communities with the conservation goals of the protected area 
(Brockington and Igoe 2006, Mclean and Straede 2003).  
Researchers have identified NTFPs oriented forest management as a viable option for 
sustainable forestry as it employs most economical and practical method for integrating 
the use and conservation of forests (Mahapatra and Mitchell 1997, Gubbi and MacMillan 
2008, Arnold and Ruiz-Perez 2001, Guariguata et al 2008, Appasamy 1993). Since 
1980s, growing interest in NTFPs has been noted in view of its increasing relevance and 
contribution to rural development and conservation of natural resources. Being less 
ecologically destructive than timber harvesting, NTFPs provided a sound base for 
sustainable forest management. Moreover, commercial harvest of NTFPs was increased 
thus providing more incentives to retain the forest resources (Arnold and Ruiz-Perez 
2001).  
Extensive global studies on NTFPs have been conducted to investigate the correlation 
between conservation and sustainable development, more particularly, contribution of 
forest resources to poverty alleviation  (Kusters et al 2006, Arnold and Ruiz Pérez 2001, 
Belcher et al 2005, Belcher et al 2003, Sunderlin et al 2005, Ruiz Pérez et al 2004, 
Belcher and Kusters 2004). Main findings of global NTFPs literature have well-
established that– (1) the NTFPs play an important role in contributing to household 
economics, thus extensively to conservation- development goals, (2) NTFPs is widely 
employed as a ‘coping’ strategy within subsistence households, ‘diversified’ strategy to 
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provide supplemental income along with other productive activities, and ‘specialized’ 
strategy focusing specifically to integrate within high cash economy through marketing 
NTFPs, (3) to alleviate poverty, NTFPS should be increasingly and efficiently integrated 
into commercial production and trade, (4) as spaces of chronic rural poverty and forests 
are likely to overlap, thus increasing chances of human dependency on forest resources, 
it becomes critical to provide incentives for conserving forests, and (5) for successful 
commercialization of NTFPs, there need to be efficient infrastructure, access to skills 
and services and expanding markets. In India, about 60 percent of NTFPs are consumed 
by approximately 70 million tribals. NTFPs contribute about 10 to 40 percent of the 
household income (Shiva 1993). 
However, over the decades, regional studies have also recognized and examined the 
importance of non-timber forest products and their role in poverty alleviation 
particularly in Latin America (Hecht 2007, López-Feldman and Wilen 2008, Pattanayak 
and Sills 2001, Pyhälä et al 2006), Asia (Belcher and Kusters 2004, Hogarth et al 2013, 
Mallik 2000, Fehr 2007, Mahapatra et al 2005, Nevins and Peluso 2008, Li 2008), and 
Africa (Lingani et al 2009, Fairhead and Leach 1994, Dovie 2003, Awono et al 2002, 
Van Den Berg et al 2007). These studies suggest (1) resource extraction is shaped by 
market forces, institutional and land tenure regimes, (2) different power relations at the 
household scale result in different access regime, (3) as an important livelihood option, 
NTFPs market integration and commercialization is not completely realized, and (4) as 
commodification process changes, the interwoven social relations and the perceptions of 
people, nature and places also change in political-economic context resulting in 
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changing access and control of resources. Belcher and Kusters (2004) argue that 
different regions have different significant characteristics, particularly seen in the 
extreme cases of Africa and Asia. For instance, African cases are marked with lower 
household incomes, increasing market demands for NTFPs, smaller volumes of trade 
and sometimes reverse migration from urban areas. On the other hand, Asian cases have 
typically higher and more stable economic state, stable NTFP markets, more stable 
resource bases and comparatively slower population growth due to urban migration. 
Conversely, cases from Latin America have exhibited higher frequency of unstable 
markets, little private investment, products created from diverse sources and less 
pressure on the resource base (Belcher and Kusters 2004).  
Much recent work in South Asia has focused on livelihoods (Gunatilake et al 1993, Fehr 
2007, Hegde et al 1996, Hegde and Enters 2000, Narendran et al 2001, Das 2005, Mukul 
et al 2010), income diversification (Mahapatra and Mitchell 1997, Illukpitiya and 
Yanagida 2008, Mahapatra, Albers and Robinson 2005, Hegde and Enters 2000), gender 
(Kelkar 2007, Krishna 2001), ecosystem conservation (Murali et al 1996) and 
institutions (Bhattacharya and Hayat 2004, Ghate et al 2009). However, addressing a 
range of functions and constraints of the NTFPs extraction in mitigating poverty in 
developing countries, scholars argue that their contribution and potential is still least 
examined in India (Rasul et al 2008, Gubbi and MacMillian 2007 and Saxena 2003). 
Moreover, Indian studies (Murali et al 1996) mention that creation of protected areas 
often result in banning of previously established practices. There exists a wide gap in 
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assessing how new rules-in-use influence the local livelihood practices thus altering the 
household economy.  
In South Asia literature on NTFP livelihoods, Gunatilake et al (1993) argue that by 
introducing new conservation program in the Knuckle Forest Range in Sri Lanka, the 
potential income of the peripheral communities would be most affected as they would be 
forced to abstain from the extractive activities. Until such potential income losses are 
estimated, a sound socially acceptable forest management plan cannot be generated. 
Creation of Buxa Tiger Reserve in India resulted in a shift from commercial forestry to 
forest conservation thus affecting the local livelihoods based on NTFP income (Das 
2005). Once more, how livelihoods are influenced by introduction of new rules-in-use 
through new conservation enclosures has not yet been addressed. In another study, 
Hegde and Enters (2000) quantify forest dependence of local people to address forest 
importance within local household economy and assess how restrictive conservation 
regulations affect local livelihoods. They argue that commercialization of NTFPs is 
determined by both access to resources and markets (Hedge and Enters 2000). 
Therefore, it seems clear that persistent access to forest resources is the key for 
household economies to alleviate poverty but it still remains to be seen how this occurs 
when new rules-in-use are introduced in the equation. In an important study, Narendran 
et al (2001) conclude that while income from NTFP extraction still remains significant to 
forest household economies, it is plays a greater role in ethnic households. This study 
complements Narendran et al (2001) to address how new rules-in-use may influence the 
persistent benefits from NTFP income within ethnic households. 
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Studies on income diversification in context of South Asia has well –established that 
income from farm, off-farm primarily labor work and NTFP income constitute the 
household economy in varying degrees (Mahapatra, Albers and Robinson 2005, Hegde 
and Enters 2000, Illukpitiya and Yanagida 2008). In Sri Lanka, Illukpitiya and Yanagida 
(2008) established a positive correlation which suggests an increase in household income 
due to increasing sources of diversified income. More specifically, Mahapatra, Albers 
and Robinson (2005) argue that the contribution of NTFPs to cash-income differs in 
Orissa and Jharkhand in India due to seasonality, household income, proximity to 
specific resources, traditions and skills, farm size, caste, ecological and climate setting 
and the ability to harvest two crops per year. The authors mention the cash-income 
differences between the tribals groups, scheduled castes and the upper caste households 
(Mahapatra, Albers and Robinson 2005) but they fail to provide the readers more in-
depth knowledge of the workings of this dynamic, thus generating immense gap within 
the ‘ascertained’ relationship of NTFPs extraction and income generation among 
different resource users.  
Parallels can be drawn between the global studies and Indian context, but with the added 
caveat that NTFPs in South Asia represent increasing importance of local dependence of 
household economies on NTFP extraction (Bawa 1993, Rasul et al 2008). In India, about 
60 percent of NTFPs are consumed by approximately 70 million tribals. NTFPs 
contribute about 10 to 40 percent of the household income (Shiva 1993). Hence, the 
economic costs and benefits based on ethnicity within biodiversity-offsets have been 
overlooked with broader implications on effect of new rules-in-use on resource 
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extraction. What are the economic implications of conservation trade-offs for local 
people, particularly, across different ethnicity? Who benefits among the local 
communities? How does it influence different socio-cultural groups in terms of their 
income generation? This study fills the empirical gap in the NTFP literature as noted by 
Hirsch et al (2011), Brockington and Igoe (2006). Furthermore, this study complements 
Narendran et al (2001) to address how new rules-in-use may influence the persistent 
benefits from NTFP income within ethnic households. This furthers our understanding in 
context of India where such complex social organizations still exist.  Hence this study 
estimates the contribution of different economic activities, in particular, NTFPs to 
household income; analyze how income varies across different socio-cultural groups and 
villages in the proposed ONPC; and finally, it will assess how the implementation of the 
ONPC may change the   economic practices of those communities most dependent upon 
the forest for their livelihood. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Proposed Omakareshwar National Park Complex  
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC) is a planned protected area in 
Madhya Pradesh (Figure 3.1a and 3.1b). It is being designed as a compensatory 
conservation project which will overcome the loss of wildlife and forest resulting from 
the construction of and submergence from the nearby Indira-Sagar and Omkareshwar 
dams, part of the notorious multi-purpose Narmada dam project. This complex consists 
  
100 
 
of Omkareshwar National Park, Singhaji Wildlife Sanctuary, Mandhata Sanctuary and 
Narmada Conservation Reserve Unit I and II (Figure 3.2). It is situated at the junction of 
three districts, namely, Dewas, Khandwa and Khargone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 (a) and (b) Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in India  
and in Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
The creation of the ONPC broadly results from one of the mandatory guidelines from an 
independent review conducted in 1991. The World Bank had committed about $450 
million in 1985 to the Narmada dam project that led to mass-displacement which had 
ultimately resulted in Bank’s image as an abuser of human rights and environment (Ram 
Figure 1a. India 
Figure 1b. Madhya Pradesh and Study Site Location 
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1993, McCully 1996, Rich 1990).  With the onset of global environmental consciousness 
in the late 1980s onward, the World Bank was pressurized largely by the non-
governmental organizations in the United States, Europe and some developing countries 
to withdraw from the project (Rich 1990, Morse and Berger 1992).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Descriptive map of the Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
 
 
In 1987, the Government of India approved the diversion of 41,111.97 hectares of forest 
lands in the districts of Dewas, Khanwa and Hoshangabad (in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh) towards the construction of the Indira Sagar dam project (Personal 
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Communication. Government Official 2012). However, at the same time, the 
government also made it mandatory that representatives from different stakeholder 
agencies should form a committee for wildlife management and conservation, which 
would be displaced during the dam construction. These stakeholder agencies were the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), the Narmada Valley Development 
Authority (NVDA hereafter), the state government of Madhya Pradesh and the state 
forest department. This committee selected the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of 
Nature Society to prepare impact assessment reports, which were released in 1994 and 
1996. As a result, in 1993, NVDA declared its intentions to create a national park and 
sanctuaries. (ONPC N.D.) 
Dominated by the controversies of the Narmada dam project, impact assessment studies 
conducted by the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature Society recommended 
that a protected area be established as a combination of national park and wildlife 
sanctuary (total area 758.88 sq. km.) (ONPC N.D.). Such an area would help minimize 
the consequences of direct and indirect losses resulting from the development of Indira 
Sagar and Omkareshwar dams. They suggested that the selected forest area should share 
similar conservation characteristics with those that were lost due to submergence, so that 
the wildlife displaced by submergence could take refuge in the protected areas built 
around the reservoirs. However, NVDA solicited another agency, the Indian Institute of 
Forest Management, to conduct an independent study to review the recommendations of 
Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature Society. They suggested reducing the 
total extent of the proposed protected area (658.35 sq.km) by 100 sq.km (ONPC N.D.). 
  
103 
 
This decision was opposed by Wildlife Institute of India, who argued that the reduced 
area is not sufficient to restore the affected biodiversity (Personal Communication. 
Government Official 2012). Ultimately, in 2007, it was considered pragmatic to 
announce the total extent of the protected area to 651.31sq.km (ONPC N.D.).    
Approximately 84 villages are situated around the proposed ONPC - 55 villages in the 
Dewas district; 28 in Khandwa and 1 village in Khargone. Largely, this region is 
comprised of the tribal ‘adivasis’ population, constituting approximately 22.3% of the 
total population. All the villages in the ONPC largely depend on the forest resources for 
their daily sustenance, particularly fuel-wood and non-timber forest products. While 
planning the creation of the proposed ONPC, ONPC authorities have decided to grant 
enough area in the nearby forests to the local communities so that they do not depend on 
the proposed ONPC for their daily sustenance. The local people mainly engage as 
gatherers of non-timber forest resources, farmers or work as labors on other agricultural 
farms. While waiting for the designation of ONPC as protected area, the villages situated 
within the area have been declared forest villages, and forest protection committees have 
been formed there as micro-forest governance structures. The changes in rules-in-use 
have also implemented a ban on the daily extraction of forest resources for livelihood 
activities.   
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ONPC and NTFPs  
Based on an earlier available figure, Madhya Pradesh generates approximately US$ 700 
million of non-timber forest products in India (Worldwatch Institute 1991). Important 
NTFPs in this region include tendu patta (leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon), flowers of 
mahua (Madhuka indica), Kullu gum (Sterculia urerns), Dhaoda gum (Anogeissus 
latofoia) and achar (buchanania lanzan).  Of these, tendu patta and kullu gum are 
nationalized and regulated NTFPs, and the rest are non-nationalized, which means they 
can be traded freely (Madhya Pradesh State Minor Produce 2010). Other non-timber 
forest produce species include various seeds, tamarind fruits, nuts, bamboo shoots and 
honey (Khare et al 2000).  
Each NTFP represents an important product for household livelihood strategies; 
however, each NTFP has a distinct market and use. 
1. Fuelwood: While fuelwood forms the basis of daily survival needs of the local 
communities, NTFPs provide important economic resources for households. Social and 
cultural factors play a significant role in deciding which tree species can be utilized for 
fuelwood and which cannot. For instance, wood from tree species such as pipal (Ficus 
Religiosa), neem (Azadirachta Indica), kalam (Mitragyna parviflora), mohini, amla 
(Phyllanthus emblica) are not used, as these trees are worshiped by different adivasis. 
They believe their family god resides in these trees. On the other hand, fansi, another 
species, is considered inauspicious; as a result tribes do not use this wood for cooking.  
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2. Mahua: Known for its high sugar content, the mahua flower (Madhuka indica) is used 
to prepare local alcohol and also eaten as a cooked vegetable. Mahua flowers are used to 
make local alcoholic drinks Between February and April, liquor is made from mahua 
flower in almost every household in the selected villages in Khandwa district of ONPC. 
Approximately 405 liters of alcohol is yielded from one ton of dried flowers (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2006). Estimated production value of non-timber forest products in Sheopur 
district in Madhya Pradesh includes about US$ 45,000 of mahua (Madhuka indica) 
flowers used for making local alcoholic drinks (Bhattacharya and Hayat 2004). 
3. Tendupatta: Tendupatta (leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon) are used to produce local 
cigarettes or bidis largely as it is decay resistant and its capacity to retain fires. The bidi 
industry provides large-scale employment to rural population hence promoting the rural 
economy. The collection of tendupatta begins around mid-April until mid-May before 
monsoon. As previously mentioned extraction of tendupatta is nationalized, and the 
forest department actively participates in its collection and sale.  
The ONPC officials regulate the collection and sale of some NTFPs. For example, the 
forest department gives contracts to local people to collect tendupatta, and once 
collected, the local communities make bundles and deliver it to the forest department 
who then exports it out of the region based on national or international demands.  At the 
same time, current conservation reflects some aspects of “fortress conservation,” such as 
guards (nakedaar) empowered by the proposed ONPC principles to enforce and regulate 
forest access, particularly for local people living in the nearby forest villages. For 
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example, women are allowed to bring fuelwood, but only as much as they can carry in a 
single headload.  Local people are not allowed to take vehicles like tractors or bullock 
carts inside the forest. This inhibits their ability to cut down large trees for constructing 
their small huts.  
Efforts to provide economic incentives are not the result of any intention of community 
development. Instead, these efforts are the result of economic interest in the future of 
this area, namely, ecotourism.  But at the same time, the ONPC officials have also 
suggested eco-development strategies for broader community development in the 
proposed ONPC region. According to an initial ONPC management plan (N.D.), the 
objective of eco-development policy is to lessen the reliance of local resource-users on 
the forest resources and to get their extensive support in implementing the conservation-
development policies in the region in addition to the goal of boosting household 
incomes. This objective will be fulfilled by the development of agroforestry, village 
resources, alternative energy and participatory forest management (ONPC N.D.).  
 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
 I conducted intensive household surveys and participant observation, in the selected six 
villages, which attempted to extensively collect resource use and household economic 
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related data from different socio-cultural groups inhabiting the region. Each survey 
questionnaire was designed to generate quantitative data.  
I collected data and information for this study from six villages situated within five 
kilometer radius of the proposed ONPC boundary in the central Indian state of Madhya 
Pradesh. Of these six villages, two villages, namely Village E and Village F, are in the 
Dewas district while, the other four villages – Village C, Village B, Village D and 
Village A are in the Khandwa district of Madhya Pradesh. Then, I obtained a map of the 
proposed ONPC from park officials during the preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 
2008. Based on the map, I identified villages lying within 2 kilometers radius. During 
the pre-fieldwork in 2008, I selected few random villages for a visit on the basis of 
accessibility and contacts for the purpose of getting acquainted with the region. 
Preliminary data was collected from these selected villages. Ultimately, I made a final 
selection of the villages on the criteria based on the proximity to the base station 
(Narmadanagar), safety and accessibility especially during the severe monsoon season in 
the months of July August. Except for Village D and Village F, rest of the selected 
villages had been visited during preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 2008 and 
contacts were established there. In addition, these villages were especially selected under 
the guidance of the advisor, the Chief Conservator of Forests (of proposed ONPC) and 
the proposed national park’s office.   
Data was collected from November 2009 to August 2010 and December 2010-January 
2011 involving a random chain sample of 204 panel households in the six villages. For 
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this purpose of this paper, a sample of 198 households was taken. The paper studies 
distribution of income from different economic activities among different socio-cultural 
groups. I removed data from six households from the results of this paper as they did not 
mention their socio-cultural groups during the survey. Village-based young adults were 
hired to conduct the household panel surveys in summer of 2010 and December/January 
2011.  
In order to provide detailed information, the household survey was designed in six 
elaborative sections. Out of these six sections, two sections contributed to the data on 
household economics. Of these, the first section ‘general economics’ focused on the data 
from individual households and was divided into three categories based on the income 
generation activities – forest products, farm and non-farm. The first category compiled 
detailed data such as which resources they collected each year, month-wise resource 
extraction, units collected and its sale. The second category on ‘income generated due to 
farm activities’ included questions related to the agricultural activities such as how much 
land do the people own, how much do they produce, what do they grow, if they need to 
work on other’s land or if they hire labors for their own land. Questions related to, travel 
in particular labor tasks outside the village and how much do they get paid, formed part 
of the third category.   
Other section relevant to this section aimed at calculating (closest approximate) 
individual household incomes based on the information provided by each household. 
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The income generated by resource extraction, farm activities and off-farm activities, 
income based on farm size and cumulative income was calculated in this section.  
Focusing on the household economics, in contrast to selecting villages situated within 5 
kilometer of a market town (Mahapatra, Albers and Robinson 2005), the guiding factor 
in this study was the proximity to the proposed national park.  As a result, the villages 
selected for the study were situated within 2 kilometer of the park boundary and had 
alternate selective criteria such as safety and daily commute especially during the 
monsoons. In such cases, the weekly market or haat are one of the adopted trading 
places where the resources extracted are sold locally except in the case of tendupatta 
which is sold on contractual basis. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Socio-cultural groups within the six sampled villages 
 
Socio-cultural 
groups 
Village A Village B Village C Village D Village E Village F 
Total sample 19 36 34 40 36 39 
Adivasi 12 29 30 33 33 37 
Non-Adivasi 7 7 4 7 3 2 
Total 
percentage of 
Adivasi (%) 
63 81 88 83 92 95 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: Percentage has been rounded off  
 
 
It should be noted here the complex social heterogeneity of the rural Indian society is 
such that it cannot be ensured during sampling that similar socio-cultural groups and 
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sub-groups are evenly distributed in each sample villages (Table 3.1). Since the study 
area is predominantly tribal in social nature, people belonging to other socio-cultural 
groups would be relatively smaller in number. Hence this affected the data analysis. 
One of the main problems was that there was no way to corroborate the household 
income data that was collected through the household surveys. It is possible that 
household heads or members, when surveyed, exaggerated their household income data, 
which might cause anomalies in the data. However, I tried to ascertain the income told 
by the household head/member by observing the number of consumer items such as a 
television, a radio, a motor vehicle, a refrigerator in the house and type and built of the 
house. In addition, there were few cases in which the field assistants forgot to ask for the 
detailed household income data. Such cases have been included in the data analysis. 
These factors can again cause abnormality in the data.  
 
Data Analysis 
First, I filed the data collected from the surveys into an excel spreadsheet where the raw 
income data from different economic activities was arranged. Three categories were 
created that included farm activities, off-farm activities and non-timber forest resources 
for 198 households. For the farm activities, all the income generated from the crop 
production in summer, monsoon and winter seasons was registered separately along with 
the livestock sale. The income from the off-farm activities was divided into the work on 
another’s farm, work under forest department, work under the village panchayats, and 
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temporary remittances. Subsequently, incomes from the non-timber forest products were 
noted separately from the sale of tendupatta, mahua, kullu gum, dhavda gum and 
fuelwood.  Statistics software IBM SPSS version 20 was used to analyze this data set.  
 
RESULTS 
This sub-section investigates how economic practices and processes are affected by the 
new rules-in-use. Alternatively, I examine who benefits, from establishing new rules-in-
use as part of compensatory conservation, among the local communities (adivasi versus 
non-adivasi) in the proposed ONPC. First, I estimate contribution of different economic 
activities to household income. Then I analyze income variation among and across 
different socio-cultural groups based on different economic activities in the sample 
villages. Finally, I investigate how formalization of the park complex will change the 
economic practices and how local communities use forest products in the proposed 
ONPC.  
 
Contribution of Different Economic Activities to Household Income 
Three main economic activities exist in the ONPC region which includes farm, off-farm 
and NTFPs extraction that are primarily seasonal activities (Figure 3.3). The resource-
users generally begin the year with the extraction of mahua flowers for subsistence or 
commercial use in February which continues from a fortnight up to a month. At the same 
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time, if the wealthy households have irrigation facilities, they indulge in winter farming 
from November to March. In May, tendupatta is extracted for up to a month. Farming, 
based on the monsoon, is practiced from May to July/August which is the mainstay of 
majority of the farmers in the proposed ONPC. In between the extraction and the 
farming activities and for the rest of the year, the forest communities depend on the off-
farm activities, majority of which are outside their own village. Generally, labor is hired 
during agricultural season for preparing the land for sowing seeds, sowing seeds, 
watering and harvesting. The household labor largely engages in the extraction of forest 
resources including tendupatta and mahua. Due to insufficient monthly data for the farm 
and the off-farm activities, seasonal data could not be calculated. In addition, data on 
seasonal variation of economic activities cannot be calculated distinctively for farm and 
off-farm activities as the respondents did not specify the years. 
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Note: Kullu and Dhavda varieties of gum are extracted throughout the year 
 
Figure 3.3 Seasonal variations of economic activities 
 
 
Farming constitutes one of the main economic activities in the ONPC region which is 
primarily restricted to monsoon months (end of May- beginning of August). Table 3.2 
presents descriptive statistics for 198 sampled households for farm activity. It provides a 
clear representation of the households participating in the farm activities from all the six 
sampled villages. Income from farm activities is generated primarily from the monsoon 
farming (33.2 percent) and livestock sale (15.2 percent). This finding signifies that fewer 
farmers engage in winter (0.28) or summer farming (0.20), and largely local farmers 
depend on the monsoons in absence of adequate irrigation system.  
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Table 3.2 Household participation in seasonal farming activities 
 
 
 
 
In terms of income generation, the maximum average income per household is produced 
during the monsoon months (Table 3.3). Larger standard deviation during the monsoon 
and winter months indicates that there is too much income variation between the least 
and most income generated households. This variation could be a result of affordability 
of adequate irrigation systems or larger farm size and type of crops grown by a larger 
proportion of richer households. At the same time, the income from the livestock sale 
reflects that fewer people engage in livestock sale (as also represented in Figure 3.4) but 
larger standard deviations for the participant households and income generated signifies 
that some households sell their livestock for larger sum of money (<1000) thus creating 
wider income fluctuations. Hen, bull, cow, goat are some of the examples of the 
livestock in this region.  
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Table 3.3 Average Household Income from Farming activities (US$) 
 
Income source Average 
Income per 
household 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Summer production 
 
266.09 1.82 0 26,00,000 
Monsoon production 
 
329.21 81,316.46 0 6,79,600 
Winter production  
 
2.76 1,334.07 0 15,800 
Livestock 5.69 1,347.19 0 12,000 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
 
 
Second important economic activity in the ONPC region is off-farm activities. Table 
summarizes household characteristics including off-farm activities and income.  One of 
the obvious characteristics revealed includes that there is no full-time employment 
available in the ONPC region except for a miniscule population (8.7 percent). The off-
farm income generation includes working on another’s farm land, working outside the 
village (commuting or temporary migration), remittances from short-term employment 
and lastly, incomes from work offered by forest department or panchayats. Annually, 
about 66 percent of the sampled households suggested that employment is available 
during different seasons. A quick look at the frequency reflects that more manual? Labor 
is available to work on other’s farm land during the monsoons (40.7 percent) but less in 
the winter season (14.8 percent). A significant proportion (63 percent) of local 
households earns income by working on another’s farm land. Likewise, more people 
(56.6 percent) travel daily outside their village for work particularly during the 
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monsoons (9.1 percent). In the ONPC region, remittances, from chili factory and cotton 
factory, provide another form of off-farm income. Larger standard deviation means 
wider disparity between the low and high remittance income households. Additional 
seasonal employment is provided by short-term (e.g. daily) work opportunities offered 
by forest department and panchayat such as to dig a pond in the village or dig around the 
agricultural fields.  
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Table 3.4 Household participation in seasonal off-farming activities 
  
118 
 
Table 3.4 (continued) 
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Table 3.5 Average Household Income from off-farm activities (US$) 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 reflect off-farm income from farming on another’s land, remittances 
and temporary wage work provided by forest department and panchayat. Large standard 
deviations can be seen in the case of all the four sub-activities. This implies that there 
exist a large income variation between the least and the maximum income generated as 
proved by minimum and maximum figures in the table.  
Extraction of NTFPs is another significant source of income generation in the ONPC 
(Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Four main NTFPs extracted here include tendupatta, mahua, kullu 
and dhavda gums. Less variance seems to exist among the four sub-activities in context 
of household participation. This signifies that largely all households engage in extraction 
of NTFPs.  
Based on income produced from extraction of four NTFPs in the ONPC, a substantial 
income variation exist. Different households extract NTFPs in varying amounts. Hence, 
large standard deviations suggest that income differences prevail among different 
households that extract NTFPs. 
 
Income source Average 
Income per 
household 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Farm labor 37.80 7,171.51 0 90,000 
Forest labor  30.06 2,488.32 0 18,000 
Panchayat labor 8.83 1,932.78 0 18,000 
Remittances 13.78 7,457.49 0 90,000 
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Table 3.6 Household participation in seasonal NTFP activities 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Average Household Income from NTFP extraction (US$) 
 
Income source Average 
per 
household 
Income 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tendupatta 25.85 1,527.35 0 10,400 
Mahua 8.49 2,203.43 0 30,000 
Kullu gum 26.19 5,523.73 0 34,500 
Mahua gum 4.52 1,680.96 0 19,500 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
 
 
Income Variation Among and Across Different Socio-Cultural Groups  
The second aim of this analysis is to examine the income variation among and across 
different socio-cultural groups. To fulfill this, two sets of groups have been determined – 
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adivasi versus non-adivasi and landowners versus non-landowners. Previously (Table 
3.1) it has been established that the sample villages are predominantly tribal in nature. 
Hence, it becomes important to examine if and how income variation will differ among 
the two socio-cultural groups. In addition, income variation will also be established for 
landowners versus non-landowners. From the previous sub-section, it becomes clear that 
farm and off-farm economic production primarily revolve around the land use. To 
understand how economic practices and processes are changed due to implementation of 
new rules-in-use, land tenure for economic production can provide a good portrayal. 
First, Table 3.8 presents village-wise average household income distribution across 
different economic activities (US$). It seems obvious that farming is the most profitable 
occupation particularly the monsoon farming in the sampled villages. It is striking to 
note that village D produces more income from summer farming. Possible reason for this 
trend may include additional irrigation system. Consequently, variable incomes are 
generated through off-farm and extraction of the NTFPs. Geographic factors including 
location of the villages, type of forest, status of forest degradation and regional 
development, also play important role in deciding the economic activities.   
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Table 3.8 Village wise average per household income detailed distribution (US$) 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
 
 
 
Location of village and access to factors of production explains some variation among 
income distribution between farm activities and NTFPs (Table 3.9). Villages, that are 
particularly close to the forests but far away from the nearest developed road, engage 
more in NTFPs extraction. The proximity to the nearest main pucca (paved) road attracts 
resource-users to opt for the labor jobs, be it working at another farmer’s agricultural 
land in another village, or at a chilli producing factory, thus providing income during the 
peak-off extraction season.  
 
 
Economic 
Activity 
Income source Village-wise Average Income Per Household (US$) 
A B C D E F 
Farm Summer farming 46.38 48.22 42.06 1253.44 0 2.52 
 Monsoon 
farming 
227.90 1061.53 525.30 41.81 39.73 93.61 
 Winter farming 0 13.52 0 0 0 1.94 
 Livestock 18.87 14.10 0.69 0.97 3.05 2.95 
        
Off-farm Farm labor  22.39 99.36 20.32 15.16 30.24 40.25 
 Remittances 8.58 43.14 11.05 72.65 20.12 10.50 
 Forest labor 62.99 5.71 11.04 3.92 16.64 7.13 
 Panchayat labor 10.05 4.42 11.87 4.95 22.32 1.21 
        
NTFPs Tendupatta 58.90 51.94 11.98 6.03 16.42 40.39 
 Mahua 6.50 3.12 2.83 0.23 4.52 31.51 
 Kullu gum 48.26 2.56 0 0.21 120.17 0 
 Mahua gum 0.79 4.30 0 0.14 20.76 0 
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Table 3.9 Distance between villages and nearest forest and roads in kilometers 
 
Village Distance between village 
and nearest forest (in 
kms.) 
Distance to nearest 
pucca road (in kms.) 
A 3 2 
B 1 9 
C 1 3 
D 2 4 
E 2 4 
F 2 10 
 Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
 
 
Based on the three main economic activities, non-parametric statistical t-test was 
calculated to investigate the income variation across six sampled villages (Figure 3.4). 
The null hypothesis of this t-test concluded that there is income variation between the six 
villages from different economic activities except for income from winter farming and 
remittances. These show strong statistical significance, thus implying that there is no 
income variation based on these two specific activities. For all other income generating 
activities, the null hypothesis was rejected, thus implying income difference.  
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Figure 3.4 Independent t-test for income variation between villages 
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It is evident from the comprehensive data of average income per household from the six 
sample villages (Table 3.8) that while farming is the main choice of economic activity in 
sampled Villages A,B,C, D, while extraction of NTFPs is more prevalent in the villages 
from Dewas district (Figure 3.5).  
For the off-farm activities, several people from the six villages have received benefits 
from the national poverty alleviation program called Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act. If and when some labor job becomes available in the park 
vicinity, they (the villagers) are asked to work. Irregularity of these job openings is a 
main problem. Despite the fact that this is a national poverty alleviation program, not 
many households are getting any benefits from this. The off-farm activities include 
working as hired laborers on another’s agricultural field for 2-15 days at a stretch during 
harvesting or sowing in monsoons and in winters (for those farmers who can afford to 
grow two crops due to lack of irrigation facilities). Other than working on other’s land, 
people send their children to cotton factories or chili factories to work there for 2-3 
months at a stretch. The villagers also travel outside their village to work in the fields 
during wheat and soybean harvest. It should be noted here that in this situation, people 
receive reciprocal payments in form of five kilogram of wheat instead of money for their 
15-day labor. Several members of the household working in such a job would mean 
receiving plentiful amount of grain in return of labor. It was observed that local 
inhabitants sell their share of wheat, considered as a high quality grain, in return of seeds 
to grow or other grains such as jowar and barley for consumption reasons. 
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Figure 3.5 Comparison of NTFPs share per household among the six sample villages 
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The income also varies based on land tenure. An inverse relationship can be seen here 
between the farm income and the NTFPs based on different farm sizes (Table 3.10). It 
demonstrates that higher the farm size, less percentage of total income is generated from 
the extraction of NTFPs and vice-versa. People who have no land or own less than half 
an acre concentrate more on the extraction of NTFPs for their income generation.  It 
exhibits that the smaller farm size owners yield 33.6 percent of their total household 
income from the extraction of NTFPs as compared to that of the farm activities. This 
signifies that poor forest dwellers depend more on forest resources for their sustenance. 
While, on the other hand, it is clearly evident from the table that people who have larger 
land size (more than 5 acres) produce a huge proportion of their total income from the 
farm activities. 
 
 
Table 3.10 Total Annual Cash Income by farm-size per household (in US$) 
 
Land size 
(acres) 
Annual 
Farm 
income per 
household 
Annual Off- 
farm income 
per 
household 
Annual 
NTFPs 
income per 
household 
Total annual 
income 
% total 
income from 
NTFPs 
More than 5  11,582 102 95.6 11,780.2 0.81 
5 to 2.5 3,169 128 71.9 3,369.1 2.13 
2.5 to 0.5 3,918 174 146.8 4,238.4 3.46 
0.5 to 0 11 207 110.4 328.3 33.63 
Total 18,680 611 424.7   
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
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Ethnicity based on adivasi versus non-adivasi is also an important criterion. Table 3.11 
illustrates the income differences between adivasi and non-adivasi groups. It is clearly 
evident that adivasis generate most of their cash income by the extraction of NTFPs 
(US$ 342.1) followed by the farm activities (US$ 1,902.3) whereas the non-adivasi 
groups produce maximum of their cash income through the farm activities (US$ 
1,4181.5) and least from the NTFPs extraction (US$ 169.9). 
 
 
Table 3.11 Average Annual Cash Income Distribution per Household based on 
different socio-cultural groups within the proposed ONPC (in US$) 
 
Socio-Cultural Groups Number of 
households 
Farm 
activities 
Off-farm 
activities 
NTFPs 
Adivasi 174 1,902.3 353.6 342.1 
Non-Adivasi 23 1,4181.5 1,847.6 169.9 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 
 
 
Specifically for the extraction of NTFPs, different socio-cultural groups collect varying 
amount of NTFPs that result in their varying household income (Table 3.12). The main 
share of NTFPs is extracted by the tribal groups while the non-tribal groups extract the 
least amount of NTFPs annually. Extractions of tendupatta and the gums from kullu and 
dhavda trees are the most income generating activities. However this is limited due to 
the spatial distribution of the kullu and dhavda trees. These NTFPs also fetch high prices 
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in the market – the kullu gum is sold at US$ 4.72 per kilogram and the dhavda gum is 
sold at US$ 2.83 per kilogram in the market. In addition to the cash income, these 
communities also extract the same NTFPs for self-consumption such as mahua and kullu 
gum. In the case of the non-adivasi, it seems clear that they invest their time particularly 
in the extraction of the tendupatta as both mahua and gum extractions are time and 
labor- intensive. Hence the economic differences can be identified among different 
socio-cultural groups.  
 
 
Table 3.12 Average Annual NTFP cash incomes of tribal and non-tribal per 
household within the six sampled villages (in US$) 
 
Socio-cultural groups Tendupatta Mahua Kullu Gum Dhavda 
Gum 
Adivasi 110.0 21.2 174.9 36.0 
Non-Adivasi 100.0 40.7 29.2 0 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 
 
Non-parametric statistical t-test was also calculated to investigate the income variation 
across adivasi and non-adivasi based on the three main economic activities (Figure 3.6). 
Except for income derived from monsoon and winter farming along with extraction of 
Kullu gum, the null hypothesis of this t-test concluded that there is no income variation 
between the adivasi and non-adivasi from other different economic activities. Income 
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from monsoon and winter farming and extraction of kullu gum show strong statistical 
significance, thus implying that there is income variation. For all other income 
generating activities, the null hypothesis was accepted, thus implying no income 
difference. This might also be attributed to large income discrepancies within the three 
specific activities. 
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Figure 3.6 Independent t-test for income variation between adivasi and non-adivasi 
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DISCUSSION 
Proposed ONPC is an example of transformation of the common forest reserves into a 
restrictive protected area by implementing a new set of rules-in-use. This is positioned 
within the region of Narmada dam development project which is loaded with the history 
of struggles and conflicts depicting marginalization of the adivasis. This research 
advances the biodiversity offset literature by focusing on the economic benefits and 
loses within conservation enclosures examined through income generation by different 
economic activities across different ethnicity which the previous studies lacked 
(Gunatilake et al 1993, Mahapatra, Albers and Robinson 2005, Hirsch et al 2011).  
Main finding of this study include – (1) three main income production activities exist in 
the ONPC region that include farm, off-farm and extraction of NTFPs; (2) Different 
people engage in different economic activities in varying degrees. For all of the villages, 
monsoon farming is most profitable; (3) income production from different economic 
activities relies on seasonality; (4) for farm activities, there is higher dependence on 
monsoon farming followed by livestock sale; (5) working on other’s farm lands 
particularly during monsoon and winter seasons seem to be desirable for the off-farm 
work; (6) an inverse relationship exists between incomes derived from farm and NTFP 
extraction based on different farm sizes; (7) Based on ethnicity, adivasi engage in more 
NTFP extraction, while non-adivasi prefer farm income, even though, as indicated by 
the t-test that there is no difference between the total income generated from the NTFP 
activities (minus kullu gum) for the two social groups. The results clearly reveal that a 
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significant portion of the resource-users, from the forested communities of proposed 
ONPC, depend on the extraction of forest resources for their sustenance, particularly in 
the Villages E and F. The remaining portion generates their income from increasing farm 
and off-farm activities.  
Sale of NTFPs contributes to rural economy, thus alleviating poverty. By developing the 
model of ONPC, both objectives of rural development and forest management will be 
achieved, thus bringing economic development to the region. The context of farm 
activities, when the forest is cleared to carve out additional agricultural land, can be 
considered development. Increasingly greater income generated from the agriculture 
with the help of additional arrangements including irrigation systems, fertilizers, 
chemical pesticides, better improved seeds and better technology prove this. However, to 
reminisce ONPC is an example of biodiversity offset. Biodiversity offsets are trade-offs 
that set aside land for conservation from within development schemes. By greater 
engagement in farm activities to produce household income is another form of imposing 
development over conservation, which was the purpose of introducing biodiversity 
offsets in the first place. This is of greater concern particularly when there is a shift 
among local households towards farm jobs rather than extraction of NTFPs as opposed 
to the existing belief of latter being the mainstay of forest economy.  
There are certain disadvantages to this development over conservation phenomenon. 
First, as mentioned previously, in absence of available forest resources and 
opportunities, majority of the local communities are shifting to the off-farm activities. 
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This would imply movement of the local labor to other places, most likely to be situated 
outside their villages, which would imply absence of labor in the immediate 
geographical settings. This would result into commodification of labor particularly in the 
case of the adivasis. Another indirect consequence of labor as a commodity would 
include the decline in the economic productivity of the industries (such as tendupatta) 
that extract raw materials from the forests closer to the proposed ONPC. Secondly, it 
was deduced that the majority of the local communities engage in the farm activities 
primarily during the monsoon season, except for some of the elite families that can 
afford irrigational facilities during the rest of the year. This results in the economic 
disparities among the various socio-cultural groups in the sampled villages. Already 
evident in the local economy, these economic disparities further are responsible for 
creating distinct different economic classes among different socio-cultural groups, 
particularly giving rise to local ‘elites’.  
National poverty alleviation programs and occasional jobs provided by the ONPC 
officials and the village panchayats are not generating adequate household income. 
Hence, the adivasi become vulnerable to change by being economically placed at the 
lower rungs of the pyramid, thus further socially and economically marginalizing them 
by the local ‘elites’ and the forest officials. This struggle is further intensified by the 
restricted activities such as seasonal farming, remotely located off-farm jobs, and forest 
degradation, which will be further controlled by the creation of the proposed 
conservation unit.  
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The question of who benefits the most among the local communities in this process, the 
answer would be farm owners. They earn the profits from their agricultural produce such 
that they need not supplement their income with the extraction of the NTFPs except 
during an abnormal monsoon season. And who suffers the most? It is the adivasi who 
depend largely on the extraction of different forest produce to support their income. In 
absence of extractive economy, all the other resource-users that depend on it, will switch 
over to other economic activities mainly labor jobs within and outside their villages. 
Different interactions with the rules-in-use result in different ways of shaping the 
landscape. Based on access regime framework as proposed by Jepson et al (2010), 
access does not only include institutions but also other arrangements that might affect 
social productions of landscapes. In the current context of ONPC as a biodiversity offset, 
access to forest resources can be defined not only through forest institutions but also by 
changing labor patterns particularly gender, opportunities to generate income, 
introduction of technology, social capital, infrastructure and financial capital. All these 
factors have an impact on the decisions taken by the resource users to access and 
mobilize of the forest resources.  In the case of proposed ONPC, with the change in the 
access to and mobilization of forest resources for the purpose of income generation, the 
local inhabitants have negotiated the change in access by shifting the economic practices 
from NTFPs extraction to farm or off-farm activities. With increasing unemployment 
from the loss of income from the NTFP extraction, as a result commodification of labor 
occurs where labor is exchanged as a commodity. In addition, the changes in rules-in-use 
also invent ‘reserve army of labor’ which may prove beneficial particularly for the farm-
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owners by providing supplemental labor. This will be discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
It is important to recognize and work towards conserving forest, not only for the 
conventional reasons but also to address the growing needs of the ethnic groups. This is 
critical especially as with the creation of ONPC as a protected area, more restrictions to 
control access to forest resources will be implemented. I suggest introducing economic 
incentives such as payments to the local communities to supplement their interest and 
efforts to conserve forest. This will help to achieve not only the conservation with 
poverty alleviation goal but also the purpose of creating biodiversity offset. Another 
suggestion is to re-introduce Joint Forest Management within the proposed ONPC which 
would give the local communities not only the accountability and decision making 
authority but also would help them to economically sustain themselves.  
 
 CONCLUSION 
With the creation of proposed ONPC as a biodiversity offset, this study examined how 
new rules-in-use will influence the household economies by changing the income 
dynamics. To determine this, contribution of different economic activities to the 
household income and how income varies across different socio-cultural groups was 
examined. Three main economically productive activities were identified including farm, 
off-farm and NTFP extraction.  
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Different socio-cultural groups engage in different economic activities. Results suggest 
that the adivasi are the main economic beneficiaries of the extractive economy of 
NTFPs. For additional income, they engage in the farm and the off-farm activities. 
Therefore, the tribal groups will be the losers in the creation of proposed ONPC as a 
biodiversity offset. Subsequently, it is evident that mainly the farm owners have no 
economic loss in the creation of the proposed ONPC. It is found that higher the farm 
size, less percentage of total income is generated from the extraction of the NTFPs and 
vice-versa. People who have no land or own less than half an acre concentrate more on 
the extraction of NTFPs for their income generation. 
Hence this paper illustrates the significance of the extraction of NTFPs in the proposed 
ONPC and speculates about the future of the economic benefits provided from these 
extractive activities when the national park becomes notified. Factors such as 
geographical proximity, seasonality and land-size play a significant role in contribution 
of the NTFPs towards household income. It has been suggested here that more 
participatory initiatives including Joint Forest Management and payment for ecosystem 
services should be introduced in the park area to overcome the economic problems that 
are bound to change the economic and social dynamics of this region when the proposed 
national park complex becomes notified.  
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4. LABOR DYNAMICS WITHIN COMPENSATORY CONSERVATION: A 
CASE STUDY OF PROPOSED OMKARESHWAR NATIONAL PARK, INDIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Compensatory conservation has emerged as a result of conflicts between state 
development projects and the environmental movement (Burgin 2008, Bayon 2008, 
Robertson 2004, Madsen et al 2010). Biodiversity offsets, one form of compensatory 
conservation, are “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, 
unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net 
loss of biodiversity” (ten Kate et al 2004:13). Countries and regions such as United 
States, Canada, Uganda, European Union, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and 
Switzerland have biodiversity offset programs established (McKenney and Kiesecker 
2010, ten Kate et al 2004). 
Recently scholars have argued that a careful analysis of labor relations in relation to 
conservation (Robertson 2012).  Within market based conservation, studies reveal a lack 
of research on marginalization of labor relations (Foley 2000). To extend this work, this 
section draws on labor theory of value, as interpreted by Marx, because it provides a 
better understanding of labor relations in context of social classes. Additionally, the 
biodiversity offset studies have focused on its definition and global status (Madsen et al 
2010, ten Kate et al 2004), framework assessment (Norton 2009, McKenney and 
Kiesecker 2010, Kiesecker et al 2009, Burgin 2008, Tew 2011), mechanisms and 
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impacts (Bayon 2008, Gordon et al 2011). However, there are no studies on how the 
institutional change will alter how people use the resources, and thus, restructure labor 
regimes for forest product collection.  
The Indian Forest Conservation Act of 1980 is one such governmental policy that has 
implemented compensation for any change in forest land use to a definite non-forest land 
use accomplished ‘on-site’ through deforestation, de-reservation or diversion for any 
development project, carried out and monitored through set of established guidelines 
(Kohli et al 2011). Compensatory activities are carried out across comparable area of 
non-forest land exploited for development projects including mining, hydropower, and 
public welfare such as community centers in rural areas. For creation of such areas, 
specific territorial enclosures with restructured governance are formed such as the case 
of proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC hereafter). Consequently, 
restructuring of the forest management institutions transforms the different political-
economic processes thus altering the access to, control and mobilization of the forest 
resources that forces the resource-users to re-negotiate or contest access, control and 
mobilization of forest resources. Restructuring also enhances command and control 
policies through re-regulation of ecosystem services, which changes the access and 
control dynamics to ensure existence of capitalist power and accumulation dynamics.  
The case of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC hereafter) in 
Central India is an example of such compensatory conservation. The ONPC was initiated 
as a conservation trade-off to the development of Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar dams, 
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part of the notorious Narmada dam project. It entails significant changes to the current 
forest management institutions and the forest policies that directly cause the local 
communities to lose their access to, control of and the mobilization of the resources, thus 
affecting their livelihoods that are dependent on the forest resources. On the other hand, 
the state participating in such dispossession projects gains capital by reinvesting the 
seized commons’ ecosystem services and resources, thus shifting the dynamics of labor 
relations among the different stakeholders. Future plans to introduce ecotourism in the 
proposed park will shift it to market based conservation where the local inhabitants will 
be encouraged to get involved in the park management along with the park officials, in 
return of incentives.   
This study will address the gaps by examining the undercurrents of the social relations, 
in which the dynamics of labor relations will be analyzed through labor theory of value 
based on the Marxist tradition in proposed ONPC in India. Hence, the new rules-in-use 
reframe the political, economic and social problems of the local “labor” communities in 
the name of market based conservation. It will address how new rules-in-use affect the 
labor relations by altering access to, control and mobilization of forest resources. 
Therefore, this paper will–  
1. Examine labor dynamics within proposed ONPC with particular emphasis on 
changing state-society relations. 
2. Examine the different territorial strategies of compensatory conservation and 
how they influence the labor regimes of forest use.  
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This paper begins by examining the literature on the biodiversity offsets and labor within 
the conservation paradigm. The second section presents the details of proposed ONPC 
and its communities. The third section addresses the two research questions pertaining to 
labor dynamics and social relationships between different actors. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Biodiversity Offsets 
Biodiversity offsets are a recent phenomenon within conservation-development 
paradigm. Part of compensatory conservation, biodiversity offsets are trade-offs that set 
aside land for conservation from within development schemes, similar to carbon credit 
tradable certificates. Specifically, biodiversity offsets are “conservation actions intended 
to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development 
projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity” (ten Kate et al 2004:13). They are 
considered an important tool for addressing environmental impacts of development, thus 
maintaining and equilibrium between the environment and development (McKenney and 
Kiesecker 2010).  
While different names for biodiversity offsets exist, including mitigation banking, 
conservation banking, compensatory mitigation, BioBanking, they all share similar 
objective – to reduce biodiversity loss through market-based incentives and payments 
(Madsen et al 2010, ten Kate et al 2004, Morris et al 2006). According to State 
  
142 
 
Biodiversity Markets report, at present 39 compensatory mitigation programs exist 
across the world, with several individual offset sites, in addition to 25 more programs in 
different stages of development (Madsen et al 2010). Such offset programs can be 
particularly found in New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, China, South 
Africa, Madagascar, Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom, Brazil, Colombia, United 
States, and Canada (McKenney and Kiesecker 2009, Madsen et al 2010, Gordon et al 
2011). In Europe, biodiversity offset is generally signified as compensatory conservation 
that fundamentally involves creation of new habitat enclosures as trade-off to 
development consequences (Morris et al 2006). While examining compensatory 
conservation activities from cases around the world, the authors suggest they are being 
employed extensively by the governments and businesses to authorize development 
activities which require clearance of the ecosystems within a no net loss or net gain 
framework (ten Kate et al 2004). In another study, Seagle (2009) examines how the Rio 
Tinto mining project in Madagascar is perceived by stakeholders, in context of access, 
use, ownership of land and environmental resources, which are symbolized through 
labor, knowledge and human health. By creating biodiversity offsets outside their mining 
areas, Rio Tinto has legitimately gained access to land in Madagascar.  
Extensive research has been conducted on assessing the biodiversity offsets through 
various frameworks (Norton 2009, McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Kiesecker et al 
2009). Norton (2009) studies two biodiversity offsets, one offset as a trade-off to landfill 
and another compensating for pasture reestablishment in New Zealand and proposes an 
environmental framework to assess its effectiveness. Within United States, numerous 
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studies have been conducted on wetland mitigation, one form of biodiversity offsets 
(Robertson 2004, Robertson and Hayden 2008, Rolband et al 2001, Brown and Lant 
1999). Robertson (2004) examines wetland mitigation banking in Illinois, as an 
emerging form of rules-in-use for the existent phase in neoliberal governance, thus 
creating a balance between the policies, institutions and capitalist interests in an attempt 
towards market environmentalism.  
Studies on biodiversity offset program largely explore definition and global status 
(Madsen et al 2010, ten Kate et al 2004), framework assessment (Norton 2009, 
McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Kiesecker et al 2009, Burgin 2008, Tew 2011), 
mechanisms and impacts (Bayon 2008, Gordon et al 2011). However, there is wide gap 
within the literature linking biodiversity offsets with development parameters of 
livelihoods, labor dynamics, social relationships and institutions.  
 
Re-Territorialization and Conservation Trade-Offs 
Sack’s territoriality theory (1986) has been applied to this study to understand how 
changes in rules-in-use control spatial actions that alter social relationships between the 
resource controllers and the resource-users by restricting their access/control of 
resources. The changes in rules-in-use compel the resource users to often negotiate or 
contest resources. He defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to 
affect influence or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and 
asserting control over a geographic area. This area will be called Territory” (Sack 1986: 
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19). Territoriality is a social construction that emphasizes how people perceive space and 
how they categorize it by situating things, processes and people in certain spaces which 
would ultimately affect the interrelationships. Territoriality can be identified by three 
characteristics: classification of area, communication and enforcement of area that must 
exist in space (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). Examining territorialization theory, 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argue that market systems and territorial administrative 
units are not the only factors involved in its broader process. Subsequently, territoriality 
can be thought of as a resource control strategy, as emphasized by Vandergeest and 
Peluso (1995) that is put into effect by creating boundaries, and by controlling 
communities and their interaction with forest resources. Different activities are managed 
by different territorial strategies across different spaces.  
Production of power dynamics between different actors originates from Marx’s 
economic division of labor which is a key element in determining who controls whom 
and for what purposes (Sack 1986). In a capitalist society, economic division of labor 
determines social division of labor and hence these two processes are interrelated.  
According to the capitalist view, the state has a double role of suppressing the class 
conflicts to avoid any contestation of resources in the society and to safeguard the 
capitalist tendencies. Capitalism perceives space as location for production and 
distribution of resources which can be turned into commodities and hence generate 
profits. Marxism influences territoriality theory by advocating that dynamicity is 
essential for capital accumulation in a capitalist economy and dynamicity signifies a 
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flexible relationship between people, things and space. Hence its ability to change the 
varying degrees of asserting control towards access to resources.  
 
Works of Conservation: Dynamics of Labor in Compensatory Conservation 
Within market based conservation, studies reveal a lack of research on marginalization 
of wage versus non-wage labor relations (Foley 2000). Brockington and Duffy (2010: 
480) state that “the restrictions conservation can impose on rural livelihoods can increase 
the importance of wage labor,” and thus capitalist conservation creates opening for 
creating or deepening the production of rural working classes. Sodikoff (2007) examines 
low-wage laborers hired within special reserve of Andasibe in Madagascar, developed 
under Integrated Conservation and Development Program initiative. He describes how 
decentralized governance has change the economic circumstance for this group. He 
argues that conservation reduces labor as a means of production, which in turn, produces 
difficulties for the success of conservation initiatives in tropical developing countries 
like Madagascar (Sodikoff 2007). In other words, in absence of labor, it is difficult for 
the conservation initiatives to be successful, following the notion of the people living 
harmoniously with the park. Sodikoff (2007) improved on Brockington and Duffy 
(2010) but his work does not focus on the exchange value of labor which emphasizes of 
the role of the state in this process.  
Some have even argued that market based conservation have created hegemonic 
capitalist agencies by (re) regulating the resources from welfare to privatized state, thus 
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creating social and economic inequality among the different stakeholders (Harvey 2005). 
Therefore, there have been concerns that transitioning resource management through 
capitalist expansion will not lead to acceptable outcomes via effective and efficient 
conservation of forests and biodiversity (Bakker 2005, Büscher and Whande 2007, 
Büscher et al 2012).  
Market-based conservation produces entities that have a market value. Labor is one of 
few fictitious commodities (others being land and nature), which are neither concretely 
traded nor fundamentally produced for sale (Polanyi 1944). Hegemonic state agencies 
accumulate surplus labor that is over-accumulated across a period of time. By restricting 
control of, access to and mobilization of resources that result in lack of local job 
opportunities, the state agencies create this surplus labor. It is this surplus of labor that is 
commodified; in other words, labor is exchanged for monetary or non-monetary 
payment. State redistribution of resources from common tenure into private ownership 
restricts the previously allowed income generating activities, forcing commodification of 
labor/ local resource-users to sell their labor elsewhere in absence of employment 
opportunities.  
Labor theory of value plays an essential role in a capitalist commodity producing 
economy and proves to be a useful tool in discussing the market conservation. 
Commodities are produced to fulfill the materialistic needs of the society. Each 
commodity has an exchange or a use value. Use value of a commodity refers to its 
usefulness to the humans to satisfy their basic material needs. On the other hand, the 
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exchange value expresses how much of a given commodity it takes to equal the value of 
another commodity. In a capitalist society, those who do not own any means of 
production must sell their labor to sustain themselves (Smith 1990). Hence, the worker’s 
labor is considered as a commodity exchanged in forms of barter, reciprocal or cash 
incomes.  
The value of labor power is a subsection of the larger labor theory of value. Marx 
understood value as that which is created by the labor and its importance is based on 
proportional amount of labor invested to produce commodities (Foley 1982, Wolff 1981, 
Vlachou 2002). Marxist view of labor theory of value explains how the labor process 
both conserves and increases the innovative value of the commodities it produces. 
Therefore, Marxism defines a value of commodity as “socially necessary abstract labor” 
expressed in the commodity that is created (Foley 1982, Foley 2000). Under this 
tradition, the value is perceived based on social perspective through forms of 
exploitation.  Abstract labor is a characteristic of commodity producing labor that is 
shared by all different types of labor (Marx 1898).  By ‘socially necessary’, Marx refers 
to the quantity required to produce a commodity in a given state of society, determined 
by social standards. Foley (2000) advocates that according to Marx, solutions to the 
transformation of human societies were arranged in those instruments through which the 
elite class, within the society, procured the hegemony of surplus production. It is this 
surplus production that also forms part of Marx’s primitive accumulation.  
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The discussion above raises the question of how this surplus labor is re-invested in the 
system. What are the instruments through which the hegemonic state procures surplus 
labor? Labor has an exchange and use value attached to it. What benefits do laborers get 
in exchange for their labor? Who pays for this exchange value of labor? Who makes the 
rules? Who is responsible for the infrastructure? Who are the producers and the 
consumers in this process? Particularly in the case of proposed ONPC, how this value of 
labor is negotiated by the forest officials is raised by this change in the rules-in-use from 
welfare to market based conservation. How does the re-territorialization and restricting 
the resource-user’s forest access contribute to the dynamics of labor relations? Who is 
doing the labor jobs within the controlled area of proposed ONPC? Who is controlling 
these jobs?  
Hence, this study will address the gaps by examining labor dynamics through labor 
theory of value in the proposed ONPC in India. The new rules-in-use reframe the 
political, economic and social problems of the local “labor” communities in the name of 
market based and compensatory conservation. It will address how new rules-in-use 
affect the labor relations by altering access to, control and mobilization of forest 
resources. Therefore, this paper will examine labor dynamics within proposed ONPC 
with particular emphasis on changing state-society relations. Then, it will study the 
different territorial strategies of compensatory conservation and how they influence the 
labor regimes of forest use.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC) is a planned protected area in 
Madhya Pradesh in India (Figures 4.1a and 4.1b). It is being designed as a compensatory 
conservation project which will overcome the loss of wildlife and forest resulting from 
the construction of and submergence from the nearby Indira-Sagar and Omkareshwar 
dams, part of the infamous multi-purpose Narmada dam project. This complex consists 
of Omkareshwar National Park, Singhaji Wildlife Sanctuary, Mandhata Sanctuary and 
Narmada Conservation Reserve Unit I and II (Figure 4.2). It is situated at the junction of 
three districts, namely, Dewas, Khandwa and Khargone.   
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Figure 4.1 (a) and (b) Depiction of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in 
India and within Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 A map representing the Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
Figure 1a. India 
Figure 1b. Madhya Pradesh and Study Site Location 
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The creation of the ONPC broadly results from one of the mandatory guidelines from an 
independent review conducted in 1991. The World Bank had committed about $450 
million in 1985 to the Narmada dam project that led to mass-displacement which had 
ultimately resulted in Bank’s image as an abuser of human rights and environment (Ram 
1993, McCully 1996, Rich 1990).  With the onset of global environmental consciousness 
in the late 1980s onward, the World Bank was pressurized largely by the non-
governmental organizations in the United States, Europe and some developing countries 
to withdraw from the project (Rich 1990, Morse and Berger 1992).   
In 1987, the Government of India approved the diversion of 41,111.97 hectares of forest 
lands in the districts of Dewas, Khanwa and Hoshangabad (in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh) towards the construction of the Indira Sagar dam project (Personal 
Communication. Government Official 2012). However, at the same time, the 
government also made it mandatory that representatives from different stakeholder 
agencies should form a committee for wildlife management and conservation, which 
would be displaced during the dam construction. These stakeholder agencies were the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), the Narmada Valley Development 
Authority (NVDA hereafter), the state government of Madhya Pradesh and the state 
forest department. This committee selected the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of 
Nature Society to prepare impact assessment reports, which were released in 1994 and 
1996. As a result, in 1993, NVDA declared its intentions to create a national park and 
sanctuaries. (ONPC N.D.) 
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Dominated by the controversies of the Narmada dam project, impact assessment studies 
conducted by the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature Society recommended 
that a protected area be established as a combination of national park and wildlife 
sanctuary (total area 758.88 sq. km.) (ONPC N.D.). Such an area would help minimize 
the consequences of direct and indirect losses resulting from the development of Indira 
Sagar and Omkareshwar dams. They suggested that the selected forest area should share 
similar conservation characteristics with those that were lost due to submergence, so that 
the wildlife displaced by submergence could take refuge in the protected areas built 
around the reservoirs. However, NVDA solicited another agency, the Indian Institute of 
Forest Management, to conduct an independent study to review the recommendations of 
Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of Nature Society. They suggested reducing the 
total extent of the proposed protected area (658.35 sq.km) by 100 sq.km (ONPC N.D.). 
This decision was opposed by Wildlife Institute of India, who argued that the reduced 
area is not sufficient to restore the affected biodiversity (Personal Communication. 
Government Official 2012). Ultimately, in 2007, it was considered pragmatic to 
announce the total extent of the protected area to 651.31sq.km (ONPC N.D.).    
Approximately 84 villages are situated around the proposed ONPC - 55 villages in the 
Dewas district; 28 in Khandwa and 1 village in Khargone. Largely, this region is 
comprised of the tribal ‘adivasis’ population, constituting approximately 22.3% of the 
total population. All the villages in the ONPC largely depend on the forest resources for 
their daily sustenance, particularly fuel-wood and non-timber forest products. While 
planning the creation of the proposed ONPC, ONPC authorities have decided to grant 
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enough area in the nearby forests to the local communities so that they do not depend on 
the proposed ONPC for their daily sustenance. The local people mainly engage as 
gatherers of non-timber forest resources, farmers or work as labors on other agricultural 
farms. While waiting for the designation of ONPC as protected area, the villages situated 
within the area have been declared forest villages, and forest protection committees have 
been formed there as micro-forest governance structures. The changes in rules-in-use 
have also implemented a ban on the daily extraction of forest resources for livelihood 
activities.   
 
ONPC and NTFP  
Based on an earlier available figure, Madhya Pradesh generates approximately US$ 700 
million of non-timber forest products in India (Worldwatch Institute 1991). Important 
NTFPs in this region include tendupatta (leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon), flowers of 
mahua (Madhuka indica), kullu gum (Sterculia urerns), dhavda gum (Anogeissus 
latofoia) and achar (buchanania lanzan). Of these, tendupatta and kullu gum are 
nationalized and regulated NTFPs, and the rest are non-nationalized, which means they 
can be traded freely (Madhya Pradesh State Minor Produce 2010). Other non-timber 
forest produce species include various seeds, tamarind fruits, nuts, bamboo shoots and 
honey (Khare et al 2000).  
Each NTFP represents an important product for household livelihood strategies; 
however, each NTFP has a distinct market and use. 
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1. Fuelwood: While fuelwood forms the basis of daily survival needs of the local 
communities, NTFPs provide important economic resources for households. Social and 
cultural factors play a significant role in deciding which tree species can be utilized for 
fuelwood and which cannot. For instance, wood from tree species such as pipal, neem, 
kalam mohini, amla are not used, as these trees are worshiped by different adivasis. 
They believe their family god resides in these trees. On the other hand, fansi, another 
species, is considered inauspicious; as a result tribes do not use this wood for cooking.  
2. Mahua: Known for its high sugar content, the mahua flower (Madhuka indica) is used 
to prepare local alcohol and also eaten as a cooked vegetable. Mahua flowers are used to 
make local alcoholic drinks Between February and April, liquor is made from mahua 
flower in almost every household in the selected villages in Khandwa district of ONPC. 
Approximately 405 liters of alcohol is yielded from one ton of dried flowers (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2006). Estimated production value of non-timber forest products in Sheopur 
district in Madhya Pradesh includes about US$ 45,000 of mahua (Madhuka indica) 
flowers used for making local alcoholic drinks (Bhattacharya and Hayat 2004). 
3. Tendupatta: Tendupatta (leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon) are used to produce local 
cigarettes or bidis largely as it is decay resistant and its capacity to retain fires. The bidi 
industry provides large-scale employment to rural population hence promoting the rural 
economy. The collection of tendupatta begins around mid-April until mid-May before 
monsoon. As previously mentioned extraction of tendupatta is nationalized, and the 
forest department actively participates in its collection and sale.  
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The ONPC officials regulate the collection and sale of some NTFPs. For example, the 
forest department gives contracts to local people to collect tendupatta, and once 
collected, the local communities make bundles and deliver it to the forest department 
who then exports it out of the region based on national or international demands.  At the 
same time, current conservation reflects some aspects of “fortress conservation,” such as 
guards (nakedaar) empowered by the proposed ONPC principles to enforce and regulate 
forest access, particularly for local people living in the nearby forest villages. For 
example, women are allowed to bring fuelwood, but only as much as they can carry in a 
single headload.  Local people are not allowed to take vehicles like tractors or bullock 
carts inside the forest. This inhibits their ability to cut down large trees for constructing 
their small huts.  
Efforts to provide economic incentives are not the result of any intention of community 
development. Instead, these efforts are the result of economic interest in the future of 
this area, namely in ecotourism.  But at the same time, the ONPC officials have also 
suggested eco-development strategies for broader community development in the 
proposed ONPC region. According to an initial ONPC management plan (N.D.), the 
objective of eco-development policy is to lessen the reliance of local resource-users on 
the forest resources and to get their extensive support in implementing the conservation-
development policies in the region in addition to the goal of boosting household 
incomes. This objective will be fulfilled by the development of agroforestry, village 
resources, alternative energy and participatory forest management (ONPC N.D.).  
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Forest Institutions within ONPC 
 In case of proposed ONPC, previously, the forest commons were under the jurisdiction 
of Forest departments of Khandwa and Dewas districts. Presently, the ONPC authority 
governs this region. The resource governance structure two institutions: (1) van suraksha 
samiti (Forest Protection Committees, FPCs henceforth)) and (2) the ONPC officials. 
Formal FPCs have been established in the forest villages (FVs) situated within the 
complex, and are responsible for protecting biodiversity and village development with 
the assistance of ONPC officials. Under the Forest Protection Act 1988, protected areas 
such as proposed ONPC are situated under direct control of central forest ministry with 
no interference from the state government.  
Every forest village has its own FPC that has a total of 13 members, including both 
males and females. These members are elected by the villagers in presence of the ONPC 
ranger and a forest guard, who facilitate the process, during village meeting within a day. 
There are as such no criteria for the selection of members with any fixed representation 
of different social groups. There are no seats reserved on the committee based on sex, 
caste, class, education or age. It is quite common for the FPC chief within a village to 
hold the same post for number of years (Fieldwork 2009-2010). These FPCs have 
limited set of power and responsibilities, as per the ONPC officials. They are responsible 
for helping the ONPC officials with forest protection through functions like providing 
manual labor for jobs- related to village development or forest protection and for 
guarding the forest against poachers and illegal woodcutters (Fieldwork 2009-2010). 
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While planning for the creation of ONPC, the ONPC authorities have decided to grant 
enough area in the nearby forests to the local communities so that they do not depend on 
the ONPC for their daily sustenance.  In addition, the proposed ONPC is to implement a 
Joint Forest Management (JFM) plan (Khare et al 2000), a strategy developed by the 
Indian government to decentralize forest management to local communities (Forest 
Official, personal Interview, 2008). 
 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
 I conducted intensive household surveys and participant observation, in the selected six 
villages, which attempted to extensively collect resource use and household economic 
related data from different socio-cultural groups inhabiting the region. Each survey 
questionnaire was designed to generate quantitative data.  
I collected data and information for this study from six villages situated within five 
kilometer radius of the proposed ONPC boundary in the central Indian state of Madhya 
Pradesh. Of these six villages, two villages, namely Village E and Village F, are in the 
Dewas district while, the other four villages – Village C, Village B, Village D and 
Village A are in the Khandwa district of Madhya Pradesh. Then, I obtained a map of the 
proposed ONPC from park officials during the preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 
2008. Based on the map, I identified villages lying within 2 kilometers radius. During 
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the pre-fieldwork in 2008, I selected few random villages for a visit on the basis of 
accessibility and contacts for the purpose of getting acquainted with the region. 
Preliminary data was collected from these selected villages. Ultimately, I made a final 
selection of the villages on the criteria based on the proximity to the base station 
(Narmadanagar), safety and accessibility especially during the severe monsoon season in 
the months of July August. Except for Village D and Village F, rest of the selected 
villages had been visited during preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 2008 and 
contacts were established there. In addition, these villages were especially selected under 
the guidance of the advisor, the Chief Conservator of Forests (of proposed ONPC) and 
the proposed national park’s office.   
I collected data from November 2009 to August 2010 and December 2010-January 2011 
involving a random chain sample of 204 panel households in the six villages. The paper 
studies how labor dynamics, resulting from new rules-in-use, shape access to resources. I 
hired village-based young adults to conduct the household panel surveys in summer of 
2010 and December/January 2011.  
In order to provide detailed information, I designed the household survey in six 
elaborative sections. Out of these six sections, two sections contributed to the data on 
household economics. Of these, the first section ‘general economics’ focused on the data 
from individual households and was divided into three categories based on the income 
generation activities – forest products, farm and non-farm. The first category compiled 
detailed data such as which resources they collected each year, month-wise resource 
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extraction, units collected and its sale. The second category on ‘income generated due to 
farm activities’ included questions related to the agricultural activities such as how much 
land do the people own, how much do they produce, what do they grow, if they need to 
work on other’s land or if they hire labors for their own land. Questions related to, travel 
in particular labor tasks outside the village and how much do they get paid, formed part 
of the third category. Other sections aimed at calculating (closest approximate) 
individual household incomes, utilizing forest resources for cultural events, forest 
management institutions and consumption of fuelwood for different purposes. In context 
of forest institutions, I incorporated numerous questions within the household surveys to 
acquire perception of the resource-users to understand the dynamics of forest 
institutions.  
 
Data Analysis  
To analyze, I designed the data collected from the surveys into excel spreadsheets, with 
each village maintaining a separate spreadsheet. I transcribed the interviews of the 
resource-users and the officials through Express Scribe and coding was performed by 
employing Atlas software. For the qualitative analysis, field notes, interviews with 
officials and case- studies narratives were examined.  
It should be noted here the complex social heterogeneity of the rural Indian society is 
such that it cannot be ensured during sampling that similar socio-cultural groups and 
sub-groups are evenly distributed in each sample villages (Table 4.1). Since the study 
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area is predominantly tribal in social nature, people belonging to other socio-cultural 
groups would be relatively smaller in number. Hence this affected the data analysis.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Broad socio-cultural groups within the sampled villages 
 
Socio-cultural 
groups 
Village A Village B Village C Village D Village E Village F 
Total sample 19 36 34 40 36 39 
Adivasi 12 29 30 33 33 37 
Non-Adivasi 7 7 4 7 3 2 
Total 
percentage of 
Adivasi (%) 
63 81 88 83 92 95 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: Percentage has been rounded off  
 
 
Data Problems 
One of the main problems was that there was no way to corroborate the household 
income data that was collected through the household surveys. It is possible that 
household heads or members, when surveyed, exaggerated their household income data, 
which might cause anomalies in the data. However, the researcher tried to ascertain the 
income told by the household head/member by observing the number of consumer items 
such as a television, a radio, a motor vehicle, a refrigerator in the house and type and 
built of the house. In addition, there were few cases in which the field assistants forgot to 
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ask for the detailed household income data. Such cases have been included in the data 
analysis. These factors can again cause abnormality in the data.  
 
RESULTS 
This sub-section investigates how new rules-in-use as a result of compensatory 
conservation affect the labor dynamics thus altering the access to forest resources. Based 
on quantitative data, two aims are examined. First, I examine the labor dynamics within 
the ONPC. Secondly, I study the different territorial strategies of compensatory 
conservation and how they influence the labor regimes of forest use.  
 
Labor Dynamics in the ONPC Region 
Within the park, an average household has four to seven members depending upon its 
status as a nuclear or a joint family. A nuclear family includes parents and two to four 
children whereas a joint family consists of parents, their son/s, their wives and children. 
It was observed that the different family status influences different household labor. For 
instance, in both nuclear and a joint family, it is the responsibility of the woman/women 
of the house to perform all household chores inside the house. The only distinction 
includes that a woman from the nuclear family is responsible for all chores inside as well 
as outside her house. A normal day routine would include preparing food twice a day, 
cleaning the house, taking care of her small children (if any), preparing older children 
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for school and collecting fuelwood two three times a week particularly for cooking and 
bathing. During the tendupatta season, she may or may not go with her husband to 
extract tendupatta but after lunch, she and her children would sit and tie them in bundles. 
She does not engage in extracting kullu and dhavda gums. When children grow old 
enough to go to school, the couple engages in farm labor within the village. The woman 
from the nuclear family does not participate in labor jobs outside her village. In that 
case, only the husband would be the sole earner in the household.  On the other hand, the 
women (daughter/s-in-law) from the joint families are responsible only for the household 
chores including taking care of their parents-in-law, husbands and children, preparing 
food, and cleaning the house. If there is a young unmarried daughter in the house, 
fuelwood collection responsibility lies on her. In this case, there may be more than one 
income producers in the household which may be limited to the father and his sons. 
Approximately 46% of average household members engage in contributing to their 
household income by working on the farms or in the forests (Table 4.2).  This implies 
that out of an average family of five, only two members work and generates income 
while three members are not bread-earners.  
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Table 4.2 Contribution of the household laborers 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Total family 
members 
Total members 
contributing to 
household 
income 
Percentage of members 
contributing to 
household income (%)
^
 
A 19 111 51 46 
B 36 271 116 42 
C 34 206 86 42 
D 40 221 97 44 
E 36 243 130 53 
F 39 240 114 47 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: ^Percentages have been rounded off  
 
 
In the proposed park, labor can be categorized into both formal and informal categories 
on the basis of duration of wage-work available in a year (Figure 4.3). Formal labor 
category includes those wage laborers who receive year-round payments from the ONPC 
officials for their duties and responsibilities. For instance, van suraksha samiti (forest 
protection committees) chief and chowkidaar (security guards) constitute this category. 
During the fieldwork, it was found that van suraksha samiti chief and chowkidaar 
receive monthly salaries of US$ 22.64 and US$ 28.30 respectively. Consequently, 
informal labor is related to seasonal work in which payments are either in monetary or 
non-monetary forms. These include daily labor or fixed-period employment. In the case 
of informal labor, payments are made by farmers (in case of agriculture), factory owners 
(remittances) or the park officials (forest work). For panchayat3 work, the state 
government pays the wages if the work conducted is under a government employment 
                                                          
3
 Gram Panchayat, or generally known as panchayat, are local self-government at the level of village or 
small town in India (Government of India 2013). It is a basic unit of administration formed in 1958.  
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program. However, these payments are handed to the workers by the park officials. The 
data below largely discuss the wage and non-wage labor from different activities active 
in the ONPC region. Here the informal labor can be classified into – 
 
Agricultural Labor 
 During monsoon and harvesting seasons, the farm owners, who have more than one acre 
land, hire external laborers to work on their fields. Depending on the size of the farm 
land, these laborers, both men and women, can be hired from the same village or from 
another village. Labor work includes watering, sowing, harvesting different crops such 
as soybean, maize, wheat, jowar, chillies and cotton. It was noted that the farm owner 
always worked on his/her own land and hired labor depending on the size of the land and 
only when extra work needed to be done which he/she could not handle alone such as 
sowing or harvesting. At times, the whole family of the farm owner including his wife 
and children work in the fields to avoid the cost of hiring laborers.  
Workers are hired for a maximum of four to five days depending on different conditions 
such as weather, soil and quality of the crop. Due to low groundwater table and in the 
absence of day round electricity, farmers (farm owners) grow crops during the monsoon 
season from June to August. Some rich farmers have installed private tubewells or other 
irrigational facilities on their farm lands. As a result, with the help of tubewells or 
supplemental irrigational facilities, the farm owners can grow winter crops during the  
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Figure 4.3 Classification of labor in the proposed ONPC 
 
Fixed salary + work available 
throughout year 
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winter months of December to March. During the peak farming time, when additional 
labor is required, the farmers inform their neighbors and other villagers. Subsequently 
the farmer picks a handful of laborers, both men and women as required, to do the work. 
In some cases, farm owners from other near and far villages also come and hire laborers 
from this region. They call someone in the village to inform them about the additional 
number of laborers required and for how long. If the farm lands are too far, the farm 
owners send and pay for the trucks to bring the laborers. This implies that this region has 
cheap and productive labor.   
It is believed that this process of hiring laborers from within or outside own village has 
been occurring from several years as the farm owners know exactly who to hire. They do 
not have to search. At times during failed monsoons, farm owners do not hire any 
laborers in absence of irrigational facilities. Some particular days during the farming 
season, my visits to the villages had to be canceled. Several times I found locks on the 
household doors with all the men and the women working in the fields and children 
studying in the school. About 70 percent of the total surveyed households own 
agricultural land (Table 4.3). Despite this large percentage of households, villagers still 
engage in additional labor tasks. Two households reported income (US$ 1698.11 and 
US$ 754.72 respectively) from engaging in contracted labor at another’s agricultural 
field. Village D (50%), Village C (53%) and Village A (63%) respectively have less 
percentage of total households that own land. This implies that rest of the households, 
within these villages which do not own land, find employment elsewhere either through 
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off-farm work or extraction of forest resources such as tendupatta. Access to paved road 
and access to forest can also be responsible for this trend.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Ownership of farm land 
 
Villages Total 
Households 
Surveyed 
Total number 
of households 
that do not own 
land 
Total number of 
households that 
own land 
Percentage of 
households 
that own land 
(%)
^
 
A 19 7 12 63 
B 36 4 27 89 
C 34 14 18* 53 
D 40 20 20 50 
E 36 8 28 78 
F 39 7 32 82 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: *2 households did not mention   
 ^Percentages have been rounded off  
 
 
In addition to the money, the laborers also receive reciprocal income that includes large 
quantities of grains (Table 4.4). This is a common practice in the villages, to receive 
payments in agricultural product (grains) instead of money. Despite this, some laborers 
complain that reciprocal income is not enough to compensate cash income. A laborer 
from village F explained “we still take loans around rainy season but when we go for 
soybean cutting, we get paid in cash and we bought a motor from that money”. Another 
from village E complained “sales from agricultural production is not enough, I have to 
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do extra labor jobs”. Many respondents (22%) said it [earned income whether cash or 
reciprocal] is not enough but we have to somehow manage it.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Details of labor jobs and annual income generated per household from 
agriculture in the proposed ONPC 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
engaged in 
agriculture 
labor 
Average 
Annual 
Income 
(US$) 
Note: Total 
Reciprocal 
income
*
 
A 19 12 397.17 58kgs of 
wheat 
B 36 27 606.04 3 quintals 
and 21kgs 
C 34 18 573.96 2 sacks 
wheat 
D 40 13 408.49  
E 36 28 260.19 5 kgs of 
maize 
F 39 32 752.28 3quintals 
maize + 8kgs 
jowar 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 *only 6 households reported reciprocal income 
 
 
 
Remunerated Forest Labor 
Work under this category is made available and supervised by the ONPC officials 
including the Forest Ranger and the Forest Guards. Since the work conducted is within 
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the ONPC, hence the state government pays for these jobs. These payments are handed 
directly to the wage workers by the deputy-ranger two to three months after the work is 
done. The deputy-ranger keeps a village-wise account of what work was done, who did 
the work and how much the worker was paid. For such jobs, both men and women are 
hired. Work, such as constructing water holes for animals, check dams, plant saplings, 
and working in the forest nurseries, are done during the day-time. In addition, only 
young men are hired as guards or chowkidaar- to patrol the forests during night time. It 
was surprising that out of all the villages, only the FPC chief from village A reported her 
income. Villages in closest proximity to the forest including Village A (US$ 118.19), 
Village C (US$ 46.93) and Village E (US$ 74.88) generate large wages by working for 
the ONPC officials (Table 4.5). These jobs are temporary and hence are not a constant 
source of wages throughout the year. 
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Table 4.5 Employment details and annual income generated per household from forest 
projects in the proposed ONPC 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
engaged in 
forest 
projects 
Total 
Income 
(US$) 
Average 
Income per 
household 
(US$) 
Note 
A 19 13 1536.42  118.19  Includes 
salaries of 
two 
chowkidaars 
and a fpc 
chief 
B 36 7 183.49  26.93   
C 34 8 375.47  46.93   
D 40 8     158.68 19.83   
E 36 8 599.06  74.88    
F 39 16 280.09   17.51    
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 
 
Panchayat Labor 
Central government’s rural employment scheme, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act, was passed in the parliament in September 2005. Its main 
objective was “to provide for the enhancement of livelihood security of the households 
in rural areas of the country by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage 
employment in every financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer 
to do unskilled manual work and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto” 
(The Gazette of India 2005). Following this program, different developmental projects 
are initiated in different villages with a goal of providing income from one hundred days 
of employment (Table 4.6). Such developmental projects are supervised by village 
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panchayats. Work within these projects include digging of well, repairing village road 
and digging khanti at the edge of agricultural fields. It was noted during informal 
discussions across different selected villages that not everybody gets benefits from the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act’s one hundred days of 
employment.  
There is not enough work in the region to provide one hundred days of work. Hence, one 
can estimate from the results that only a small percentage of total households actually 
benefit from such project work. For instance, the annual household data of Village A 
shows that out of a year, a total of 35 days of work was available under Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Works such as digging a well or 
digging khanti required about 15 people from the whole village. For each khanti dug, 
each laborer receive paltry sum of US$1. Although few villagers sometime decide to 
work on all days during which the work is available, while some work only for a day or 
two. Depending on the availability of the family members, on an average only one or 
two work members work from particular households. Both men and women engage in 
panchayat labor. This also reveals that geographic location plays an important role. For 
instance, Village B which is situated about 10 kilometers inside the forest has more 
number of households engaged in village projects but generate less income. Due to the 
greater distance between the village and the nearest developed road, officials do not 
travel deeper into the forests to open up development projects under the employment 
scheme. 
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Table 4.6 Details of labor work and income generated from village developmental  
projects in the proposed ONPC 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
engaged in 
village projects 
Total Income 
(US$) 
Average 
Income per 
household 
(US$) 
A 19 9 190.94      21.22 
B 36 10 159.06     15.91   
C 34 7 394.43  56.34  
D 40 8 213.21   26.65  
E 36 8 804.34  100.54 
F 39 3 48.30  16.10  
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 
 
Temporary Remittances Labor  
Different households engage in different economic activities, some within their village 
and some outside, hence generating remittances (Table 4.7). In surveyed villages, it was 
found that villagers often travel outside their villages for generally temporary 
opportunities during the monsoon season. Such work included working as a laborer on 
another’s agricultural land especially during the sowing and harvesting seasons and in 
the chili factories for which the region is famous and cotton factories. In such rural areas, 
income from reciprocal labor plays a significant role. Reciprocal form of labor entails 
receiving payment through forms different than money. For instance, when villagers 
work on another’s agricultural land, they are generally paid in particular quantity of 
grains such as wheat, instead of money. Under such circumstances, the laborer stays at 
the workplace and return home only after the season ends. The laborer stores wheat back 
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at his house and consumes it throughout the year.  In addition, some families send their 
young sons or daughters to nearby towns to work in a cotton or chilli factory. The 
laborers receive payments for their labor and transportation. In return of their services, 
they receive free accommodation and food. It is evident that there are spatial differences 
in income from remittances across different villages. These incomes vary because of 
geographic location of the villages and their proximity to the nearest developed road. 
Both local men and women engage in temporary remittances labor. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Details about annual temporary remittances in the proposed ONPC 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
with 
temporary 
remittance 
Total 
Remittance 
income (US$) 
Average 
Annual 
Remittance 
income per 
household 
(US$) 
Income 
from 
Reciprocal 
labor 
A 19 3   163.02   54.34 - 
B 36 12 1460.37 121.70 3 
households 
reported 
wheat 
C 34 8 279.62   34.95 160kgs of 
wheat 
D 40 13 2769.25   213.09 5.5 quintal 
wheat 
E 36 10 724.34 72.43 1 quintal 
wheat 
F 39 9 409.43   45.49 - 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
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Forest Extraction Labor 
 In proposed ONPC, extractive labor refers to labor done by members of a household by 
engaging in extraction of different forest produce for subsistence or income generation. 
Males and females, within a household, both engage in extractive labor. For instance, 
they both engage in fuelwood collection and extraction of mahua. But only men engage 
in extraction and collection of kullu and dhavda gums. Labor involved in tendupatta 
extraction is not discussed here. There is a separate section on tendupatta. 
Mahua: Extraction of mahua, a difficult task, is done over the month of February. To 
extract mahua, tree owners, visit the tree site every day before dawn to catch the falling 
mahua flowers from the tree. Since these trees are lined around the edge of the villages 
and forest, wild animals, particularly bear, always pose a danger. Sometimes these are 
sites of contention when outsiders or neighbors steal someone’s mahua flowers during 
the night. Many households depend on income from mahua extraction (Table 4.8). 
Mahua used for preparing local alcoholic drinks, is sold in the village market. Largely 
within a household, women engage in extraction of mahua but sometimes men also 
accompany in case of a conflicting situation with neighbors.   
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Table 4.8: Details of income from mahua extraction  
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
engaged in 
mahua 
extraction 
Annual total 
Income (US$) 
Average 
Annual Income 
per household 
(US$) 
A 19 10 130. 34  13.033  
B 36 5   114.15 22.83  
C 34 6 96.27 16.04   
D 40 4* 9.05  9.05 
E 36 12* 162.57  16.26 
F 39 29   746.60   25.74   
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
*Remaining households extract mahua for household use 
 
 
Kullu and Dhavda Gums: Of all the extractive activities, extraction of dhavda and kullu 
gum is a hard and demanding work, but it provides significant returns (Table 4.9). 
Extractors, generally men, have to walk as much as 8 to 10 kilometers to extract kullu 
gum. Due to time and distance, women do not engage in extraction of gums. Instead, 
they stay back at home and take care of their children and cook meals. Kullu gum is 
more expensive, due to its medicinal value, in the market as compared to the dhavda 
gum. Sold through the ONPC officials, the kullu gum is traded for US$ 4.72 per 
kilogram or less (US$ 2.45 per kilogram) if traded illegally in the market. Gum 
extractors are educated through the workshops and are provided with the useful tools 
like clean plastic sheet and sickle by the ONPC officials. Extractors generally leave their 
homes for forest around dawn and walk to the deeper parts of the forest. Once they find 
the specific kullu or dhavda tree, they mark a cut across the trunk and fix their plastic 
sheet in such a way that the oozing sticky gum can fall directly into the plastic sheet. 
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They return home and go again the next day to collect the solidified dripped gum. Over-
extraction and degrading quality of forest over the years has affected the extraction of 
gums in the park area. The cleaner and freer the gum is from the impurities, more 
valuable it is to the pharmaceutical companies. It is evident that extraction of gums is an 
economically productive activity in villages A, B and E only generating large household 
incomes. Particularly in the forests proximate to Village A and Village E, it seems 
obvious that kullu and dhavda trees can still be found.  
 
 
Table 4.9 Details of income from kullu and dhavda gum extraction 
 
Village Total 
households 
surveyed 
Households 
engaged in gum 
collection 
Total annual 
Income (US$) 
Average 
Income per 
household 
(US$) 
A 19 2 943.40  471.70  
B 36 3 290.19 96.73    
C 34 0 0 0 
D 40 1    17.55    8.77     
E 36 20 5085.85 254.29  
F 39 0 0 0 
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
 
 
Fuelwood Collection: Fuelwood collection is part of subsistence livelihood. The villages 
in and around the proposed ONPC utilize fuelwood for the purposes of cooking food and 
bathing. As similar patterns are seen across the six sampled villages, only Village A is 
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discussed here. During the survey, 100 percent participants expressed that women from 
their households collect the fuelwood from the forests surrounding their villages and 
change their collection sites on weekly basis. On an average, a bai4, from Village A, 
walks two to four kilometers one-way to collect fuelwood. In some cases, bai take their 
young children along with them to the forest. After spending about three to five hours on 
an average, each bai gets one moli (headload). Several family members accompanying 
her signify additional moli. Some bai complained that walking almost five kilometers 
two-three times a week has changed their lifestyle. Some protested that a major portion 
of their day is spent in collecting fuelwood such that they cannot take out time for 
income producing labor jobs or for their small children. In addition, they get tired due to 
the heavy weight of the headload and less number of stops made during their journey to 
back home. At times, they do not get time to rest and they have to continue with their 
leftover household chores upon returning.  
In Village A, about 42 percent participants take a bullock-cart inside the forest for 
fuelwood collection, while rest 58 percent respondents walk to the forest and bring only 
a headload as per the forest rules. All respondents informed that according to them, all 
the tree species exist in the forest. 42 percent of the respondents agreed that the quality 
and the density of the wood species has changed, making them walk further in the forest 
in absence of several good quality wood species. Some of the wood species that they do 
not prefer for cooking include mohini, salai, temru (because they smoke a great deal); 
neem (bitterness), pipal and fansi (sacred trees). It was noted that the fuelwood 
                                                          
4
 Term used for local woman in villages.  
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collection changes with the season. In order of utilization, most fuelwood is used during 
the winters followed by the monsoons and then the summer. During the summer season, 
the households stock up fuelwood for the monsoons. Depending on the household size, 
during the summers one to three moli are collected each week from the forest while 
during monsoons and winter seasons, two to six and four to ten moli are collected each 
week in Village A respectively. Primarily, the villagers pick up the fallen branches or cut 
dead branches from the trees as allowed by the forest officials. However, the officials 
informed that when villagers take carts inside the forest for fuelwood collection, they cut 
down whole, sometimes green, trees. This results in forest degradation. For instance, in 
the peripheral forests around Village E, due to bad lopping techniques and felling of the 
green trees, the quality of the forest has deteriorated. Participants informed that they do 
not use Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) or buy wood from nistaar depot in absence of 
fuelwood. However, sometimes they cook batti (type of Indian bread) on cowdung cakes 
kande to enhance the taste of the food particularly during social cultural events.  
In the proposed ONPC, local inhabitants generate household income by engaging in the 
labor jobs at the fields and the developmental project sites in addition to extracting and 
selling forest resources.  
 
Territorial Strategies and Conservation Enclosure 
As the idea of creation of the ONPC is flourishing, several instruments were 
implemented by the state agencies to imply their presence in the area. Within a few 
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years, the villages that were included within the five kilometer boundary of the new 
conservation enclosure, were declared ‘forest villages’ and were placed under complete 
control of the state forest department. Imposition of rules and regulations was placed on 
access to resources based on the National Forest Policy of 1988, according to which 
restrictions were placed on the surrounding forest villages to curb their access to forest 
resources. Furthermore, monetary fines were levied on the rule-breakers from the forest 
communities. These rules were imposed to safeguard the degrading quality of the forest 
evident by the heavy dependency of the local inhabitants on the forest resources such as 
kullu and dhavda gums. According to the management plan of the proposed ONPC, the 
park officials are designing developmental projects in the forest villages to diversify 
livelihood opportunities of the villagers and promote community based ecotourism as an 
alternative to their dependency on the forest resources.  
Construction of new developmental projects, such as a village pond or village roads, as a 
means to gaining the trust of the local inhabitants and to keep them content with the 
progress of the proposed national park has been effective. This can also be considered as 
a direct or indirect form of state controlling activities, through which it rules local 
communities. The work done through FPC was primarily funded by the ONPC 
department, the creators of FPC. A FPC chief seemed satisfied with the working of their 
FPC -  
“We have received many benefits from van suraksha samiti [fpc]. We got a well, engine 
[diesel pump for irrigation] and jobs.... If van suraksha samiti hasn't helped us, then who 
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got us well, engine and cemented roads? We also built canals along the agricultural 
fields. Twice it has been constructed so far. What else do we need?” 
In addition, physical boundaries such as wired fences were erected around the periphery 
of the proposed national park. Manifestation of such a physical boundary was meant to 
ensure that the villagers get the clear message that beyond the borderline area is out of 
limits for them. 
“[ONPC official] we are fencing around so that the wild animals and other animals do 
not come out from the forest and disturb the villages.” 
When asked, some of the local villagers drew a mental map based on the perception of 
how their own village is situated around the forest (Figure 4.4). Without hinting, they 
themselves drew the wired fence around the forest that separates it from their village. 
This signifies that the local villagers are aware of the presence of the wired fences that 
have been positioned around the Village B (Figure 4.5). During the fieldwork, I 
observed that at places, the wired fence was broken in. For instance, in Figure 4.5b, a big 
gaping hole is evident and two cows can be seen on the other side of the fence. This 
illustrates how the rules are broken by the villagers. The whole duration of my stay, I did 
not notice any conflict between the park officials and the villagers as the idea of the park 
is quite novel and the villagers are still getting used to the idea.  
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a). The map depicts a household (of map maker) on the left side that is connected by a road 
to his agricultural land on the right. At the bottom right, he drew his school and adjacent 
to his school, the park fence is drawn 
 
 
 
b) In the above image, a young girl drew her house at the bottom left which is located near 
to the water pump. Across from the pump, there is a road beyong which the forest lays. 
The forest is separated by a wired fence from the village 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Mental maps depicting forest boundaries 
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a). A picture of wired fence around Village B 
 
 
 
b). Another picture of the wired fence around Village B. Upon close inspection, a hole 
can be seen in the center left 
 
Figure 4.5 Wired fences around Village B 
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The results indicate that local people, who help the ONPC officials to protect forests, 
were unsatisfied with the benefits provided to them. When asked, a FPC chief replied 
“they don't give us anything. Only during the fire protection, the men work in 
extinguishing fire and they are paid for their labor. No other benefits.” When asked 
about their wages for forest protection, another villager stated that they are paid “per day 
approximately US$ 2 to extinguish fire and they [ONPC officials] keep two to three 
chowkidaar [security guards] on each gate, currently they are getting salary of 
approximately US$30 each month.” Not only the hired security guards paid higher, they 
also get free-rides from the forest guards, or with little bribes, access to the forest. 
Furthermore, “.. what they [forest officials] do is that they hire 4 chowkidaar and they 
keep 2 on duty and they keep the salary of other two chowkidaar in their own pocket.” 
This indicates the exploitative and corrupt relationship between the controller (ONPC 
officials) and the controlled (local people). This suggests that, according to the FPC 
chiefs, the benefits given to the communities in the form of development projects (such 
as pond development, road construction) to ease their difficulties are not considered 
benefits. Another FPC chief seemed helpless about the prospect of job opportunities -  
“Whatever work we get, we do it. We did not have the road [connecting cemented road 
from nearby bigger village of Ratanpur to Premgarh] so we asked for it and we got the 
road built.” 
Another FPC chief mentioned -  
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“In the forest, through van suraksha samiti the only work, so far, we were given was to 
cut trees, put some place markers. Whatever work comes through the van suraksha 
samiti we go for it.” 
Due to lack of regular job prospects, an indirect bribe, in form of some work offered, can 
keep the people diverted by doing odd jobs for the ONPC officials. In return, the ONPC 
provide money, in the form of funds, for the village development projects.  
“Through forest department, funds are allocated to the van suraksha samiti of the village 
and then they decide what work needs to be done in the village and accordingly decide 
to spend that money on developmental projects around the village. For instance, 
someone needs a job or water well needs to be fixed. Samiti are given loan also if they 
need for weddings, or other social events. All that money comes from the funds that 
were deposited with the samiti.” 
There is a strong presence of the forest department in the form of FPCs in this region.  
Yet survey results clearly highlight the fact that a majority of the household respondents 
admitted they do not receive any kind of benefits from the JFM program (Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Benefits of Joint Forest Management program in the proposed ONPC 
 
 
When different village communities were asked whether they proposed or opposed any 
resolutions in the JFM meetings, all 100% respondents from all the six villages replied 
that they do not participate in proposing or opposing resolutions at the meetings 
(Fieldwork 2009-10).  
Different participants provided a range of answers about their role in forest protection 
(Figure 4.7). 63% respondents admitted they actively participate in the forest protection 
and management programs. Of these 63%, the most common answers included help in 
extinguishing forest fires (35%), catch poachers (29%), and following the forest rules 
(36%) (Figure 4.8). Of the remaining respondents, 35% denied any role in forest 
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protection while 2% of participants did not know about their role in forest protection 
(Fieldwork 2009-10). From the above discussion, it seems that the local inhabitants are 
not contented and satisfied with the on-going plans of the park officials. They do not see 
JFM as a strategy of empowerment. Hence, they do not engage in the Joint Forest 
Management process including the forest protection.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Level of participation in the Joint Forest Management in the proposed ONPC 
63%
35%
2%
Level of participation 
Participate Do not participate Do not know
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Figure 4.8 Details of participation in the Joint Forest Management in the proposed ONPC 
 
 
The working population from the forest villages is hired by the park officials. Table 4.10 
summarizes the forest employment and the income generated. Only a small percent 
(30%) people work seasonal jobs from the park officials. Uneven distribution pattern can 
be seen here in terms of average money per participated household and the total number 
of households participated. Main factors for this uneven distribution included 
geographical location of the villages, job site, and availability of the jobs.  
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Table 4.10 Number of the labor jobs provided by the park officials 
 
Villages Total number of 
household 
surveyed 
Number of households 
getting jobs out of total 
surveyed households 
Total 
percentage 
of 
households 
getting jobs 
(%) 
Average 
Annual 
money earned 
in a month 
(US$) 
A 19 13 68 26.50 
B 36 7 19 14.82 
C 34 8 24 45.74 
D 40 7 18 23.74 
E 36 9 25 35.00 
F 39 16 40 18.64 
Total 204 60 100  
Source: Fieldwork (2009-2010) 
Note: 1 US$ = INR 53 
All the decimals have been rounded off. 
 
 
 
Different territorial strategies including the conservation enclosure can be seen as an 
effective form of influencing control. In an effort to empower the local communities 
with the decision-making process, the park officials are striving to reintroduce the Joint 
Forest Management in the region by establishing forest committees which the local 
inhabitants are not attracted towards.  
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DISCUSSION 
The study illustrates how creation of compensatory conservation enclosure, as a part of 
‘market based’ conservation strategy, becomes a site for struggle of access and 
mobilization of forest resources. The struggle, although subtle, occurs as more and more 
restrictions are placed on the activities of the local communities to fulfill the state‘s plan 
to gain capital by reinvesting the seized common’s ecosystem services into ecotourism. 
This study investigates how changes in rules-in-use, as a result of compensatory 
conservation, influence labor dynamics thus altering resource access.  
Previous section 3 established main sources of income within the ONPC. Subsequently, 
the main findings of this paper include (1) employment includes both seasonal wage and 
non-wage work within the ONPC, (2) formal wage labor includes a steady annual 
income for chowkidaar and chief of van suraksha samiti, (3) informal labor includes 
seasonal employment that ranges from labor jobs within agriculture, forest, panchayats, 
temporary remittances and forest extraction, (4) agriculture labor is compensated 
through both wage and non-wage income, (5) access to road and forest plays an 
important role in earnest engagement in off-farm jobs, (6) the state agencies exert 
pressure on the local communities by strictly imposing new rules that restrict their access 
to forest. This has also been done by constructing wired fences around the park, thus 
separating it from the villages, and (7) the local people are not satisfied by the role of the 
local forest institutions.    
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Some generalizations can be made about the labor dynamics in the ONPC: (1) both 
unskilled wage and non-wage working class exists, (2) wage labor can be temporary or 
permanent, (3) based on social norms, different labor jobs require different people 
depending on the nature of the work, particularly within a household men engage in 
work related to income generation while women involve in labor work related to 
household for instance fuelwood extraction, (4) however, during monsoon farming, 
when additional labor is required, both men and women engage in farm labor to generate 
household income, and (5) only men or young adults from a household travel outside the 
village for labor work. These generalizations reflect that season and social norms control 
the labor relations.   
Future plans for this proposed park complex entail establishing ecotourism as a 
compensatory ‘market-based’ conservation initiative. By privatizing and 
commercializing the newly formed ONPC, restrictions are being imposed on the 
extraction of NTFPs for both subsistence and commercial uses. This ban on the NTFPs 
extraction, which provides seasonal employment to the forest communities, may further 
compel them to alter their livelihoods. It is clear that fewer jobs are made available to the 
local communities in absence of the extraction of forest produce. Benefits derived from 
these employment opportunities within proposed ONPC include both wage income 
(cash) and reciprocal income in form of wheat and maize which the workers use for 
subsistence rather than selling it. Instead of extracting NTFPs, resource users will have 
to travel outside their villages for employment to compensate the loss of income. Even 
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with active government policies such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, 100 days of work is not available or guaranteed in the sampled villages.  
Exchange labor is a characteristic feature in determining the social relationships. It is 
evident from the results that currently, an imbalanced equation exists between the FPCs, 
formed by the resource-users, and the ONPC officials. Resource-users are not involved 
in the decision-making process of forests management, protection and conservation. In 
addition, according to the local communities, they do not receive any benefits from the 
Joint Forest Management. However, formation of FPCs, through which the member 
villages get regular sum of money for village development from the ONPC department, 
should be considered a positive outcome from the creation of ONPC. This money is 
invested in village projects such as constructing school, community center, buying 
utensils for weddings and hand pumps. These incentives in form of monetary and non-
monetary benefits should be considered as forms of additional privileges to the different 
villages.  
With the new rules-in-use, there will be change in the control of the local access of 
resources (for any purposes) in varying degrees. Hence, in this case, the state becomes 
the controller through the forest communities become the controlled. Territoriality can 
be understood as a social, human and power construction. This asserts power equation 
between the state and the forest communities across different institutions. This is an 
example where institutional and structural changes are made by establishing FPCs and 
transferring the control reins from territorial forest department to ONPC officials. The 
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forest area in question is being privatized by converting it into a national park with 
restricted use and by introducing ecotourism. According to the park officials, future 
efforts would include granting projects to private businesses to construct rest houses 
within the park area, hiring private transportation services to move the travelers/guests 
from one end to another end of the park, contracting food chains and local restaurant 
owners to open restaurants to provide meals and snacks, that is, creating more economic 
opportunities within the park for the state’s capitalist interests.  
By restricting access and mobilization of forest resources, thus influencing livelihood 
opportunities results in the creation of the surplus labor. This surplus labor should be re-
invested in the privatized economy in order to save the shield the system from 
collapsing. In the case of ONPC, the park officials plan to empower the surplus labor 
(unemployed) by engaging them in the new economy supported by ecotourism.  
 
Different Territorial Strategies of the State 
Proposed ONPC presents an ideal example of state’s use of territorialization as a 
resource control strategy. The state has used/ is using different strategies for privatizing 
resources in this spatial unit called proposed ONPC. Such strategies include creating 
physical boundaries through park fences thus cutting off the forest communities from the 
communal forest resources. Subsequently, physical fences are a symbolic representation 
of boundary, thus hindering people’s access and mobilization of forest resources that 
provide livelihood opportunities to forest communities including adivasis. A second 
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strategy is to impose restrictions on use of and access to forest resources for livelihood 
activities for subsistence purposes including permitting only to carry a headload of 
fuelwood for household purposes. A third strategy is to hire forest guards (hence under 
state control) to ensure proper and effective implementation of forest rules and policies 
through the creation of FPCs in the forest villages. Consequently, rights to use forest 
‘state’ land and associated resources are marginalized. Therefore, all the activities of the 
forest communities, be it social, political or economic in nature, are all controlled and 
governed by the park officials including agricultural labor and extraction of resources 
within the park boundaries. Based on Sack’s (1986) examples, territoriality, in proposed 
ONPC, is asserted through (Table 4.11)–  
 
 
Table 4.11 Examples of Territorial Strategies from the proposed ONPC 
 
Example In ONPC context 
Job description ONPC officials telling FPCs what to do and what not to do 
Legal rights in land Imposing a ban on extraction of NTFPs including tendupatta which 
generates large revenues for the state government 
Brute force or power Indirectly, when the forest guards take money (bribe) from the 
resource-users to enter forest to extract fuelwood 
Alter cultural norms Force resource-users to modify their cultural lifestyles by not 
extracting forest resources such as bamboo needed for cultural events 
like wedding 
Subtler forms of 
communication 
Telling the resource-users that the forest is closed for extraction 
today, go back home  
 
 
  
194 
 
Based on the labor theory of value, the village people, that is, the laborers produce and 
enhance the value of the commodity (in this case proposed ONPC) by engaging in 
different activities such as extraction of tendupatta for making bidis especially during 
the early grafting season in the month of March that results in better leaf quality, 
extinguishing fires during forest fires, following forest rules and regulations to protect 
their forests, stop poachers from illegal cutting of trees, getting jobs as chowkidaar 
(security guards) and roam around the forests at night and finally help the forest guards 
to protect the forest in every way.  Often villagers from different nearby villages (out of 
the study site) come and cut down trees in the middle of the night to cope during the 
absence of electricity or during winters. As the village life is completely dependent on 
the forest in absence of any materialistic things for their livelihoods and sustenance, the 
villagers assess the forest as their source of food, employment, cultural materials. This 
makes a strong reason for the villagers to protect their own forest compartments so that 
they never face shortage of wood or other forest resources.  
As mentioned earlier, territoriality is an approach to ascertain varying degrees of access 
to people, things and relationships. This access can be altered by the differing interests 
of the ONPC department, thereby supporting unequal relationships in the ONPC. With 
this move to create proposed ONPC in central India, the state and the ONPC department 
has brought attention to its interest in the function of market based system approach, that 
is, payment for ecosystem services as a better idea to conserve ONPC nature. It can be 
determined that conservation trade-offs, managed through structural and institutional 
changes, can become influential in controlling access to the former commons. However, 
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it is not necessary that the local communities are economically marginalized in the 
process. For instance, in the case of ONPC, structural and institutional changes have 
resulted in restrictive forest access, thus limiting livelihood opportunities. On the other 
hand, the purpose of introducing ecotourism in the park signifies that lost livelihood 
opportunities will be taken care of.  
To bridge the gap between the park officials and local inhabitants, it is recommended 
that more workshops should be organized by the park officials, on regular basis, to 1) 
explain the future of the ONPC; 2) describe their objectives related to forest 
management; 3) break down the purpose and the workings of Joint Forest Management; 
and 4) empowering local communities with special focus on women. This would be 
beneficial as the local communities will get a clear idea of the future of the park and 
hence their own, in turn making them as active stakeholders with invested interests. Joint 
Forest Management program should be redesigned by the park officials to demand more 
active participation of the local communities including their ability to make decisions. In 
addition, the park officials should find solutions along with the local communities to 
provide basic infrastructural amenities such as water and electricity so their daily 
sustenance is not hindered.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The case of proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in Central India is a result 
of a resource control strategy which entails significant changes to the current forest 
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management institutions and the forest policies that directly affect the local 
communities, their control of, access to and the mobilization of the resources. Through 
creation of this new conservation enclosure, local livelihoods are being threatened and 
may compel the forest communities to travel outside their villages for labor jobs. 
Another implication is the commercialization of enclosure by introducing ecotourism.  
Conservation efforts, to be successful, must be a combination of more accountable and 
decentralized transformation of traditional power relations. There should be an exchange 
of ideas, practices and knowledge between the different stakeholders for sustainable 
resource management and conservation. Support and participation of the local 
communities whose lives and livelihoods are impacted by such policies, should be 
engaged. By creating Forest Protection Committees in the participant villages, women 
resource users should be encouraged not only to become elected to these committees but 
they should be involved in the decision-making power.  
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5. COMMUNITIES AND FOREST USE IN PROPOSED OMKARESHWAR 
NATIONAL PARK COMPLEX: INTERACTIONS OF TERRITORIALITY AND 
FILIÈRE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Along with many countries in the developing world, including Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, China, and Indonesia, India is one of the twelve mega-diverse 
countries in the world (Brooks et al 2006). About 200 million poor people are dependent 
upon the forest resources itself for their daily sustenance (Forest Survey of India 2009). 
Rural forest dwellers across the world are known to extract and use extensively timber 
and non-timber forest products to sustain their livelihoods. Some of the products 
harvested offer employment opportunity, while remaining contributes to the daily food 
consumption. The proximity of these dwellings to the forested areas exert pressure to the 
forest in forms of increasing human and livestock population along with growing 
poverty resulting in severe loss of biodiversity.  
Rapid emergence of development projects in the vicinity of the conservation enclosures 
is another reason for the loss of biodiversity. Formation of the proposed Omkareshwar 
National Park Complex (ONPC henceforth) is an example of one such development 
project – the Narmada dam development project. Under such circumstances, trade-offs 
are made to set aside land for conservation from within development schemes for 
biodiversity conservation. In such cases, the state either relocates the entire forest 
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dwelling, situated close to a protected area, away from the buffer zone or else 
amalgamates these communities with the conservation goals of the protected area. This 
results in restricting and controlling the local communities’ resource access and use. 
I will employ filières that maps out the actual flow of the commodity and identifies the 
agents and activities within the chain, to examine the social relations and the institutions 
that establish and influence local economic systems including markets (Bernstein 1996). 
This framework will allow me to highlight the social practices and processes of forest 
product extraction within the proposed ONPC. By acquiring in-depth and accurate 
information about the interrelationships between the physical and social processes in an 
environment, filière approach provides a meaningful understanding of the social 
relations As a result, the filière approach is an optimal alternative to examine the 
production and reproduction of proposed ONPC as an economic space that is negotiated 
and contested by a myriad of economic and social processes through different 
institutions.  
In particular I examine the tendupatta filière – leaves of Diospyros melonoxylon largely 
used in making local cigarettes known as bidis —in terms of social networks, social 
activities, social capital, and social tensions.  Additionally, this approach will allow me 
to identify more directly the micropolitics of NTFP (tendupatta) production and consider 
the economic and social consequences of the ONPC implementation. I focus on 
tendupatta because of its significance in the regional economy. Another reason pertains 
to the fact that other resources, that are extracted such as mahua, belpatta and dhavda 
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and kullu gums, are not extensively found in the entire region like tendupatta, hence they 
were not included in this section. 
This study examines how territorial restructuring reinforces inequalities among the 
resource-users as the producers and the state as the capitalist. Through filière approach, 
links between the social relations among different actors at different scales at various 
stages within the chain will be highlighted. It would also reflect the unequal power 
dynamics among different actors within the economic productive space of proposed 
ONPC. This paper begins by examining the literature on the territoriality and filiéres. 
The second section presents the details of proposed ONPC and its communities. The 
third section addresses the two research questions pertaining to micropolitics of social 
relationships between different actors within tendupatta filiére. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Non Timber Forest Products and Filières  
Since 1980s conservation and development research illustrated the importance of forest 
resources, particularly non-timber forest products, among the forest people. Forest 
communities often collect, process, sell and consume NTFPs to meet their subsistence 
needs and support commercial activities. As defined by De Beer and McDermott (1989), 
“the term ‘Non-Timber Forest Products’ (NTFPs) encompasses all biological materials 
other than timber, which are extracted from forests for human use.”  
  
200 
 
Studies have argued for the effectiveness of the commodity chains as a tool to 
understand the processes of production and distribution of commodities (Le Billion 
2007, Belcher 2005, Ribot 1998). The role and the potential of NTFPs can be well-
determined by studying the economic and environmental context of the production, 
processing and marketing system than by the physical characteristics of the product itself 
(Belcher 2005). Le Billion (2007) argues that commodity chain analysis play an 
important role in resource conflicts by identifying the actors involved and exposing their 
responsibilities at different scales. It further takes away the attention from the local 
scales and places the conflict within broader processes of resource production. Through 
commodity chain analysis, historical processes of mode of production of a resource 
conflict can also be studied.  
Several scholars have examined and offered definitions and differences between 
commodity chains and filières. Raikes et al (2000) compare and critique Global 
Commodity Chain and filière  approach – two frameworks used by scholars to study 
dynamics of commodity-specific production. Global Commodity Chain (GCC) has been 
developed within political economy of development and owes its origin to world 
systems theory. It largely concentrates on the industrial commodity chain. One of the 
positive aspects of GCC is its focus on power within economic relations. Hopkins and 
Wallerstein (1986) envisioned commodity chain analysis as a mean of examining the 
whole network of flows and exchanges that disclose the ‘real division of labor in 
complex production processes’.  Ribot (1998) defines a commodity chain as ‘a series of 
interlinked exchanges through which a commodity and its constituents pass from 
  
201 
 
extraction or harvesting through production to end use’. The concept of commodity 
chain, as defined by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) ‘refers to a network of labor 
and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ – something that 
can be bought and sold. Global value or commodity chain analyses the effectiveness of 
the system as a whole from collection to production. The main goal of commodity chain 
analysis is to determine the division of surplus and labor among the different stages. 
However, it does not take into account the unequal distribution of surplus and labor at 
each stage (Shillington 2002) and between participants of those stages (Dunaway 2001). 
It also fails to give attention to minute specifications of socio-economic processes 
concerning each key actor at each micro-level.  
Filière approach, on the other hand, is considered an empirical analytical tool rather than 
a theory. It studies both local and international production systems and consumption 
processes. It maps out the actual flow of the commodity and identifies the agents and 
activities within the chain. Regulation, both state and private, power and access to 
resources can be empirically studied at different stages of commodity chain. Filière 
studies identify agents and activities within a filière, how public institutions create a 
physical flow of commodities and their resultant effect on the local production system 
emphasizing particularly on the structure and relations of production and power around 
the specific commodities (Raikes et al 2000).  
Commodity chain research has examined studies on gender and NTFPs (Shillington 
2002, Leslie and Reimer 1999, Barrientos et al 2003) and race (Wilson 2005). The 
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concept of a local commodity chain enhances the potential of commodity chain analysis 
as a tool to examine not only households and gender within a global framework 
(Shillington 2002) but also women’s informal economic activities which are usually 
located at the micro level and in many cases are linked to the macro institutional chains. 
It is evident that the women’s involvement in local economic activities is not only 
significant to the survival and the maintenance of the households but also contributes to 
the local commodity chain making them an important actor in the process.  
Studies have emphasized on the importance of the filière approach to ascertain different 
presence of, if any, obstructions in the production and distribution market systems that 
may slow down economic development process and hence demands attention from 
scholars, policymakers, local communities and state officials. In their study, Bosc and 
Freud (1995: 89) define filière s or commodity systems as a reference “to the successive 
chain of activities from production to the final sale of the output on local or export 
markets”. They further characterize the concept in context of qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions within the filière approach. Qualitative dimension within filière approach is 
a horizontal investigation of the benefits and shortcomings of the filière system and the 
interaction among different stakeholders along the chain (Bosc and Freud 1995). On the 
other hand, the quantitative dimension is an examination of the structural supply and 
demand in addition to the market costs of the product at micro and macro scales (Bosc 
and Freud 1995).  
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Following the quantitative or the vertical structural dimension of filière approach, 
extensive research has been conducted including straw brooms and coco baskets 
(Shillington 2002), tendu leaves (Boaz and Boaz, 2003), adda leaves (Suryakumari et al 
2008). Boaz and Boaz (2003) described the cooperative model of the community-based 
sustainable management of tendu leaves in Madhya Pradesh with special emphasis on 
the socio-economic impact of the rural communities in Harda district. This paper will 
complement Boaz and Boaz (2003) by focusing on the micropolitics of the social 
relationships within the tendupatta filière including different conflicts and rapport that 
exist between the park officials and the local communities particularly. In another 
similar study, Suryakumari et al (2008) suggest an alternative theoretical framework to 
address the problems created by the deregulation of ‘adda’ leaf, used to make leaf plates 
and cups by the tribal communities, by the Andhra Pradesh state forest department. 
On the other hand, limited numbers of studies emphasize the need to examine the social 
dimension of the commodity systems between different actors within the micro-level 
production and distribution processes (Bernstein 1996, Jarosz 2000, Gibbon 1997 and 
Rammohan and Sundaresan 2003). Jarosz (2000) suggests actor network theory and 
supply chain management theory for better understanding of the social relations, based 
on trust and cooperation, intertwining the different actors in agri-food systems in the 
United States. In India, Rammohan and Sundaresan (2003) address the need to trace the 
social connections of production and interchange of coir yarn spinning in southern India 
and to focus on their social consequences. Bernstein’s (1996) classic paper on maize 
filière emphasizes on the filière approach as socio-cultural analytical tool which can be 
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applied to social practices and processes within economic domain. He studied the 
different social characteristics, such as class and gender, and its interactions with the 
market agents like producers and consumers in a comparative examination of maize 
filière in USA and South Africa (Bernstein 1996). This paper recognizes and employs 
filière approach as a sociological analytical tool. Following Bernstein’s (1996) study, 
this research examines the social relations and the institutions that establish and 
influence local economic systems including markets.  
 
Filière and Territoriality: A Social Framework 
Few scholars have studied the interaction of filières and territoriality (Mather 1999, 
Lagendijk 1997, Lewis et al 2002, Jones and Clark 2003). Lewis et al (2002) examines 
how the term ‘governance’ can be understood through different literatures including NIE 
(New Institutional Economics), spatial embeddedness and regulation approach through 
an example of New Zealand and European wine filières. Jones and Clark (2003) 
investigates the role of contrat territorial d’exploitation, a specific feature of European 
Union’s Common Agriculture Policy in Languedoc region which has broad concerns 
related to viticulture, diversification efforts and urban and tourist development pressures. 
In another study, Mather (1999) employs filière framework to examine the organization 
and the restructuring of the South African citrus exports. However, such filière studies 
lack inclusion of the territoriality as a resource control strategy (Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995) and to what degree it affects the social practices and processes.  
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Territoriality has been studied in context of broadly political boundaries (Brenner 1999, 
Agnew and Corbridge 1995, Passi 1998, Anderson and O’Dowd 1999, Passi 2001, 
Kratochwil 1986), resource rights (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, Vandergeest 1996, 
Walkers and Peters 2001), resource access (Levine 1984, Robson and Nayak 2010), 
social relations (Barnard 1992, Bernstein 1996) and territorial disputes (Perez et al 2009, 
Sikor and Lund 2009). Most of the studies based on territoriality are outdated. Passi 
(2001) examines changing narratives of Europe’s spatial identity since 1990s and the 
shifting interaction between spatial structures, social relations and meanings. Boundaries 
are understood as the indicators of the social practice and discourse (Passi 1998). 
Creating boundaries are one method to organize social space (Massey 1995) and are 
considered an expression of power structures (Passi 1998).  Therefore, to understand 
territoriality as a resource control strategy, within the proposed ONPC, the local social 
relations within extractive economy of tendupatta will be highlighted through filière 
framework. How resource control strategy transforms the social relations? Who decides 
who has access to the forest resources? How is power relations defined? Who are the 
controllers and controlees? How controlled access and resource deprivation affects 
horizontally across different social relationships?  
Forms of access and control as well as cognition (one person’s accumulation is another 
person’s degradation) influence how people manage and use resources. Therefore, by 
applying this reasoning to the case study of proposed biodiversity offset in India, this 
section examines on how territorial restructuring restructures the social relationship of 
resource-users to the broader political economy. Through the filière approach, I can 
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examine the links between the social relations among different actors at different scales 
at various stages within the chain. Within that analysis I can assess how social power 
operates within the economic productive space of proposed ONPC.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park 
Since late 1950s, Madhya Pradesh is the site of contention of notorious Narmada Dam 
Project which is spread over other states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. 
Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex (ONPC), is a planned park in Madhya 
Pradesh, represents 30.72 percent of India’s forests, and is the largest forested area 
within the state of India (Figures 5.1a and 5.1b). It is being designed as a compensatory 
conservation project which will overcome the loss of wildlife and forest resulting from 
the construction of and submergence from the nearby Indira-Sagar and Omkareshwar 
dams, part of the notorious multi-purpose Narmada dam project. This complex consists 
of Omkareshwar National Park, Singhaji Wildlife Sanctuary, Mandhata Sanctuary and 
Narmada Conservation Reserve Unit I and II (Figure 5.2). It is situated at the junction of 
three districts, namely, Dewas, Khandwa and Khargone.  
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Figure 5.1 (a) and (b) Position of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex in 
India and within Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Details of the Proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex 
 
Figure 1a. India 
Figure 1b. Madhya Pradesh and Study Site Location 
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In 1987, the Government of India approved the diversion of 41,111.97 hectares of forest 
lands in the districts of Dewas, Khanwa and Hoshangabad (in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh) towards the construction of the Indira Sagar dam project (Personal 
Communication. Government Official 2012). However, at the same time, the 
government also made it mandatory that representatives from different stakeholder 
agencies should form a committee for wildlife management and conservation, which 
would be displaced during the dam construction. These stakeholder agencies were the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), the Narmada Valley Development 
Authority (NVDA hereafter), the state government of Madhya Pradesh and the state 
forest department. This committee selected the Wildlife Institute of India and Friends of 
Nature Society to prepare impact assessment reports, which were released in 1994 and 
1996. As a result, in 1993, NVDA declared its intentions to create a national park and 
sanctuaries. Approximately 84 villages are situated around the proposed ONPC - 55 
villages in the Dewas district; 28 in Khandwa and 1 village in Khargone. Largely, this 
region is comprised of the tribal ‘adivasis’ population, constituting approximately 22.3% 
of the total population.  
Previously the forest commons were under the jurisdiction of Forest departments of 
Khandwa and Dewas districts. Presently, the ONPC authority governs this region. The 
resource governance structure two institutions: (1) van suraksha samiti (FPCs) and (2) 
the ONPC officials. Formal forest protection committees (FPCs) have been established 
in the forest villages (FVs) situated within the complex, and are responsible for 
protecting biodiversity along with village development.  Forest villages are under direct 
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control of forest department of the central government with no interference from the 
state government.   
All the villages in the ONPC largely depend on the forest resources for their daily 
sustenance, particularly fuel-wood and non-timber forest products. The local people 
mainly engage as gatherers of non-timber forest resources, farmers or work as labors on 
other agricultural farms. The local farmers usually grow soybeans, wheat, peas, gram, 
black gram, corn and sorghum all year round. 
 
Methodology 
To understand the dynamics of social relations as affected by the newly implemented 
rules-in-use, I conducted intensive household surveys, interviews and micro studies in 
the selected six villages, which attempted to extensively collect resource extraction and 
use related data from different social groups inhabiting the region. I designed each 
survey questionnaire and the micro study prompts with special care to generate both 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
 
Data Collection 
I collected data and information for this study from six villages situated within five 
kilometers radius of the proposed Omkareshwar National Park Complex boundary in the 
central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Of these six villages, two villages, namely 
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Village E and Village F, are situated in the Dewas district while, the other four villages – 
Villages C, B and A are located in the Khandwa district of Madhya Pradesh. I selected 
these villages on the criteria based on the proximity to the base station, safety and 
accessibility especially during the monsoon season around July-August. In addition, 
these villages were especially selected under the guidance of the advisor, the Chief 
Conservator of Forests (of ONPC) and the proposed national park office.   
I collected data from November 2009 to August 2010 and December 2010-January 2011 
involving a random chain sample of 204 panel households and 18 micro-studies in six 
villages. I hired village-based young adults to conduct the household panel surveys in 
summer of 2010 and December/January 2011. I conducted all the micro studies along 
with my assistant who helped with the local dialect.  
 
Data Analysis 
I incorporated numerous questions on tendupatta filières in the household surveys and 
particularly in micro-study prompts to acquire experiences of the resource-users to 
understand their approach to extract and use tendupatta. Other resources that are 
extracted such as mahua, belpatta and dhavda and kullu gums were not included in this 
section as these resources are not extensively found in the entire region like tendupatta.  
I transcribed the data collected from the micro-studies from Nimari, the local dialect to 
Hindi and then into English through Express Scribe and coding was performed by 
employing Atlas software. For the qualitative analysis, field notes, interviews with 
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officials and case- studies narratives were examined. These helped in understanding the 
production and distribution process of various extractive resources and investigate every 
actor’s role in it. Summaries of the result, from both surveys and interviews, are 
presented below.   
 
RESULTS 
This sub-section investigates how new rules-in-use as a result of compensatory 
conservation affect the micropolitics of tendupatta filière thus altering the access to 
forest resources. Based on quantitative data, three aims are examined. First, I examine 
the tendupatta filière within the ONPC. Secondly, I examine social and political 
institutions within the filière. Thirdly, I identify and analyze politics of the tendupatta 
production and distribution process. 
 
Tendupatta Filière  
Tendupatta is used for making localized cigarettes called bidis which are sold in India as 
well as internationally such as in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. In the proposed 
ONPC, the resource-users belonging to different social groups have been extracting 
tendupatta since many years. It is the most profitable resource extraction within the 
region (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
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Table 5.1 Tendupatta collection in Khandwa district in the ONPC ranges 
 
Range Year Samiti Phad (Collection 
center) 
Total tendupatta 
collection 
(Manak bora)
*
 
Punasa 2004 Richpal Village D 326.700 
 2005   245.300 
 2006   174.950 
 2007   191.680 
 2008   - 
 2009   107.850 
 2010   - 
Moondi 2004 Udaypur Village C - 
 2005   248.900 
 2006   83.055 
 2007   589.750 
 2008   527.665 
 2009   331.450 
 2010   610.510 
Chandgarh 2004 Village A Village A 246.850 
 2005   - 
 2006   53.865 
 2007   - 
 2008   188.860 
 2009   230.150 
 2010   - 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
*1 manak bora = 1000 bundles; 1 bundle = 50 leaves 
 
 
Before 1964, tendupatta extraction was done privately by landowners and sold it to bidi-
making businesses independently. To stop illegal extraction of tendupatta from 
government and forest lands, safeguard extractors’ interests against exploitation and to 
increase the state revenue, in 1964 tendupatta extraction was nationalized. Under this 
policy, the tendupatta producing forest areas were divided into forest compartments, in 
such a way that from each compartment, the maximum extraction can be 2500-3000 
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manak boras (1 manak boras = 50,000 leaves or 1000 bundles). For each forest 
compartment, procurators were appointed who helped at the collection centers or phads. 
 
Table 5.2 Details of tendupatta collection in Dewas district in the ONPC ranges  
 
Range Year Samiti Phad (Collection 
center) 
Total tendupatta 
collection 
(Manak bora)
*
 
Punjapura 2005 Palasi Village F 831.340 
 2006   954.400 
 2007   894.650 
 2008   771.705 
 2009   686.070 
 2010   660.225 
Punjapura 2005 Ratanpur Village E 207.130 
 2006   251.775 
 2007   524.920 
 2008   518.750 
 2009   503.050 
 2010   327.750 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
*1 manak bora = 1000 bundles; 1 bundle = 50 leaves 
 
 
In Madhya Pradesh, the organizational structure includes Minor Forest Produce is the 
apex body, district forest product organization in the middle (total 60) and primary forest 
produce cooperatives (total 1066 in number) at the local level (Figure 5.3). In 2004, 
some changes were introduced in the tendupatta policy that included provision of 
storage and transportation facilities to the suppliers. Some of the benefits provided to the 
extractor include umbrella, wall clock, slippers, rechargeable torch and carry bags. In 
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addition, health insurance was provided to about 1.505 million extractors from ages 18 
to 60, based on a new plan introduced in 1991. 
 
 
    Minor Forest Produce (n=1) 
 
      
 
 
     District Forest Tendupatta Organization (n=60) 
 
     Tendupatta Cooperatives (n=1066) 
 
Figure 5.3 Organizational Structure of Tendupatta in Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
Madhya Pradesh is one of the several central states where state regulates tendupatta 
extraction for private businesses. Though seasonal, extraction of tendupatta is a 
significant economic activity in the region as it generates substantial income for the 
extractors (Table 5.3). Based on the household data collected during fieldwork, it is 
evident that different villages generate different revenues from tendupatta sale based on 
mainly geographic proximity to the forest as well as the road. From the table 3, it is 
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obvious that within the proposed ONPC region, villages B, D and A generate the 
maximum income from the extraction of tendupatta respectively.  
 
 
Table 5.3 Details of village-wise tendupatta sale 
 
Villages 
 
Total households 
Average number of 
tendupatta bundles 
sold 
Average money 
generated 
(in US$) per 
Household 
A 19 2528 31 
B 36 4235 52 
C 34 976 12 
D 40 492 6 
E 36 1339 16 
F 39 3282 40 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
Note: Decimals have been rounded off. Exchange rate 1US$ = INR53 
 
 
 
The entire season of tendu leaves commercial extraction ranges from mid-March to early 
June in Khandwa and Dewas districts of Madhya Pradesh. The process starts by 
auctioning tenders for the state forest compartments for the extraction of tendu leaves by 
the state forest department. For this purpose, tenders are invited from several 
industrialists who have established bidi factories in India. A list is then generated and 
numbers of forest compartments are allotted to each one of them. The success rate of the 
extraction of tendu leaves or fulfilling their estimated quota depends on the quality of the 
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forest. Due to regional differentiation, southern part of Madhya Pradesh extracts more 
tendupatta than the northern part. Each village or a group of smaller villages, depending 
on the total number of households, has a samiti or a phad (collection center). 
In the month of March, the contractors visit the forest areas which they have been 
awarded. Accompanied by the local forest department officials, they recruit a group of 
villagers to prune the tendu shrubs. It is not clear how few extractors are selected from 
the entire village by the ONPC officials for the pruning process (Figure 5.4).  
Primarily, during the pre-season work, women and children are involved in the 
extraction of tendu leaves. They work from morning till late afternoon pruning every 
tendu shrub in the allotted forest compartment for roughly 7-10 days. They are paid a 
fixed rate of INR35 (less than US$ 1) per day for their work.  
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Figure 5.4 Filière of Tendupatta 
 
 
During the pruning season, the forest officials often ask village workers to prune the 
tendu shrubs particularly in the areas closer to the forest paths/trails (pagdandi). The 
workers are not instructed to prune the shrubs located interior-wards from the forest 
paths. This constitutes a major concern for the contractors. In absence of proper pruning, 
depending on the poor quality of leaves and the forest compartments, they are, 
sometimes, not able to fulfill their total quota. As one villager explained -  
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“Contractor takes contracts of different samiti. Cutting [pruning] is supervised by the 
contractor. Contractor doesn't come here, his manager does. What they do is, they hire 
daily labor from the villages. They don't get the cutting done carefully. They get the 
areas cut that are closer to the village. Work just maybe one day and that's it. If they get 
the cutting done properly, then it will be good. We can pick more leaves then. The 
villagers are paid for the cutting that they do in maybe one, two or three days. This time 
cutting for only two days was done. In their attendance register, they mark the presence 
of the villagers for ten days but in reality the work is done only for two days.” 
On the other hand, according to a contractor, forest officials and their elected 
representatives phadmunshis, are to be blamed- 
“no, their phadmunshi don't give their last payments…see it’s because they are poor 
laborers, forest officers and phadmunshi together take most of the money.” 
From mid-march till mid may, the tendu shrubs are allowed to grow. The forest officials 
regularly check the growth of the tendu leaves and when satisfied would declare the 
extraction season open. From each household, the adult male and female members 
collect the tendu leaves. It was observed during the fieldwork that households that have 
large agricultural fields generally do not engage in tendupatta extraction. They go to the 
forest at dawn break and engage in picking of the tendu leaves for 2-3 hours. The 
collection workers travel as much as 4-6 kilometers one way from their village to the 
interior forests to pick the tendu leaves. After each member of the household has 
collected enough to make at least 100-200 bundles (1 bundle=50 leaves) or about 10,000 
leaves, they return back to their houses. Leaves are counted and tied into bundles of 50. 
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Since most of the times, the workers are illiterate, they often miscount the leaves in the 
bundle as a result of which they are not paid for that bundle.  
“There are less leaves in it, and they cut money for it. We do full labor and hard work 
and then they won't accept it. They cut money from the full pay and give us..... 
(Inaudible). What do poor people do, because of INR200-300 [USD 4-6], we can't sleep. 
We have to go so far into the forest to get these leaves”. 
Each worker is paid a fixed amount of INR65 (about 1.50 USD) for every 100 bundles 
he/she makes. On an average, each household makes about 200-700 bundles in a day, 
depending on the family size. Once the bundles are made, the bundles are taken to the 
phad and are handed over to the phadmunshi or the collection agent. Phadmunshis, a 
male member, are selected by the forest department and elected by the villagers.  
During the fieldwork, I observed that each household that engages in the extraction of 
tendupatta are required to hand over five extra bundles of tendu leaves. This means for 
every 105 bundles that the extractors present to the phadmunshi, they receive US$ 1.22. 
Generally, US$ 1.22 is paid to the extractors per 100 bundles. When asked for 
clarification, the phadmunshi acknowledges this and argued that this is the general rule 
since many years. An ONPC official said that “when there is a loss and tendupatta quota 
cannot be fulfilled, these extra bundles make up for the loss”. This implies that during 
the extraction season, each extractor has to pick about 500 extra leaves to make such 
extra bundles.   
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Once the bundles are handed over to the phadmunshi, he takes them to a fallow 
agricultural field in the village and spreads them over in neat rows so that the leaves can 
dry. Once the leaves are dried, they are handed over to the contractor/manager at the 
designated phad. Once the bundles reach the phad, they are sorted out and put into 
sacks. Each sack has 1000 bundles. Each sack is then marked. For this particular 
laborious task at the godown (storage unit), the manager/contractor hires trained people 
from Maharashtra. From the storage units the sacks are transported to the bidi- factories 
located in different parts of India. At such factories, tendu leaves are transformed into 
bidis. The profits from the whole process are generally distributed among the workers 
next year. There exist tension between the contractors and the workers due because of 
lower than expected distributions. According to a forest guard,   
“If the contractor gets a profitable margin in selling the tendu leaves in the market, then 
he distributes about 50 percent of the profit among the villagers so that they are 
motivated to work better. In case, when there is no profit, then there is no bonus” 
(per.comm. Forest Guard 2010). 
Due to regional forest differences and local differences in the targets for extraction of 
tendupatta, different villages receive different bonus amounts. The villagers are 
generally upset about the lack of profits. Because they are illiterate, they do not 
understand the whole process and those tendupatta contractors are different from the 
forest officials (government).  As one villager said,  
“We listen to others who tell us that bonuses have been given in this village and that 
village, then we tell them they (officials) say that other people are making a fool of us. 
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When bonuses haven't been released from higher offices how can we give you? That’s 
what they tell us. See, government is only one, right. So when government has released 
the bonus then why haven't we got it yet? All these forest guard, deputy sahab, ranger - 
they all  cut money from the bonus and distribute leftover money to the villagers.” 
From the above, it is clear that there is significant tension among the extractors and the 
managers who represent the contractors. One of the main reasons for is that the 
phadmunshi, selected by the ONPC officials or the earlier forest officials, is given power 
over the extractors. He has the authority to reject or accept any bundle if it does not look 
good and this creates social tension among the villagers, and it is thus open for 
corruption. 
 
Relations Across Tendupatta Filière 
Within the tendupatta filière, there are four main actors – extractors, phadmunshi 
(collection agent), ONPC officials and contractors and their managers.  
 
Extractors 
 Extractors from same villages usually belong to similar social groups (Table 5.4). Low 
level of competition exists among the villagers. Fearful of the wild animals, particularly 
the wild bear, villagers tend to stick together and go into the forest as a group. Generally, 
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all bais women go together to extract tendupatta or fuelwood or any other forest 
resources.   
 “If someone from the neighborhood is going, I go with them. With all the men in the 
neighborhood, we relate ourselves to them, and ask them to accompany us to the forest. 
If another bai goes, then we go together. Those you like in the village, you go with 
them.” 
Another woman from the village, emphasizing the role of men, said -  
“bai go to the forest. Men don't go to the forest for the tendupatta plucking. If men go, 
then we get leaves for about 100 bundles otherwise if only we go, then we (bais) go, 
then we get leaves for about 50-60 bundles.”  
She further explained that –  
“If my husband is here at home, then I prefer to go with him. He climbs trees also. I 
can't. He lops the branches of tendu tree, when the branch falls down to the ground, I 
pick up what I need and leave the rest there. Cutting is not done well in this forest. That's 
why we can't pluck many leaves.” 
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Table 5.4 Income generated by tendupatta across different socio-cultural groups 
 
Socio-cultural Groups Income from Tendupatta (US$) 
Adivasi 4,651.47 
Non-Adivasi 550.06 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
Note: Decimals have been rounded off. Exchange rate 1US$ = INR53 
 
 
 
Phadmunshi/ ONPC officials 
Phadmunshi (collection agents) are the selected appointees of the ONPC officials. It was 
noticed during the fieldwork that in most of the cases, same person has held the post for 
more than 5 years. The main role of ONPC officials is to administer the entire process of 
pruning and extraction of tendupatta to safeguard the interest of extractors from the 
contractors. Phadmunshi and ONPC officials are combined here together as a single 
category because although phadmunshi work under the officials, they do not have any 
decision making power other than accepting or rejecting the tendupatta bundles. They 
both share a contentious relationship with the villagers/ extractors. The villagers 
complained that officials do not educate them well about the selection of each tendu leaf 
during plucking and then the bundles are rejected by the phadmunshi.  
“There is no separate meeting. The forest people give us advice when the season start, 
when we go to the forest to pluck leaves. They don't organize a meeting particularly to 
give advice.” 
  
224 
 
Further the villagers complained when asked if they receive the money that they are 
promised for tendupatta, they said -  
“No, the rate they tell us doesn't match with what they pay us. For the cutting [pruning] 
they said they will pay us US$ 1.5 but they gave us only US$ 1.” 
 
Contractors/Managers 
 Contractors merely act as mediators between the ONPC officials and the bidi business-
owners. These business owners prefer tendupatta of specific size for making bidi. At 
times, they supervise the pruning process and educate the extractors about quality of the 
leaves. Often there is a conflict between the extractors and the contractors related to the 
meetings arranged prior to tendupatta season to educate them (Table 5.5). A small 
proportion of households (22.5 percent) stated that before the tendupatta season begins, 
no meetings are held either by the contractor or the ONPC officials. As a result, they are 
not well-advised about the quality of the leaves. This results in extraction of undesirable 
leaves (red, small or torn) which are then thrown away by the phadmunshi. 
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Table 5.5 Households’ stance on whether properly advised or not 
 
Villages Total Households Total households 
that agree meetings 
were held 
Total households 
that agree meetings 
were not held 
A 19 17 2 
B 36 24 12 
C 34 23 11 
D 40 31 9 
E 36 29 7 
F 39 30 5 
Source: Fieldwork 2009-2010 
 
 
In addition, for tendupatta extraction, there is another category of extractors called 
‘camping laborer’. These extractors belong to peripheral or distant villages. They are 
hired by contractors to work in specific deep pocketed forest areas that are away from 
the inhabited villages. Consequently, these laborers move with their families and 
temporary belongings and live in make-shift camps as a group. The need to mention 
about camping laborers is important in the context of the ONPC because this group will 
lose significantly when the ONPC is fully operational as a protected area. Restrictions 
will be imposed on taking camping laborers to deep pocketed forest areas, which will 
then come under core park area where all activities need to be banned. Some of the 
camping laborers were observed during the fieldwork but were not interviewed as none 
of them belonged to the study-specific villages.  
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DISCUSSION 
Tendupatta is the mainstay economic activity of the forest communities in proposed 
ONPC. Like any system, there exist conflicts and harmony regarding the different 
production and distribution processes among the different social actors. For most of the 
extractors, their social lives are surrounded by around such economic activity.  
Main findings of this paper include (1) tendupatta is the most profitable resource 
extraction within the ONPC, (2) based on close proximity to the road and forest, 
different villages generate different revenues from tendupatta sale, (3) conflict exists 
between contractors and the park officials due to inadequate pruning of the tendu shrub 
which implies less production of tendupatta, (4) villagers also have difference with the 
contractors that include low pay for the extraction of tendupatta, (5) based on 
geographic proximity and forest condition, different villages receive different bonus 
amounts, (6) tendupatta is extracted by both men and women, and (7) adivasi generate 
more income from tendupatta extraction than non-adivasi. 
Conflicts exist between extractors and forest officials, phadmunshi. Lack of proper 
adequate pruning practices adopted by the forest officials can be considered a form of 
resource control as it affects the quality of tendu leaves extracted which means more 
susceptible to bundles being rejected by the phadmunshi. As stated earlier, forms of 
access and control as well as cognition (one person’s accumulation is another person’s 
degradation) influence how people manage and use resources. Unsustainable practices of 
extracting tendu threaten the forest quality, particularly its ability to regenerate. This 
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hinders the forest officials in their main objective of conserving and protecting forest and 
its resources. Moreover, forest degradation also signifies loss of income from tendu 
extraction.  
Once the ONPC gets notified, tendupatta collection will be stopped. For the filière, 
notification of the ONPC would signify (1) loss of main source of income for both the 
state and the local communities, (2) different conflicts among the stakeholders, related to 
the extraction of tendupatta, will cease to exist and hence will change their social 
relationships, for better or worse, (3) losing this source of income would imply less 
focus on the forest degradation, which would have been otherwise done to improve the 
quality of the tendupatta, (4) local people, particularly adivasi would seek additional 
employment elsewhere to supplement their household income which is more likely to be 
from off-farm sources, (5) as adivasi are the main benefactors of tendupatta extraction, 
they are most vulnerable to this change, (6) loss of social capital, otherwise gained 
during the extraction process, and (7) notification of the ONPC would imply less 
interaction between the park officials and the communities which would result in more 
rigid implementation of forest rules. 
The implications are wide-reaching.  First, the tendupatta is an important wage labor that 
involves largely all members of the household including the children. With the entire 
family working to produce maximum tendu bundles in a day, more income can be 
generated. Rejecting the tendu bundles, the phadmunshi, threaten not only the household 
income but also the exchange labor value. Secondly, both tendupatta filière and forest 
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access is controlled and managed by the state. Change in state policies implies a shift in 
access to resources in context of both tendupatta filière and forest resources. This will 
largely affect the adivasi as they are the main economic beneficiaries of tendu 
extraction. Thirdly, social interactions during the labor process will be affected and it 
would make the forest communities vulnerable. In absence of trust, cooperation and 
support from the contractors and the forest officials, the communities tend to strengthen 
themselves. For instance, when few neighborhood women travel together into the far 
stretches of the forest, they talk and through such processes, social networks and social 
capital are formed. Under such situations, locals get a chance to discuss about every 
topic ranging from previous day’s activities, new job opportunities, visiting family, 
cultural festivals, etc. Subsequently, it seems clear that successful social relations among 
different forest communities would result in disturbing state’s capitalist and power-
oriented territorial goals to bring in the era of development in the region and vice-versa. 
This could result in commodification of social institutions where a common place, in this 
case, the forest is removed from the equation which is the foundation for constructing 
social networks and social capital through trust and cooperation. Space is defined by its 
social characteristics that are embedded through different social practices and processes. 
This is threatened by further creation of protected area. This discussion leads back to 
people versus park debate – conservation of biodiversity or development of societies.  
Territorialization as a resource control strategy can have profound effects on the local 
social dynamics. Control and command type of ideology, as adopted by the state, also 
leads to social tensions among the different actors. It creates conflicting identities of ‘us 
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versus them’. For instance, the adivasis villages identify themselves as different from the 
ONPC officials. Due to the implementation of the new territorial rules, a new category is 
created in the productive economic space of proposed ONPC - domination versus 
subordination. Perhaps not in its crudest form, but subtle instances of this new 
relationship are emerging. Different forms of reactions to territoriality are also emerging. 
Instances of manipulation, free rides, bribery and corruption are widely evident. 
Extraction of forest resources are often accompanied by such reactions from either 
actors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This section examined the tendupatta filière within the proposed Omkareshwar National 
Park Complex in Central India. Then, it analyzed the interaction of the social relations 
embedded within these filières. Conflict exists between different stakeholders. Struggle 
between contractors and the park officials exist due to inadequate pruning of the tendu 
shrub which implies less production of tendupatta. Villagers also have difference with 
the contractors that include low pay for the extraction of tendupatta. Based on 
geographic proximity and forest condition, different villages receive different bonus 
amounts. Adivasi generate more income from tendupatta extraction than non-adivasi.  
Different forms of reactions to territoriality including manipulation, free rides, bribery 
and corruption are emerging within the social processes.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of biodiversity offsets have been created to 
compensate the negative aspects of the regional development projects. Such offsets 
cause the local communities to lose their access to, control of and the mobilization of the 
resources through new rules-in-use. The state, by participating in such projects, earns 
capital by reinvesting the seized commons’ ecosystem services and resources.  
This dissertation examined the political economic processes in the proposed 
Omkareshwar National Park Complex. Section one introduced the context of the 
problem and reviewed the biodiversity offset literature. It also included a brief overview 
of the Indian Forest Conservation. Section two included the research design and thus 
was divided into two parts. The first part described the history of the Narmada dam 
development in the region and consequent development of the ONPC, followed by a 
description of the six selected village communities. This was followed by detailed 
segment on methodology that included data collection and data analysis. Section three 
focused on the income dynamics across different socio-cultural groups within the park. It 
studied the economic costs and benefits of the changes in access to and control of forest 
resources. Villagers, who own agricultural lands benefit from the creation of the ONPC 
as a biodiversity offset, while other villagers engaged in off-farm and NTFP extraction 
labor, are more economically vulnerable. It is found that higher the farm size, less 
percentage of total income is generated from the extraction of the NTFPs and vice-versa. 
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The data also illustrated that the different tribal groups depend most on the forest 
resource extraction.  
Section four highlights how new rules-in-use affect the labor dynamics by altering 
access to, control and mobilization of forest resources. The result shows that labor work 
is paid through either cash incomes or reciprocal incomes. With increasing restrictions 
placed on the resource access and control, resource users are forced to travel outside 
their villages in search of wage labor. Hence, the process of privatization of the former 
forest commons (via ecotourism) will result in the commodification of labor.  
The last section, section five, assesses the social relations through tendupatta filière 
approach. It investigates how territorial reorganization highlights inequalities among the 
resource-users as the producers and the state as the capitalist. Subtle identities of 
subordination and domination and ‘us versus them’ are created. Different forms of 
reactions to territoriality including manipulation, free rides, bribery and corruption are 
emerging within the social processes in the park area. In addition, there will be several 
repercussions when the ONPC gets notified, having an effect on both territoriality and 
the filière.  
Different interactions with the rules-in-use result in different ways of shaping the 
landscape. Based on access regime framework as proposed by Jepson et al (2010), 
access does not only include institutions but also other arrangements that might affect 
social productions of landscapes. In the current context of ONPC as a biodiversity offset, 
access to forest resources can be defined not only through forest institutions but also by 
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changing labor patterns particularly gender, opportunities to generate income, 
introduction of technology and people’s perception towards income generation. All these 
factors have an impact on the decisions taken by the resource users to access and 
mobilize of the forest resources.  
It is critical to recognize and work towards conserving forest, not only for the 
conventional reasons but also to address the growing needs of the ethnic groups. This is 
critical especially as with the creation of ONPC as a protected area, more restrictions to 
control access to forest resources will be implemented. I suggest introducing economic 
incentives such as payments to the local communities to supplement their interest and 
efforts to conserve forest. This will help to achieve not only the conservation with 
poverty alleviation goal but also the purpose of creating biodiversity offset. Another 
suggestion is to re-introduce Joint Forest Management within the proposed ONPC which 
would give the local communities not only the accountability and decision making 
authority but also would help them to economically sustain themselves. Decentralization 
of the power and authority will overcome the economic and labor issues that are bound 
to change the economic and social dynamics of this region when the proposed national 
park complex becomes notified.  
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RESOURCE SECURITY MICRO-PROMPTS 
 
Micro Case Study # ____ 
Name: 
Village: 
Education: 
Tribe: 
PHYSICAL ASPECT 
1. What all do you collect from the forest? For subsistence/commercial  
• Tendupatta 
• Gum 
• Mahua 
• Fuelwood 
• Others 
2. What are your sources of income? Contribution to household income- Annual cash 
income from different sources – explain the sources like agricultural laborer, tendupatta 
picker, mahua seller, gum seller etc. OR off-farm activities like remittances, livestock, 
NTFP sale 
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3. Do you have agricultural land? How much? 
Subsistence – Mahua and Fuelwood 
Mahua – 
1. Uses of mahua – which parts are collected – How to identify a good mahua 
flower/wood/fruit  and a bad one 
2. When do you collect mahua – how long does the season lasts-  Do men of the house 
gather the mahua flowers or women/ children and why? quantity able to bring back – 
male/ female/children respectively – how do you feel about the wasted quantity if any? 
3. Collection in self-organized groups- neighborly, women etc - Any rules that governs 
- How do you feel about collecting mahua in groups? -any threats while collecting 
mahua - collect mahua earlier but have stopped now? Why? 
4. Are the flowers sufficient? How many do you collect? Is a basket load enough? How 
many times in a week do you have to go out to get sufficient flowers? How long do you 
collect mahua? (hours) Is it taking you longer to collect what you need? How many 
baskets of flowers do you need to make mahua drinks? (unit) -  Do you also store mahua 
raw material / processed for future use 
5. Do you also sell mahua – who do you sell it to – intra/inter – where do you sell it? 
How much do you get for it per unit? How would you feel if you are not able to sell your 
collection? 
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6. Role of van suraksha samiti/gram van samiti in collection/ processing/storage/market 
of mahua 
7. Do you make the drink? Do you consume it? How many bottles are made in a day? 
(quantity unit) – number of bottles you consume in a day - how is mahua drink made? Is 
it good enough to make what you need- how are you using it?  
8. Does someone hire you to pick mahua flowers? Do you hire someone to pick flowers 
for you? Do you get the labor cost? Does it add to your household income? 
9. How do you use wood / mahua fruit – how many times in a year do you collect these 
– what do you use the mahua wood to build for – any restrictions from the forest 
officials 
10. Collection of mahua – Processing of mahua flower/fruit/wood – in detail 
11. Do you collect enough to fulfill your requirements in your household? What 
problems do you have in collecting these products for your family in your household? 
Are you able to fulfill your family’s basic needs?  How do you feel about fulfilling your 
family’s basic needs? 
12. Have you had to change (the ways) how you collect mahua – describe that - If there 
is change, how has change affected your use of mahua – make more drinks/ less drinks 
13. How has the quality of your collection changed?  
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14. Has your collection changed over last 5 years? How has it changed? 
(increased/decreased)  What problems has that change caused you? How do you feel 
about this change in the collection? 
15. Any restrictions in the collection quantity of mahua - What do you feel? – does it 
interfere in your collection? Any restrictions on the movement of mahua parts - how do 
you feel about restrictions on movement of mahua- any restrictions on storage of mahua- 
how do you feel about restrictions on storage 
16. How do you feel about the quality/ quantity that you get from the forest? Describe 
what do you feel when you collect - Describe what do you feel when you do not get your 
desired quality? How often do you feel the above emotions?   
Fuelwood- 
1. Type of fuelwood you use -  its uses - How to identify a good fuelwood from a bad 
one 
2. When do you collect fuelwood - daily/ weekly/bi-weekly/monthly - Who collects it -  
women / men / both - Do you have to walk farther for it – how much - How do you feel 
about it?  How much has the distance changed over 1 year, 5 years, 10 years. - quantity 
able to bring back – male/ female/children respectively – store wood for future use 
3. Collection in self-organized groups- neighborly, women etc - Any rules that governs 
- How do you feel about collecting fuelwood in groups? -any threats while collecting 
fuelwood - collect fuelwood earlier but have stopped now? Why?   
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4. Do you also sell fuelwood - Who do you sell it to – intra/inter – any particular 
species that you sell- where do you sell – how much do you get per unit? how would you 
feel if you are not able to sell your collection? 
5. Use/access a nistaar depot?  How do you feel about using nistaar depot - How much 
do you pay at nistaar depot - Has the cost changed at nistaar depot?  Distance traveled to 
nistaar depot 
6. Role of van suraksha samiti/gram van samiti in collection/ processing/storage/market 
of wood 
7. Do you collect enough to fulfill your requirements in your household? Are you able 
to fulfill your family’s basic needs?  How do you feel about fulfilling your family’s basic 
needs? 
8. Have you had to change (the ways) how you collect fuelwood – describe that - If 
there is change, how has change affected your use of fuelwood 
9. Have you changed the types of fuelwood that you collect? 
10. Has your collection changed over last 5 years? How has it changed? 
(increased/decreased)  What problems has that change caused you? how do you feel 
about this change in the collection? 
11. Any restrictions in the collection quantity of  fuelwood - What do you feel? – does it 
interfere in your collection? Any restrictions on the movement of fuelwood - how do you 
  
268 
 
feel about restrictions on movement of fuelwood - any restrictions on storage of 
fuelwood - how do you feel about restrictions on storage 
12. How do you feel about the quality/ quantity that you get from the forest? Describe 
what do you feel when you collect - Describe what do you feel when you do not get your 
desired quality? How often do you feel the above emotions?   
13. Are you collecting enough good products? Are you happy with the resources that 
you collect from the forest? 
14. What do you do in absence of wood / mahua? Do you still get to cook food? 
15. Why do men and women go out to collect mahua but only women go out to collect 
fuelwood? 
COMMERCIAL – tendupatta, bel leaves and gum 
Tendupatta 
1. Who collects– male/female/ both/ children - quantity able to bring back – 
male/female/children respectively - collection in self-organized groups- neighborly, 
women etc - Any rules that governs - How do you feel about collecting tendupatta in 
groups? -any threats while collecting tendupatta - how do you feel about the wasted 
quantity? 
2. When do you collect tendupatta (season)? Engaged in pruning, collecting and drying 
activities before?  Previous seasons? Since how many years have you been doing this? 
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3. Working for cooperative society or contractor – benefits received - how do you feel 
about not getting benefits? - Daily wage received – get promised amount or not? – how 
do you feel?  
4. Role of gram van samiti/van suraksha samiti in collection/ pruning/drying/marketing 
of tendupatta - who controls the pruning activity 
5. Relative household income from production of the tendupatta increased, remained 
stable, or declined over the previous decade? How do you feel about this change? 
previous year’s income from tendupatta collection 
6. Do you also sell tendupatta - Who do you sell it to – intra/inter market – how much 
do you get per unit? How would you feel if you are not able to sell your collection?  
7. Collection and processing of tendupatta – in detail  
8. Have you had to change (the ways) how you collect tendupatta – describe that - If 
there is change, how has change affected your use of tendupatta 
9. Has your collection changed over last 5 years? (increased/decreased) -  What 
problems has that change caused you? How do you feel?  
10. Do you collect enough to fulfill your requirements in your household? How do you 
feel about it 
11. Restrictions in the collection quantity of tendupatta – what do you feel – does it 
interfere in your collection? Any restrictions on the movement of tendupatta  
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12. Does phadmunshi or contractor give you instructions about picking/ drying of 
tendupatta – who gives these instructions – what instructions are given?  
13. How do you feel about the quality/ quantity that you get from the forest? Describe 
what do you feel when you collect - Describe what do you feel when you do not get your 
desired quality? How often do you feel the above emotions?  How to identify a good 
tendupatta leaf from a bad one 
14. Dynamics of quality/ quantity of collection- different for villagers n different for 
contractors 
Bel Leaves 
1. Uses of belpatta – how did you start this activity?  How to identify a good belpatta 
leaf from a bad one 
2. Who collects– male/female/ both/ children - quantity able to bring back – 
male/female/children respectively - collection in self-organized groups- neighborly, 
women etc - Any rules that governs - How do you feel about collecting tendupatta in 
groups? -any threats while collecting bel leaves - Did you collect bel patta earlier but 
have stopped now? Why? How do you feel about it? how do you feel about the wasted 
quantity? 
3. When do you collect bel leaves (season)? Engaged in collecting and marketing 
activities before?  Previous seasons? Since how many years have you been doing this? 
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4. Working for cooperative society or contractor – benefits received - how do you feel 
about not getting benefits? - daily wage received – get promised amount or not? – how 
do you feel?  
5. Role of gram van samiti / van suraksha samiti  in collection/marketing of belpatta - 
who controls it? 
6. Relative household income from production of the belpatta increased, remained 
stable, or declined over the previous decade? how do you feel about this change? 
previous year’s income from belpatta collection 
7. Do you also sell belpatta - Who do you sell it to – intra/inter market – how much do 
you get per unit?- where do you sell it - presence of middleman or direct market - how 
would you feel if you are not able to sell your collection? 
8. Collection and processing / marketing of belpatta – in detail  
9. Have you had to change (the ways) how you collect belpatta – describe that - If there 
is change, how has change affected your use of belpatta 
10. Has your collection changed over last 5 years? (increased/decreased) -  What 
problems has that change caused you? how do you feel?  
11. Do you collect enough to fulfill your requirements in your household? How do you 
feel about it 
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12. Restrictions in the collection quantity of belpatta – what do you feel – does it 
interfere in your collection? Any restrictions on the movement of belpatta – do you store 
belpatta – any restrictions 
13. Do you get any instructions about picking of belpatta – who gives these instructions 
– what instructions are given?  
14. How do you feel about the quality/ quantity that you get from the forest? Describe 
what do you feel when you collect - Describe what do you feel when you do not get your 
desired quality? How often do you feel the above emotions?  How to identify a good 
tendupatta leaf from a bad one 
15. Do you use these products for your home and family?  In what capacity? 
Gum 
1. Type of gum that you collect -its uses - How to identify a good gum from bad one 
(quality) 
2. Who collects– male/female/ both/ children - quantity able to bring back – 
male/female/children respectively - collection in self-organized groups- neighborly, 
women etc - Any rules that governs - How do you feel about collecting gum in groups? -
any threats while collecting gum – how do you feel about the wasted quantity? 
3. When do you collect gum (season)? How long does it lasts? Engaged in collection 
before?  Previous seasons? Since how many years have you been doing this? Did you 
collect gum earlier but have stopped now? Why? How do you feel about it? 
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4. Working for self or cooperative society or contractor – benefits received - how do 
you feel about not getting benefits? - daily wage received – get promised amount or not? 
– how do you feel?  
5. Role of gram van samiti / van suraksha samiti  in collection/ marketing of gum 
6. Relative household income from production of the gum increased, remained stable, 
or declined over the previous decade? How do you feel about this change? previous 
year’s income from gum collection 
7. Do you also sell gum - Who do you sell it to – intra/inter market – where -  how 
much do you get per unit?- how would you feel if you are not able to sell your 
collection? 
8. Collection of gum – Processing of gum– Marketing and preparation of gum 
9. Have you had to change (the ways) how you collect gum – describe that - If there is 
change, how has change affected your use of gum 
10. Has your collection changed over last 5 years? (increased/decreased) -  What 
problems has that change caused you? How do you feel?  
11. Do you collect enough to fulfill your requirements in your household? How do you 
feel about it 
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12. Restrictions in the collection quantity of gum– what do you feel – does it interfere in 
your collection? Any restrictions on the movement of gum– any restrictions on storage – 
how do you feel  
13. Do you get instructions about collection of gum– who gives these instructions – what 
instructions are given? What are these instructions 
14. How do you feel about the quality/ quantity that you get from the forest? Describe 
what do you feel when you collect - Describe what do you feel when you do not get your 
desired quality? How often do you feel the above emotions?   
15. Do you use these products for your home and family?  In what capacity? 
CULTURAL/SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDES 
1. Are you concerned about obtaining fire fuelwood wood, leaves like 
tendupatta/mahua in the near future? Why? How would you feel if that supply is 
threatened – how often do you feel this way? 
2. How do you feel if you are not able to earn your daily wages? What do you feel 
regarding your inability to meet daily needs social norms?  How often 
3. What do you feel if there is a resource shortage? If the forest is closed to you for a 
day? – how often - Any restrictions in resource collection/use due to social structures – 
how do you feel about it?  - How do you feel if you have a shortage of fuelwood and you 
request your neighbor for a loan and she refuses you? 
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4. Have you ever collected resources from the forest illegally- when – were you 
punished by forest officials – what was fine- how do you feel about it? 
5. How do you feel that you have to work so hard to collect the resources, taken care of 
your family and earn money?  -  
6. Do you use any resources from the forest (wood, leaves, mahua,etc) for any 
festivals? If yes, name them. What role does it play in the festivals? What do you do if a 
particular resource is not available? How would you feel if you are unable to meet social 
norms? 
7. Any particular specie of wood that you don’t use in your society. Why?  
8. Is there any resource (wood, leaves, etc.) that you consider sacred? Do you worship 
it? Why do you think it is sacred? 
9. Is there any other resource that you consider evil and hence don’t use it? Why do you 
think it is evil? How do you feel about it? 
10. Is there any resource that you use for medicinal purposes? Name them.  How do you 
use it? 
11. Do you use any resource during your cultural functions like marriage/death/ birth of 
a baby? What is its significance? How do you use it? If that particular resource is not 
available, then do you have any preferred alternatives? How do you feel if a particular 
resource is not available? Does it hurt your cultural sentiments? 
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12. How is the relationship between you and your mother-in-law (MIL)/ you and your 
daughter-in-law (DIL)?  Do you both go to collect the resources from the forest? Does 
your MIL or DIL scold you when you don’t go to forest to collect the resources due to 
health reasons? How do you feel In case you don’t get the desired wood (both quality 
and quantity), do you get scolded by anyone in your family- Mother-in-law or husband? 
How do you feel  
13. What does wood or NTFPs like mahua/tendupatta mean to you? What significance 
does it have for you? 
14. What does your husband do? Stay-at home/work Where does he work? Does he 
shares the profits of his work with you? How much? Does he have a share in your 
profits? How much? If he doesn’t help you- how do you feel?  
15. Does he go with you to the forest to collect the resources? If yes, How often? How 
do you feel when he accompanies you? And alternatively when he doesn’t ? 
16. Resource most important to women and why - Resource most important to men and 
why  
RELATIONAL ASPECT 
1. Has the distance you have to travel to collect the mahua and fuelwood changed over 
the past several seasons?  If so, why do you think? Do you feel frustrated when you have 
to travel farther? 
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2. Are the mahua and fuelwood available to you without any restrictions? Fuelwood 
and mahua – subsistence – break down by products 
3. How do you feel about collecting mahua / fuelwood?  
4. How would define quality – in Hindi and Nimari terms 
5. Organization of groups - are they organized by external agents? How do these groups 
work? Who are the members of these groups? Any certain name given to these groups? 
Do they organize themselves in similar or different fashion for different resource 
collection? Have they changed? What are the different changes that they have undergone 
over last several seasons? Are they organized tribe-wise? Any social tension in 
organizing the groups? 
6. Any social exchange of any resources– reciprocal exchanges  
7. Are there local, i.e., traditional or customary, nonstatutory, rules governing access to 
and management of the product? Answer yes or no.  
8. Do these rules promote equitable access to the resource? If not, which groups 
dominate resource access? Do these rules affect total production?   
9. Are state laws and traditional (local) rules conflicting, complementary, or neutral to 
each other with regard to the product in question?  
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FOREST PROTECTION COMMITTEES (VAN SURAKSHASAMITI) 
 
1. Name of FPC (if any) 
2. Year of establishment 
3. Does your organization have any members?  Yes/No 
a. If yes, how many? Are these members from this village or outsiders?  
b. If no, why no members? 
i. Then who are included as members? 
4. Explain (in your own words) what is van suraksha samiti ? 
5. How are members elected in van suraksha samiti ? 
a. Is the decision based on caste/class/age/sex/experience/other (specify)? 
6. Describe the process of selection of members 
7. Describe the history of van suraksha samiti  in this village 
8. Explain the powers of van suraksha samiti  
a. Rules and regulations of van suraksha samiti  (for governance) 
b. Details of duty and responsibility involved 
9. How many offences are recorded each year? 
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a. Details 
b. Types of offences and their statistics 
c. Details of fines and punishments 
10. What is the hierarchy of van suraksha samiti  upto state level? 
11. Is there any other branch of van suraksha samiti  in this village such as Mahila 
(Women) van suraksha samiti  etc? 
12. Describe the types of activities allowed in the forest 
a. What are the limits to their activities? 
b. What punishments or fines are offered in case of offences? 
c. Can people harvest any forest produce for  - subsistence/commercial 
d. Who can harvest the forest produce –  
i. members only (as outsiders)  
ii. members as villagers 
iii. nobody 
iv. with special permission 
13. Is there any local participation to protect the forest and its produce? Explain 
14. What powers reside with you? 
15. Enumerate anthropogenic burdens on the forest, if any. 
16. How would rate the village’s van suraksha samiti  as a forest protection program?  
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Successful/ average/ failed 
17. Salient features of van suraksha samiti  
a. van suraksha samiti  managed area (in hectares) 
per household/ per person/per cattle unit 
b. reserved forest in the vicinity of the village 
c. type of forest 
d. status of forest in terms of degradation 
e. women’s involvement in terms of forest management 
18. Since how many years have you been elected the president of van suraksha samiti ? 
How many times? 
19. After how many years the samiti members are elected? 
20. Can anybody become a member of van suraksha samiti or does it require any special 
skills/situation? 
21. Are there any reserved seats for women? How many? 
22. How many women presently hold membership of van suraksha samiti ? 
23. Relationship with the forest department before and after the JFM  
24. Benefits of van suraksha samiti  to village 
25. Rules of forest product distribution used 
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26. Your experience of forest –related conflicts 
27. Do you think that van suraksha samiti  is able to unite the village and forest 
department? 
28. How does the committee deal with the people who don’t participate? 
29. How often meetings are held? 
30. How often do you attend meetings? 
31. Do you feel that the economic benefits from the van suraksha samiti  activities are 
adequate? 
32. Nature of forest before and after the JFM activities 
33. Who should own forest land? Why? 
JFM committee, village panchayat, forest department  
34. Any powers you think should or should not be given to the van suraksha samiti ? 
Why? 
35. How many women from this village participate in van suraksha samiti  activities? 
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PANEL SURVEY 
 
Name:  
Village: 
Present harvest activities  
• Agriculture 
• NTFPs 
 
I Demographic 
 Family size 
Note: (First member being the interviewee) 
 
1. Livestock  Yes/ No 
2. Types of animals maintained Cow Buffalo Goat Hen Other 
Criteria Family Members 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Relation to the respondent          
Age          
Gender          
Education          
Occupation          
Contributes to household  
Income 
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3. Number of animals maintained Cow Buffalo Goat Hen Other 
4. Place of livestock grazing 
5. Access to agricultural land  Yes / No 
6. Agricultural land holding owned (acres) 
7. Number of times crops are grown in a year:   Single-crop/Two-crops/Three 
crops/More 
8. Crops grown 
9. Caste/Tribal group 
10. Religion 
11. Total number of workers in the household 
12. Total number of non-workers in the household 
13. Distance to road (in kms.) 
14. Distance to forest (in kms.) 
15. Household mode of transportation 
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16. Type of house 
a. Exterior  
b. Roof 
c. Interior 
17. Top 3 concerns of your household:  ________; _________; __________ 
18. How many people regularly eat in this house? ________________________ 
19. Has this number changed in the last five years? _______________________ 
20. Does anyone who is not a family member regularly eat or cook food in this house? 
____________________________________________________________  
21. Do you receive benefits as part of any government program?  Yes/ No  
22. Describe the benefits  
____________________________________________________________ 
(Name the government programs, year and details) 
II General Economics 
a. Non Timber Forest Products 
1. What do you collect? 
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NTFPs Subsistence Commercial Uses 
Tendupatta    
 
Mahua  
a. Flower 
b. Toli (fruit) 
c. Wood 
 
   
Gond (Gum) 
d. Dhavda 
 Wood 
 Gum 
e. Kullu 
 Wood 
 Gum 
   
Fuelwood    
Belpatta    
 
2. NTFPs collected without any restriction:___________________________________ 
3. NTFPs that have restricted access: _______________________________________ 
4. Month- wise collection of NTFPs in a year 
Month Non-timber forest product 
collected / Actions performed 
Amount of NTFPs 
collected 
Time Spent in 
collection 
January    
February    
March    
April    
May    
June    
July    
August    
September    
October    
November    
December    
 
5. Do you process any NTFPs that you collect?  Yes /No 
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6. If yes, then name the particular NTFP and explain how you process it  
___________________________________________________________________ 
7. How many units are produced after processing?  
____________________________________________________________________ 
8. Sale of NTFPs (previous year) 
NTFPs Amount of NTFPs 
collected 
Sold to Price received for each 
sale 
Tendupatta    
Mahua  
a. Flower 
b. Toli (fruit) 
c. Wood 
 
   
Gond (Gum) 
d. Dhavda 
 Wood 
 Gum 
e. Kullu 
 Wood 
 Gum 
   
Fuelwood    
Belpatta    
 
9. Different parts of trees used as NTFPs 
NTFPs Name the different parts of the tree that are collected 
Tendupatta  
Mahua  
Gond (Gum) 
a. Dhavda 
b. Kullu 
 
Fuelwood  
Belpatta  
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10. Different species of fuelwood collected 
Species Collect Do not 
collect 
Uses/ Benefits 
Dhavda    
Sagon    
Kullu/ Kadhai    
Sagre    
Beeje    
Sejal    
Bille (billpatti wood)    
Anjan    
Khair    
Others    
 
11. Why do you use these particular species?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
12. How often do go to collect fuelwood?  Daily/ weekly / bi-weekly / monthly / other 
___________________________________________________________________ 
13. Since how long have you been picking up the tendupatta?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
14. How many family members are involved in picking tendupatta?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
15. How many bundles are you and your family able to make in a season?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
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16. Have you been paid the entire sum that you have earned from tendupatta including 
cutting and picking? Yes/ No 
a. If no, why not?  
_____________________________________________________________ 
b. When was the last time you received the bonus?  
______________________________________________________________ 
17. Have your bundles been ever rejected by the phadmunshi?   Yes/ No 
a. How often? In last 5 years?  
______________________________________________________________ 
18. Have you ever worked as camping laborers?  Yes/ No 
a. If yes, did the contractor pay for your entire expense (accomo, food, travel)? 
  Yes/ No 
i. If no, then who paid for your expenses?  
______________________________________________________ 
ii.What difficulties did you encounter?  
______________________________________________________ 
b. How much are you paid for your tendu picking services?  
_________________________________________________________ 
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19. Do you feel you are correctly guided by the contractors and the forest officials about 
NTFPs collection? Yes/ No 
a. If no, why not?  
_________________________________________________________ 
b. Agriculture 
1. Do you cultivate for subsistence or commercial purposes? 
Subsistence/Commercial/Both  
2. Do you have irrigated land?   Yes/ No 
3. Sources of irrigation  
____________________________________________________________________ 
4. Do you work as a laborer on another’s agricultural land?  Yes/No 
a. Do you get work as an agricultural laborer throughout the year?  Yes/No 
b. If no, then list the months that you get work   
_________________________________________________________________ 
c. How much are you paid each month if you work as a laborer?  
________________________________________________________________ 
5. Do you engage any laborers to work on your agricultural land?  Yes/No 
a. If yes, do the same laborers work on your agricultural land throughout the year? 
 Yes/No 
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i. How much do you pay them?  
_______________________________________________________ 
ii. Is this pay fixed throughout the year?   Yes/No 
iii. Do these laborers belong to your village?   Yes/No 
b. If no, then who works on your agricultural land?  
__________________________________________________________ 
c. Off-farm activities  
1. For labor work, do you have to travel outside your village?  Yes / No 
2. How many times have you traveled outside to get work?  
______________________________________________________________ 
3. How do you get to know about such activities?  
______________________________________________________________ 
4. Do these activities compensate cash income of your household enough?  Yes/ No 
a. If not, why?  
___________________________________________________________ 
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III. Household Cash Income 
1. Average daily income per household:  
___________________________________________________________ 
2. Number of people with regular income in your household:  
___________________________________________________________ 
3. Sources of household income 
Contribution from Gross Annual Income 
Agriculture 
a. Kharif 
b. Rabi 
c. Livestock 
 
Off- Farm activities 
a. Remittances 
b. Development activities 
• Forest department 
• Village Panchayat 
c. Trading activities 
d. Other services (sale of products) 
 
NTFPs 
a. Tendupatta 
b. Mahua  
c. Fuelwood 
d. Belpatta 
e. Gum 
• Dhavda 
• Kullu 
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4. Average Monthly Income from NTFPs 
Months NTFPs No 
income Fuelwood Mahua Tendupatta Dhavda 
gond 
Kullu 
gond 
Belpatta 
January        
February        
March        
April        
May        
June        
July        
August        
September        
October        
November        
December        
 
5. Agricultural land size and income generated 
Land size Crop Income Off-farm income NTFPs income Total Income 
Landless / marginal  
(0 to 0.5 ha.) 
    
Small (0.5 to 2.5 ha.)     
Medium (2.5 to 5 ha.)     
Large (more than 5 ha.)     
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6. Average Monthly Income from other activities 
 
IV Fuelwood 
a. Cooking 
1. On a typical day how many times do you cook?  
_______________________________________________________________ 
2. If you cook fewer than 3 meals a day, which meal do you cook for?  
_______________________________________________________________ 
3. How many hours in a day do you spend your time in cooking?  
______________________________________________________________ 
Months Agriculture Off- farm No 
income 
Development 
by village 
Panchayat 
Development 
by FD 
Remittances Trading Other 
services 
 
January        
February        
March        
April        
May        
June        
July        
August        
September        
October        
November        
December        
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4. What type of fuel do you use generally for cooking?  
• Wood 
• Cowdung 
• LPG 
• Other alternative fuel 
5. Since how many years have you been using -  tick all that apply- 
• Wood  
• Cowdung 
• LPG 
• Kerosene Stove 
• Other alternative fuel 
6. From where do you collect the dung to prepare cowdung cakes? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
7. Can you substitute cowdung with wood and use it as a fuel for cooking, heating 
water?  Yes/ No 
• If no, why not?  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
295 
 
8. Does the quantity of wood used vary depending on the season? If yes, how much? 
Seasons Increase Decrease 
Summer   
Winter   
Monsoon   
 
9. Has the amount of wood you use to cook with has changed over time?  
• Last week 
• Last month 
• Last year 
• Last decade 
10. Does the quantity of cowdung vary with seasons?  Yes/ No 
11. How much does it vary? 
Seasons Increase Decrease 
Summer   
Winter   
Monsoon   
 
12. Have you ever used LPG for cooking purposes?  Yes/ No 
13. Name species of wood that you prefer for cooking and why  
______________________________________________________________ 
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14. Name species of wood that you do not prefer for cooking and why 
____________________________________________________________ 
15. If you use cow dung, how much time does it take for you to prepare one?  
____________________________________________________________ 
16. Does the taste of food change with wood and cowdung?   
____________________________________________________________ 
b. Heating water 
1. Do you heat water?   Yes / No 
2. For what purposes do you heat water? 
___________________________________________________________ 
3. How many times a day do you heat water?   
____________________________________________________________ 
4. Do you use wood or cowdung to heat water?  Wood/ Cowdung 
i. If yes, then how does the proportion of each vary with seasons? 
Seasons Wood Cowdung 
Summer   
Winter   
Monsoon   
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ii. How much amount of wood do you use in each season? 
Seasons Amount of wood used 
Summer  
Winter  
Monsoon  
 
c. Lighting House 
1. Do you have to light your house at night?  Yes/ No 
2. How do you light your house at night? Tick all that applies- 
• Candles 
• Kerosene Lamp 
• Electricity 
• Battery operated torch 
• Other source 
3. For how many hours do you light your house with fuels?  
___________________________________________________________ 
4. Has the type of fuel you use to heat your house changed in the last 2 years?  
____________________________________________________________ 
5. How much amount of candles/kerosene/batteries do you use in a week?  
___________________________________________________________ 
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6. Do you buy them at your local shop?   Yes/ No 
7. At what price?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
8. If no, then how much distance do you have to travel to secure them? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
d. Fuel Types 
1. What type of fuel do you prefer for daily purposes? Why?  
________________________________________________________________ 
2. If you gather wood – 
i. From where do you gather the wood? ______________________________ 
ii. Do you always gather wood from the same place or from different places 
everyday? __________________________________________________ 
iii. How often do you have to change your search locations? (weeks/months) 
__________________________________________________________ 
iv. How many kilometers do you have to travel to gather wood? 
__________________________________________________________ 
v. Who gathers the wood? _________________________________________ 
vi. Do your children accompany you? __________________________________ 
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vii. How many people from your household are involved in gathering the wood? 
_______________________________________________________ 
viii. How many days in a week do you go to collect the wood? 
________________________________________________________ 
ix. How many hours do you spend in a day to gather the wood? 
________________________________________________________ 
x. How does it change over seasons? 
Seasons Increase Decrease 
Summer   
Winter   
Monsoon   
 
xi. Do you gather different species of wood for different daily purposes like 
cooking, heating, etc.? Specify.   ________________________________ 
xii. How do you normally collect the wood? Tick all that applies- 
• Pick up the fallen wood from the ground 
• Cut branches of a dead tree 
• Cut branches of a living tree 
• Cut down a whole tree 
• Other 
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xiii. How different is the situation from your parent’s village?  
Criteria Own village Parent’s village 
Easy availability of wood   
Easy availability of 
preferred species 
  
Distance traveled    
 
xiv. Have the distances to site from where you collect the resources changed over 
last - 
• Week 
• Month 
• One year 
• More than five years 
xv. You walk more or less 5 kms. everyday to collect the fuelwood, how does 
that change 
• your life __________________________________________________ 
• daily lifestyle ______________________________________________ 
xvi. Has the quality of your preferred specie of wood changed over last 5 years? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
  
301 
 
xvii. Has the density of the preferred specie trees changed over the last 5 years? 
________________________________________________________ 
xviii. Do other people collect wood from the same site as you do?   Yes/ No 
xix. Has the number of people who collect wood from this site changed in last 5 
years? __________________________________________________  
xx. How has your collection activities changed in the last 5 years? 
_______________________________________________________ 
3. If you sell fuels:  
i. Have you ever sold cowdung?   Yes/ No 
ii. Who do you sell it to? ________________________________________ 
iii. How often do you sell cowdung? _______________________________ 
iv. How much do you sell it for? ___________________________________ 
4. Other fuels- 
i. Have you ever used coal to cook or heat water? 
• How much coal do you use in a week? 
• From where do you buy it? 
• How much does it cost? 
• Has the price of changed with time? Say in last 5 years? 
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5. Do you borrow wood in case you are not able to go into the forest? 
6. Who do you borrow the wood from? 
• Your neighbor 
• Your extended family 
• Nistaar depot 
• Other 
7. How do you generally transport fuelwood from the forest to your house? 
• Tractor 
• Bicycle 
• Bullock Cart 
• Walking 
8. Have you ever used any of the following to transport fuelwood from forest to your 
house? 
• Tractor 
• Bicycle 
• Bullock Cart 
• Walking 
9. Any particular tree species that was available earlier in the forest but not now? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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V Resource Security  
1. Collection and amount of NTFPs 
NTFPs Men Quantity 
collected 
Women Quantity 
collected 
Children Quantity 
collected 
Others Quantity 
collected 
Tendupatta         
Mahua         
Gum 
a. Dhavda  
b. Kullu 
 
        
Fuelwood         
Belpatta         
 
2. Distance traveled to collect these resources 
NTFPs Distance traveled(in kilometers) 
Tendupatta  
Mahua  
Gum 
a. Dhavda 
b. Kullu 
 
Fuelwood  
Belpatta  
 
3. Do you collect the resources in groups?   Yes/No 
4. How do you organize the groups? _____________________________________ 
5. Has there been any conflict or social tensions within the group? Yes/No 
a. If yes, please narrate the incidence. _______________________________ 
6. Are you satisfied with the quality and the quantity of the resources collected?  
Yes/ No 
7. Have you ever used a nistaar depot?  Yes/No 
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8. Do you have your own mahua trees?   Yes/No 
a. How many? _______________________________________________ 
b. Do you visit the tree site every day for picking or stay there for entire time 
period?  Visit everyday/ Stay  
c. Has there been any conflict concerning your mahua trees during collection 
season? Yes/No 
i. Narrate the incidence. 
9. Was anyone from your household an officeholder in panchayat, cooperatives, forest 
protection committees, village protection committees? Yes/No 
a. Name the position. ________________________________________ 
b. Who held this position? ____________________________________ 
c. How many times? _________________________________________ 
10. How frequently do members of your household interact with- 
• Forest guard (nakedaar) 
• Forest range officer 
• Forester 
• Other government officials 
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11. Benefits of JFM to your household 
12. Your experience of forest –related conflicts 
13. Do women from your household participate in JFM activities? 
14. How often do you attend JFM meetings? 
15. How often JFM meetings are held? 
16. How many times have you proposed / opposed resolutions in the JFM meeting? 
17. Your participation in the forest protection 
18. In case of a problem, can you easily approach the forest officials?  Yes/ No 
a. Why not? ______________________________________________ 
19. Draw a map based on your memory from your house to forest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Are you concerned about obtaining fuelwood, mahua, tendupatta in the near future? 
Yes/ No 
a. If yes, why? __________________________________________________ 
b. If no, why? ___________________________________________________ 
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21. Resources for cultural use-  
Activities Resources collected from the 
forest 
Uses/benefits 
Festivals like Diwali, 
Holi 
  
Wedding ceremony   
Death ceremony   
Birth of a baby   
 
22. Tree species considered scared and why ________________________________ 
23. Tree species considered evil and why__________________________________ 
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VILLAGE FORM 
 
1. Name of Village:  _________________________________________ 
2. Type of Village: Forest/ Revenue 
3. Total tribes: _________________________________________ 
4. Name of the tribes:_________________________________________ 
5. Population of the village:____________________________________ 
• Total number of males: ___________________________________ 
• Total number of females: _________________________________ 
• Total number of families: ________________________________ 
• Total number of households:  _____________________________ 
6. Total livestock: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Total number of people literate: 
Cow  
Goat  
Hen  
Bull  
Buffalo  
Others  
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• Total men: _________________________________________ 
• Total women: _________________________________________ 
• Total children: _________________________________________ 
8. Total number of people illiterate 
• Total men: ________________________________________ 
• Total women: ______________________________________ 
• Total children: _____________________________________ 
9. Water supply:   hand pump/well/other 
10. Electricity supply: Yes/No 
11. Primary school in village: Yes/No 
12. Middle School:  Yes/No 
13. Aanganwadi (basic health worker): Yes/No 
14. Aasha karyakarta (health worker): Yes/No (especially for pregnant women in 
village) 
15. Number of households above poverty line: _________________________________ 
16. Number of households below poverty line: _________________________________ 
17. Number of active government policies (name them): _________________________ 
18. In past 10 years, how many government policies have been implemented? Name 
them. ______________________________________________________________ 
19. How many families were benefited from these policies? 
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20. What were the benefits from each government policy? 
 
 
  
21. Occupation detail 
• Agricultural farmer: __________________________________ 
• Laborer:  agricultural/construction 
• Dependent on forest resources: _________________________ 
• Families migrating to other places for work: _______________ 
 
 
Name of government policy Benefits 
  
